Why do the poor vote for the extreme right?

Politics is psychology.

Oliver Thansan
Oliver Thansan
11 April 2023 Tuesday 22:24
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Why do the poor vote for the extreme right?

Politics is psychology. Perhaps in another time it also claimed to be pedagogy against the extremists who had turned ideologies into sinister secular religions. But today, politics is increasingly a cauldron of emotions and perceptions. And of real problems, of course. However, a lucid leader of the extinct UCD always warned: "What counts in politics is not what happens but what people think is happening." And in the case of lower-income citizens, some of their political perceptions and their social emotions are increasingly similar to those expressed by Vox voters and collected in the speeches of this party.

At the moment, the intention to vote in Spain has been responding more to corporate interests than to cultural antagonisms. In other words, the poor vote more to the left in search of social protection, while a substantial part of the middle and upper classes vote to the right, in search of less tax pressure. And in the case of Vox, this pattern is maintained, although with nuances. Among the middle classes, the ultra-right reaps in votes slightly more than the average suffrage (up to 8% of direct intention, according to the CIS, compared to 6.6% globally).

On the other hand, and unlike, for example, what happens in France, the ultra vote plummets among the working class in Spain as a whole (and falls to 3.4%). But beware, among those who consider themselves poor or lower class, support for Vox is on the rise again and stands somewhat above the average (around 7%). And in this segment the advantage of the PSOE over the Popular Party is also shortened.

At the moment, however, the electoral indicators do not reflect an ultra rise among the most disadvantaged sectors. And neither is it a relevant influence on his position on gender issues, a true workhorse of the radical right. However, in the perception of certain very close realities, a greater proximity between the lowest incomes and the Vox electorate, made up mainly of wealthy sectors, is reflected. In other words, beyond the concern for public health or education services, problems of coexistence and security also acquire very significant relevance among the lowest income groups.

To begin with, perceptions of immigration are sharpening among the most disadvantaged sectors. While the real number of foreigners in Catalonia (according to Idescat data) amounts to 21% and the general population (CEO data) raises it to 36%, lower-income citizens take it to more than 41% (and even almost 45% young people between 16 and 34 years old with income below 1,000 euros). And that rate is closer to that expressed by Vox voters (47%) than center-left voters (always below 35%).

Along with this oversized perception of immigration, the lower incomes reflect greater anguish about citizen insecurity in Catalonia. Compared to 72% of all those consulted who consider their closest environment safe or very safe, this rate falls to 54% among the lowest incomes (18 points less). And in parallel, 46% of the poorest citizens confess a feeling of insecurity in their environment, compared to 27% of the group.

In this sense, the concern rates of the lowest incomes are very similar to those expressed by Vox voters: 57% of the ultras voters (just three points more than the very poor) feel safe in their environment and a 43% (three points less) confess to feeling a lot or a lot of insecurity.

Finally, when some of the factors of insecurity are specified, such as drug trafficking or home occupation, the percentages speak for themselves. For example, 49% of those consulted perceive episodes of drug trafficking as frequent or very frequent in their environment, and 51%, squatting. However, among the lowest income groups, concern about drug trafficking rose to 64% (15 points above the average) and concern about house occupations to 69% (almost 20 points more than the average).

But what is politically significant is the similarity of these percentages with the rates registered by right-wing and far-right voters: around 60% of concern in the case of drug trafficking and around 70% in relation to housing occupation. And one last point that played in France in favor of Marine Le Pen: in the face of sexual violence, 19% of the population advocates harsher penalties, while that rate rises to 25% among lower-class citizens.

The breeding ground is there, at the service of any manipulator of the dissatisfaction and anger of losers and disinherited.