Russia has always had an obsession with being a maritime power: guaranteeing access to warm waters, that is, to the great oceans. For this reason, dominance of the Baltic to access the Atlantic and the Black Sea to access the Mediterranean have historically been essential. And to reach the Pacific, the conquest of Siberia, up to Vladivostok, in the Sea of Japan.
After Russia's terrible miscalculation in invading Ukraine, Putin has to try to rebuild a geopolitical position that has been greatly weakened in this regard. Indeed, he has seen how the Atlantic link – exemplified in the revitalization of NATO and the incorporation of Sweden and Finland into the Alliance – has been strengthened.
This has meant that the Baltic, a Soviet sea during the cold war, has become a NATO sea, which boxes the Russian fleet, in such a way that it can only respond by dangerously increasing the rearmament of its Kaliningrad enclave.
Also his attempt to return to control, together with Turkey, the Black Sea, has been a fiasco. The fleet in the Black Sea has shown its shortcomings, including the sinking of its flagship, the Moskva, or the withdrawal from the strategic island of Serpents, while Turkey continues to prevent the passage of warships through the Bosphorus, closing access to the Mediterranean.
The Russian third fleet, based in Vladivostok, depends on free passage through the Bering Strait and, therefore, on the United States (Alaska), as well as a continued presence in the disputed Kuril Islands, partially claimed by Japan. , and that allow free access to the Pacific.
And the fourth is located in the Arctic, based on the Kola Peninsula. Historically it has been less important, given the frozen situation of its waters during practically the whole year.
But global warming is drastically changing that reality, and the melting allows an almost permanent naval route, connecting the Atlantic with the Pacific, to the north, without having to go through the Mediterranean, the Red Sea and the Strait of Malacca.
Not only that. Melting ice allows enormous possibilities for exploiting energy resources and minerals and rare earths, essential for production processes based on digital technologies.
But the most worrying thing is that it is promoting an accelerated militarization of the area, previously unthinkable. And with which Russia intends to compensate for its setbacks in other seas, showing naval power and geopolitical ambition.
Obviously, such a move cannot ignore the fact that seven of the eight countries of the Arctic Council are or will be members of the Atlantic Alliance, which increases the perception of encirclement in an area that Russia has always considered its own. We are already witnessing strong tensions with Norway, and the relevance of Greenland has increased (very rich
in rare earths).
The Arctic is thus becoming a substantial part of the new geopolitical order. Consequently, China does not want to be on the sidelines. And the fastest way is to reach agreements with Russia to develop the Polar Silk Road, providing technology and financing that Russia does not have, in exchange for helping Russia to consolidate its military and strategic position in the ocean. The cost is to make Russia more and more of a subordinate country, and for China to establish a strategic position in a region of which it is not geographically a part.
But for Russia, it is a question of survival as a great power. Progressively curtailed their aspirations to access the warm waters (a permanent obsession since the time of the tsars), through the Baltic or the Black, the new Arctic route increasingly becomes their only alternative.
Unfortunately, the Arctic will no longer be able to be a global public good, but rather a new scenario of confrontation, like space and cyberspace. We only have Antarctica left. For how long?
