The second most popular party in the country. His success polarizes national politics, and he seems poised to triumph in the elections to be held next year in several eastern states of the country. In Poland, the ruling Law and Justice party leads the polls ahead of the October 15 general election and is being dragged further to the right by a new extremist party, Confederation.
And worse news may come. Next year, the far right could increase its influence following the European Parliament elections scheduled for June. Marine Le Pen, president of the National Rally, could win the presidential elections in France in 2027. If she succeeds, France would become the second major country governed by the hard right, after Italy, where Giorgia Meloni and her Brothers of Italy arrived last year to power in alliance with the nativist League.
In any case, let us not be fooled, Europe is not about to be dominated by fascists, in a repetition of the 1930s of the last century. All in all, the new right-wing wave represents a great challenge. If mismanaged, it could poison politics, disenfranchise a large portion of voters and prevent crucial reforms of the European Union.
Rather than trying to exclude far-right parties from government and public debate entirely, the best response is for mainstream parties to engage with them and sometimes reach agreements with them. If they have to take responsibility for governing, they may become less radical.
The European hard right has experienced several rises in the last quarter of a century. In 2000, Jörg Haider, an anti-establishment demagogue, shocked the entire continent when he entered the government of Austria: his Freedom Party is today the most popular in that country. The 2015 migration crisis, when more than a million people arrived in the European Union from poor, war-torn countries, sparked another wave of support for xenophobic and Eurosceptic parties, including British Brexiteers.
The new wave that is breaking right now is different in three aspects. First, the far right has opportunistically found new issues around which to accumulate fury. For the most part, these parties continue to be opposed to foreigners; But, given the British experience, some have moderated their hostility to community membership, and even fewer want to abandon the single currency. Everyone is animated by new concerns; and, among them, the hostility to climate policies stands out, which they consider elitist measures that harm ordinary citizens. In Germany, the AfdD has managed to mobilize opposition against a government initiative that forced citizens to install expensive heat pumps in their homes and has managed to soften the measure.
The second change is the breadth of support. According to our calculations, in 15 of the 27 member countries of the European Union there are currently extreme right-wing parties with a minimum support of 20% in opinion polls; among them, all the large countries except Spain, where Vox obtained poor results in the July elections. Almost four fifths of the population of the European Union today live in countries where the hard right has the loyalty of at least a fifth of the citizens.
The latest change is that the stakes have increased; above all, at European level. The war in Ukraine has created a pressing need for the Union to welcome new members in the east and, ultimately, Ukraine as well. At the same time, decision-making will have to be rationalized to reduce the veto power of Member States. The presence of a broader bloc of anti-immigration nationalists will make that crucial task very difficult. The Hungarian Viktor Orbán, guru of other populist nationalists, has systematically tried to block the reform of the European Union. Let's imagine that he gets more allies.
How should voters and centrist parties respond to the threat from the far right? The old answer was to erect a cordon sanitaire. The centrist parties refused to work with the insurgents; The centrist media refused to air their opinions. That approach may be outdated; In some places, it is becoming counterproductive. In Germany, the isolation of the AfD has reinforced the narrative that it is the only alternative to a failed system. The majority parties cannot pretend forever that they do not listen to the voice of 20% of voters without this ending up eroding democracy itself.
On the other hand, there is more evidence that European far-right parties tend to moderate their opinions when faced with the responsibility of governing. An example is Meloni, the first hard-right head of government of a Western European country since the Second World War. Despite her liberal fears, she has not picked fights with Europe, she has not disrupted immigration policy, she has not restricted abortion or gay rights. She has continued to be a supporter of NATO and Ukraine, something that is by no means taken for granted among the far right. In the Nordic countries, we have seen a similar pattern. The Finns Party and the Sweden Democrats, two populist parties, have become more pragmatic after joining or agreeing to support a governing coalition.
Any decision made about including a far-right party in a local or national government must be made with extreme caution; especially in places where the history of fascism arouses acute sensitivity. Certain rules of conduct can be helpful. One of them is that, to be taken into account, any party must accept the renunciation of violence and respect the rule of law. Equally important is the constitutional context. At what level of government should they be included? What are the checks and balances created by the electoral system and other institutions? In Germany, for example, it may make sense to allow the AfD to participate as a junior partner in local government coalitions. On the other hand, it would be a disaster if the extreme right obtained the presidency of France, with its enormous powers.
Finally, mainstream parties must accept that they have not done enough to satisfy a large and angry minority of citizens. The attempt to accelerate the green transition by burdening people with costs they cannot afford (such as German boiler rules or Emmanuel Macron's ill-fated attempt to increase fuel taxes) only increases the unpopularity of environmentalism. It is essential to improve communication and compensate those most affected. Failure to control national borders alienates citizens, while a well-managed immigration system would prove to benefit them. The new success of the far right in Europe is, in part, a failure of the center.
