If grievance is born from mere intention, as the moralist writers of the Golden Age maintained, the investiture 'in fieri' seems to be the prelude to a territorial war that could end up setting fire to the institutional chancelleries of autonomous Spain, deteriorating – even more – coexistence and aggravating the political crisis. The protests against the political concessions of the PSOE and Sumar in favor of independence – amnesty for Junts; forgiveness of a part of the Catalan debt for ERC – camouflage, given their ostentation, the great underlying battle that is going to be fought if the legislature prospers and there is no electoral repetition.
The devilish Spanish autonomous system, which socialists have always wanted to transform into a federal regime, contains an immense paradox: its defenders – be they traditional or converts; This is indifferent – they vehemently preach its benefits, but the economic data indicate that it suffers not only from operational deficiencies – in terms of economy of scale and efficiency – but also from an (apparent) situation of technical bankruptcy.
The regional debt, especially in the case of Catalonia, Valencia and Andalusia, is clearly insurmountable. At the same time, the autonomies have a chronic financing deficit whose resolution is like a sudoku. Especially taking into account that the state debt exceeds 113% of GDP and in Europe the return to the budget stability pact is invoked.
Evil, without being identical in all places, seems ecumenical and worsens when, at the same time as negotiating one's own, one is attentive to the gain of others. The Government (in office) has contributed to worsening the situation. First, due to its evident disinterest during the last legislature to reform a financing system that expired more than a decade ago. And, secondly, for introducing this issue into an inflamed political context. Linking regional money with the negotiation of the investiture is bad business. A problem for everyone – or for many – cannot be discussed according to a template unilaterally agreed upon with minority parties that only seek their particular benefit.
The play is catastrophic. The first consequence it has had is the war – Siamese – between Junts and ERC. If the latter have agreed with the PSOE to forgive 20% of the Generalitat's debts, the former convergents demand an absolute reduction, while insisting on a (supposed) historical debt of 450,000 million euros. The agreement between the socialists and Sumar, a ritual with which Sánchez intended to get his new majority back on track, only cited Catalonia and Valencia as poorly financed regions. Of the rest, 'niente'
A mention always implies omissions. And Andalusia, governed by the right for five years, soon felt aggrieved, remaining faithful to the wisdom of the saying: “There is no greater contempt than not showing appreciation.” The starting point, regardless of what happens with the investiture, is disastrous, since the Government – if it continues to be so – faces an autonomous front that is already hostile from the start, although it is also in need.
The reasons for anger are both objective and subjective. Within the latter, the current political sign of autonomous Spain, governed (except Catalonia, Euskadi, Navarra, Asturias and Castilla-La Mancha) by alliances between the two rights, which will not hesitate to use these institutional atriums to make opposition to Moncloa.
Among the former, in addition to the numbers corresponding to each region, the staging has an impact: a multilateral negotiation, whose melody depends on the tuning of a choir, cannot be established on bilateral criteria without there being a conflict. Next is the very substance of the matter: the how much and the how. Finally, the inevitable comparisons.
The Government is trapped in a labyrinth that it itself has helped to build. The 20% reduction promised to ERC is not extendable to Andalusia because mutualizing a different debt results in asymmetrical treatment, while rewarding governments that, instead of submitting to budgetary discipline, fail to comply, and not precisely with the excuse of social care.
In the South of Spain this inequality of origin is considered an offense. It is a feeling that will not be diluted even if the Treasury opts for an a la carte criterion for each territory based on the “negative impact of the economic cycle”, an excessively open and arbitrary formula to contribute to institutional peace. The game board is contaminated by the terms of the open negotiation with the independentists and the impact that the rise in banking interests has on each autonomy. The more debt, the higher financial costs.
After the PSOE-ERC agreement, Andalusia has done its own accounting. The Board demands 30,000 million in extraordinary funds from the State: 17,800 million as an amount equivalent to the forgiveness of the Catalan debt (a figure calculated based on the population), and another 15,000 for the accumulated underfinancing. The figure is below Andalusia's debt –38,018 million– but exceeds the 25,409 that the Board owes to the State, which would allow the credits that San Telmo has with the banks to be reduced (12,000 million).
The right has not cut the debt inherited from the PSOE, but its situation in the financial markets is not as negative as that of other self-governments. Andalusia has almost six points less debt in relation to its GDP than Catalonia with a larger population and a more deteriorated social and economic situation. The percentage that the southern debt represents in relation to that of the State is 15 points lower than the indebtedness of Catalonia.
The Quirinale of San Telmo has objective elements, apart from the subjective ones and the interested parties, to demand financial treatment analogous to the Catalan exception. The other autonomies will come behind him. The question is whether the Government is willing to take on these chain demands without feeling forced by the vote of the southern deputies. Andalusia is going to be the testing ground – and also mines – for regional (a)symmetry.
