At the moment, the confusion about the Amnesty law and about the future of the legislature is maximum. The situation has become more complicated than could be imagined. Given the unacceptable behavior of some judges, motivated purely by political strategy, Junts demands guarantees and security in the application of the amnesty that the central government cannot provide. With the law you can get to a certain point, but it is impossible to shield it completely from the increasingly outlandish occurrences of judges stubborn to sabotage its future application.
In the midst of this controversy, I would like to take advantage of the prevailing confusion to introduce an additional dimension about the amnesty that has hardly been debated. The origin of my reflection is found in a message on social networks that José Luis Ábalos posted a few days ago regarding the revelations published by La Vanguardia and ElDiario.es about the foul play of the government of Mariano Rajoy against the Catalan independence. The message closed with these words: "In the end, those who will need the amnesty will be Fernández Díaz and Rajoy. We'll see!" I understand that it was an irony, a humorous one. However, I think there are good reasons to take the idea seriously.
Let's look at it a little calmly. The Government of Spain is in a complicated situation, not only because of the opposition of the political and judicial right, but because its president, before the elections, categorically ruled out that an amnesty was possible. For this very reason, he has been forced to justify the turn he has made. The justifications range from "making a virtue out of necessity" to improving coexistence in Catalonia. Perhaps this last argument is the most used: thanks to the amnesty, a new period of political harmony will open. In my opinion, this line of argument, although very useful, is not entirely convincing, for several reasons.
Firstly, the political tension within Catalonia and between Catalonia and the rest of Spain had already eased considerably following the granting of pardons and the change towards a more pragmatic attitude of the Generalitat. From this point of view, it could be argued that, with the possibility of a PP-Vox government removed for a while, it was no longer necessary to continue moving forward with the clemency measures.
Secondly, it is problematic to talk about harmony if in the future the amnestied return to the unilateral strategy of breaking with the State. It must be remembered, for example, that in the amnesty of 1977 the prisons were emptied of ETA members, which did not prevent the ETAs from not only continuing their terrorist activity, but even intensified it significantly after the approval of the Constitution in December 1978.
Concord as the main reason for the amnesty, therefore, could turn against the Spanish Government if the territorial conflict worsens again (which cannot be completely ruled out).
In reality, even if the Sánchez Government doesn't want or can't admit it openly, the first reason for the amnesty is the realization that Spanish democracy failed to solve the Catalan problem. By this I mean that the actors involved did not live up to what should be expected in a solid and deep democracy. Rajoy's government refused to explore a negotiated exit and implemented covert operations to weaken the pro-independence movement.
For its part, independence embarked on a divisive and unilateral path, without the support of a majority of the Catalan population in this undertaking. In addition, the courts started a kind of general cause against independence, twisting the law with implausible accusations and taking preventive measures that seriously interfered with the electoral process.
Given this accumulation of errors, there is no other choice but to conclude that it was a collective failure and that the best thing to do in the current circumstances is to try to turn the page and start a new stage. This, it seems to me, is the clearest and most powerful justification for amnesty.
For this way of understanding the amnesty to be fully consistent, I think that it must include, as far as the Central State is concerned, not only the policemen denounced for the charges on October 1, but also the politicians and State officials who participated in the dirty war operations against independence. Operation Catalonia and its derivatives should be included in overcoming the conflict. Espionage and defamation compete in gravity with the constitutional disloyalty of pro-independence leaders.
The Spanish right would probably understand this extensive interpretation of the amnesty as a provocation. Until now, the protagonists of the Rajoy Government's dirty game have felt unpunished, as they counted on the negligence of the courts, which have chosen to wrap up the troche, as it is popularly said, instead of bringing light and justice. This double standard, however, cannot be maintained indefinitely and at some point a judge will end up taking charge of the matter.
The main advantage of exploring this route is that the Executive could present the amnesty as a generous and fair exercise of oblivion that applies to all parties and not as the result of "blackmail" of Catalan nationalism. There is no better proof of broad-mindedness than amnestying all those who acted unworthy of democratic principles.
