Valdis Dombrovskis: “We must prevent certain technologies from ending up in the wrong hands”

The analysis behind the economic security strategy adopted this Wednesday by the European Commission describes a more dangerous world, dominated by extreme geopolitical tensions and stalked by new risks, a critical scenario in the face of which the Twenty-seven should lose their naivety and protect themselves from China and other actors.

Oliver Thansan
Oliver Thansan
24 January 2024 Wednesday 10:24
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Valdis Dombrovskis: “We must prevent certain technologies from ending up in the wrong hands”

The analysis behind the economic security strategy adopted this Wednesday by the European Commission describes a more dangerous world, dominated by extreme geopolitical tensions and stalked by new risks, a critical scenario in the face of which the Twenty-seven should lose their naivety and protect themselves from China and other actors.

“We see that there is a general awareness that we operate in a more conflictive geopolitical situation,” celebrates the vice president of the Community Executive, Valdis Dombrovskis. Although the initial reaction of the governments has been “cautious”, at the same time “they are aware that we will do better together,” says the Latvian politician in an interview with La Vanguardia and other European media.

What concerns have governments conveyed to you?

National security is a national competence and they do not want to see it invaded by the EU. Others are concerned about the idea of ​​monitoring European investments abroad, or the scope of the economic security agenda, so that it does not become a pretext for protectionism. Our proposal attempts to respond to these concerns. It is clear that we do not want to open an institutional battle or a fight over competencies. We have also made it clear that the strategy must be fact-based and proportional so that it does not lead to a protectionist policy that goes against the interests of the EU, which benefits so much from being an open economy. Regarding the control of outgoing investments, we will have to talk again. Now we just ask you to start monitoring them to better understand the trends, and thus see what risks there may be.

The Spanish Government responded to the increase in Saudi capital in Telefónica by announcing the purchase of 10% of its shares, an operation that earned it accusations of interventionism and protectionism. Measures to mitigate the risks of certain investments are a national responsibility, but do you think we will see more responses like this in the future?

I cannot comment on specific cases in public, but, in general, questions about economic security have become more present on the European and national agenda. In the current geopolitical context it is no surprise that the EU and states are paying more attention to these issues. The strategy adopted today shows that we are going to be even more active.

They propose unifying export control measures for certain technologies, as for example the Dutch Government decided to do last year with China and some advanced microchip printer equipment. Is the objective for decisions like that to become European?

With the current legal framework, these measures could already be adopted at European level, but it does not work well because other countries only get involved when the decision has been made. In the medium term, we propose to create a coordination mechanism in the early phase of decision-making. If other countries get involved from the beginning, they will be more willing to implement the measures. In the short term, what we can already do is include on the European list export control decisions that have been blocked internationally by Russia, but on which the Twenty-Seven agree.

Where does the idea of ​​monitoring outbound investments come from?

Very easy. If we apply control measures to the export of certain technologies to prevent them from ending up in the wrong hands, the same can happen when European companies invest abroad and transfer knowledge and intellectual property to third countries. They are two sides of the same coin, they have the same objective: to prevent certain sensitive technologies from ending up in the wrong hands and being used to undermine European security or its values. But we have no data or evidence of this because no one is monitoring it. That is why we first want to understand what is happening and then, based on the data, decide possible steps.