The image of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un shaking hands with Vladimir Putin on September 13 (after having traveled by train to a cosmodrome located in the far east of Russia to discuss the sale of Korean weapons with the dictator of that country) was remarkable. in itself and for what it revealed about the arms business. The world's five largest arms sellers (the United States, Russia, France, China and Germany) are responsible for more than three-quarters of exports. However, new manufacturers are beginning to tighten the circle of that old guard. They are making the most of the opportunities created by geopolitical changes, and benefiting from the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Kim's trip to Russia follows a visit to Pyongyang in July by Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, who wanted to explore the possibility of North Korea providing war materiel to shore up his country's faltering war effort. North Korea is eager to find buyers for its military equipment. On the other hand, few regimes are willing to sell weapons to Russia. So far, deterrence has seen China provide little more than dual-use chips (although it could funnel more lethal material through North Korea). Only Iran has pleased Russia and sold it some 2,400 Shahed kamikaze drones.
North Korea has the capacity to provide a broader range of material. In addition to drones and missiles such as the KN-23, which is almost a replica of the Russian Iskander ballistic missile, it could offer self-propelled howitzers and multiple rocket launcher systems. According to US intelligence sources, North Korea has been supplying Russia with 152 mm howitzers and Katiusha-type rockets for most of the year. Russia buys from Pyongyang and Tehran because both regimes are already subject to such strong international sanctions that they have nothing to lose and everything to gain by doing business with Putin's government. They are not so much an “axis of evil” as a market for outcasts.
And if the North Korean arms industry is receiving a big boost thanks to the war in Ukraine, things are going even better for its southern enemy. South Korean arms exporters were already making money before the conflict. In the five years to 2022, the country rose to ninth place in the ranking of arms sellers compiled by the Stockholm International Peace Studies Institute (Sipri) (see chart); and the South Korean government aims to make the country the fourth largest arms exporter in the world by 2027. Last year it sold weapons worth $17 billion, more than double what it did in 2021. Some $14.5 billion corresponded to sales to Poland.
The volume and scope of the agreements reached by South Korea with Poland, a country that considers itself on the front line of Europe's defense against a revanchist Russia, is astonishing. Those deals include 1,000 K2 Black Panther tanks, 180 of which will be delivered quickly from the army's own stocks and 820 of which will be manufactured under license in Poland. Such a number of tanks exceeds the number of those operating in the armies of Germany, France, Great Britain and Italy combined. The package also includes 672 K9 Thunder self-propelled howitzers, 288 K239 Chunmoo multiple rocket launchers and 48 FA-50 Golden Eagle fourth-generation fighters.
South Korea's success in the arms business is due to it offering competitive costs, high-quality weapons and fast delivery, says Tom Waldwyn of the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies. Prices reflect Korean production efficiency. The quality comes from Korean experience with the best American weaponry and its own high-tech civilian sector. The speed of delivery is possible because the Koreans, who face a major threat from across their northern border, have hot production lines capable of speeding up deliveries.
According to Siemon Wezeman, a researcher in the Sipri arms transfer program, unconditional government support and attractive credit agreements are also fundamental to South Korea's success. Asian customers like that the country maintains close ties with the United States but without being the United States, often seen as an unreliable ally. That could also make it easier for South Korea to close a $45 billion deal to renew Canada's aging submarine fleet. Among the future questions is how far South Korea will go in transferring technology to its customers, a crucial issue for Poland, which sees itself as an export partner of South Korea, competing with Germany and France in the European market. .
If South Korea undisputedly leads the ranking of new arms exporters, second place goes to Turkey. Since coming to power in 2002, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) has invested large amounts of money in its defense sector. The objective of achieving almost autarky in weapons production has become more pressing in recent years following the imposition of US and European sanctions (the first, imposed in 2019 after Turkey, a NATO member, purchased ground-based missiles). Russian air S-400).
According to Sipri, Turkey's arms exports increased between 2018 and 2022 by 69% compared to the previous five years, and its share of the global arms market doubled. According to a report published in July by a local industry body, the value of aerospace and defense exports increased by 38% in 2022, compared to the previous year, and reached $4.4 billion. The goal for this year is to reach 6 billion dollars. Pakistan is currently receiving modernized submarines from Türkiye. And the last of the four corvettes sold by Turkey to the Pakistani navy was launched last month. More sales to other countries are likely because Turkish vessels are competitively priced and because the country has little qualms about who it sells to.
Turkey signed a $3 billion deal with Saudi Arabia on July 18 for the supply of the Akıncı unmanned combat aerial vehicle. The manufacturer is Baykar, which also produces the Bayraktar TB2, a drone used in combat by Libya, Azerbaijan, Ethiopia and Ukraine. The TB2 was developed to combat Kurdish militants after the United States refused to sell Turkey its Predator drone. More than 20 countries have lined up to buy it because it is cheaper and easier to obtain than the American alternative, and because it is more reliable than the Chinese combat drones that until then had dominated the non-Western market.
The Akıncı is more powerful. It can carry many large weapons, including air-to-air missiles and the SOM-A, a stealth cruise missile with a range of 250 kilometers. It will find buyers among some Gulf countries, such as Qatar, Oman and the United Arab Emirates, that are eager to protect themselves from a deterioration in relations with the United States and reduce dependence on its weapons. These countries aim to build their own defense industries and see Turkey as a willing partner and an example to follow.
Türkiye's ambitions are reflected in everything it has underway. Its new flagship, Anadolu, is a 25,000-tonne amphibious assault ship and light aircraft carrier capable of carrying Bayraktar drones. At least one Gulf country is said to be in talks to purchase a similar vessel. Turkey's fifth-generation fighter jet, the KAAN, in which Pakistan and Azerbaijan collaborate, should fly before the end of the year. Developed with the help of British companies BAE Systems and Rolls-Royce, the KAAN could be seen as a response to Turkey's expulsion from the F-35 partner program (as punishment for the purchase of the S-400). Turkey will market the plane to anyone to whom the United States does not sell F-35s, or who refuses to accept that country's conditions. Once again, the Gulf countries could be the first buyers.
South Korea and Türkiye have benefited from the plight of their main competitors. Between 2018 and 2022, Russian arms exports were 31% lower than the previous four-year period, according to Sipri. The country faces further declines due to the strain that its war of aggression is placing on the defense sectors, geopolitical isolation and the efforts of two major clients (India and China) to reduce dependence on Russian weapons.
India, which had been Russia's largest customer, reduced its purchases of Russian weapons by 37% in the period 2018-2022. And he probably now wishes he had gone further: Russia's largely state-controlled arms industry now has to put the needs of its own military before commitments to customers. Many of India's 272 Su-30MKIS, the backbone of its air force, are out of service because Russia cannot supply spare parts. Some Russian weapons have performed poorly in Ukraine compared to NATO equipment. And the sanctions imposed are limiting trade in products such as microprocessors, ball bearings, machine tools and optical systems, hampering Russia's ability to sell fighter jets, attack helicopters and other lethal devices. The longer the war in Ukraine continues, the more it will cost Russia to regain its position on the global arms market.
As for China, more than half of its arms exports in the period 2018-2022 went to a single country, Pakistan, which it considers an ally against India. According to Sipri, China covers almost 80% of Pakistan's main arms needs; among them, fighter planes, missiles, frigates and submarines. Beijing is not interested in its clients' human rights record, or how they plan to use what it sends, or whether they are subject to Western sanctions.
Now, the Chinese arms sector also has its problems. One of them, according to Waldwyn, is that, although China set out to dominate the military drone market a decade ago, customers grew tired of poor product quality and even worse support, and that opened a door to Turkey. The second is that, with the exception of a possible submarine deal with Thailand and an arms package for Myanmar, other Southeast Asian countries are tired of Chinese bullying and “don't even want to touch them,” Wezeman says.
At least China doesn't have to worry about Indian competition. Despite many efforts, India's growth as an arms exporting country has been glacial. Narendra Modi's government has drawn up a very extensive list of weapons parts that must be manufactured locally; He expects domestically-made light tanks and artillery to enter service by the end of the decade. However, India has for too long relied on technology transfer from Russia under production licensing deals for planes, tanks and warships that have not panned out. The investment is wasted by channeling it through state agencies. Bureaucracy stifles initiative.
Projects like the Tejas light combat aircraft have taken decades to produce and remain plagued with problems. The Dhruv light helicopter, launched in 2002, has crashed dozens of times. After decades of development, the Arjun Mk-2 tank turned out to be too heavy for deployment on the border with Pakistan. The Indian armed forces themselves often reject locally manufactured material: “If they don't want it, exporting it is impossible,” says Wezeman. South Korea and Turkey show how countries can create lucrative arms deals that serve to shore up national security. India, for all its bombast, is a lesson in how not to do it.
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Translation: Juan Gabriel López Guix
