The forced passage of the Dnieper

The Ukrainian Government finds itself in the double need to convince its allies that it is making progress in a counteroffensive that is no longer known whether it is or not, and at the same time warn that the winter will be harsh and the Russian forces will be dedicated to bomb all types of energy-related targets, so Kyiv needs, again and as always, to reinforce its anti-aircraft defense.

Oliver Thansan
Oliver Thansan
18 November 2023 Saturday 03:22
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The forced passage of the Dnieper

The Ukrainian Government finds itself in the double need to convince its allies that it is making progress in a counteroffensive that is no longer known whether it is or not, and at the same time warn that the winter will be harsh and the Russian forces will be dedicated to bomb all types of energy-related targets, so Kyiv needs, again and as always, to reinforce its anti-aircraft defense. For this double reason, Kyiv strives to send positive messages that show the efficiency of its armed forces, precisely at a time when it sees the discouragement of its allies growing at the prospect of a war much longer than expected and that does not promise changes. for the next few months.

After a few weeks of barely heeded rumors and discretion on the part of official propaganda, last Friday the Ukrainians finally announced their first significant military action since June: they have crossed the Dnieper River and established several bridgeheads on the bank. left, face to face with the Russian defenses. Perhaps chastened by the frustration left by the summer counteroffensive, they waited an entire month to say so.

The first landing on the left or south bank of the great river took place – and has been recognized as such by Russian sources – on October 17. It was in Krinkí, a small town about 35 kilometers east of the city of Kherson and downstream from the destroyed Nová Kakhovka dam. A few days later, the Ukrainian marines made up to four attempts further west, in the Poima sector, being repelled by Russian artillery and aviation.

Now the general command of the Ukrainian forces affirms that it has “several” bridgeheads, an aspect that seems to be confirmed by Russian military bloggers who refer to combats in several sectors. The Russian governor of Kherson, Vladimir Saldo, has also confirmed the Ukrainian presence at least in Krinkí, where the infantrymen try to transport material and equipment over pontoons, favored whenever possible by the fog and bad weather but sometimes rejected by the Russian artillery.

The Ukrainian military statement on Friday was triumphalist. In this month of operations in the Dnieper they would have caused some 3,500 casualties to the Russians, including dead and wounded, and destroyed a large number of tanks and armored vehicles. On November 8, the Ukrainians were able to transfer armored vehicles, on the 13th they would have advanced west along the bank and on Friday they would have stopped. Their positions, they say, were consolidated.

Since last February, the marines, aboard inflatable boats, have made raids along the Dnieper and its marshes. The current raid is also not a large-scale operation, as shown by the fact that the Russians have not seen the need to move reinforcements.

The official version says the aim is to move Russian forces away from the shore to protect Jerson civilians, who are suffering from their attacks. It must be recalled that in November of 2022 General Surovikin, then in command of Russian operations in Ukraine – and today fallen into disgrace – ordered the evacuation of that region north of the Dnieper to withdraw to the southern bank. The capital, Jerson, however, has remained within range of the Russian artillery. Days ago, another retaliator, Ígor Guirkin, alias Strelkov, former Donetsk military chief has written from prison that it was a mistake to withdraw from Jerson.

Another objective of the landing, according to the military statement, consists of reconnaissance actions to identify Russian supply routes. However, during his visit to Washington last Monday, the head of the Ukrainian presidential office, Andryi Yermak, took a long shot, stating at a conference that “the Ukrainian Armed Forces have conquered a bridgehead on the left bank of the Dnieper river. Step by step, we are demilitarizing Crimea. We have covered 70% of the distance. And our counteroffensive continues.”

While it is true that Kyiv continues to harass Crimea using drones, and that the Kherson region constitutes one of the passes to the peninsula, the distance is enormous. But the need to convey some progress is imperative, especially after the frankness with which General Zaluzhni recently spoke about the stagnation of the war, to the further discomfort of President Zelensky, and the need for ammunition and – above all – technology. The southern front remains stationary and in the east a long and tough battle is taking place for the enclave of Avdíyivka, in Donetsk, apparently at a very high cost for the Russian attacker, reminiscent of the situation in Bakhmut. Thus, the Dnieper crossing – regardless of whether it is capable of prospering or, failing that, diverting Russian forces from other fronts – appears as a symbol.