The United States and its Western allies emerged victorious from the Cold War, fought above all in the territories of the global south, and were then believed to be in control of the liberal international order model. The various campaigns to export the liberal democratic model around the world (especially in Iraq and Afghanistan) have been counterproductive and have unleashed a series of secondary effects (including global terrorism). Likewise, attempts to leverage the US-based Bretton Woods institutions to drive modernization and market creation around the world are now encountering some resistance from the global south, which is seeking alternative economic partnerships, as stated manifested the appearance of the Brics group of countries. The 2024 presidential and legislative elections in the United States will be crucial for shaping the world in the future, and it is worth considering how the Democratic Party and the Republican Party will position themselves in relation to the global south after the elections.
When it comes to its relationship with the global south, the United States has operated on the basis of political realism, which views international relations as an area in which power politics are central, if not all-encompassing. A central tenet of realism is that the primary agents of the international system, nation states, are primarily rational, self-interested agents operating through systems of alliances. The Cold War gave rise to a geopolitical confrontation between the Western bloc, led by the United States and the Western European countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the former USSR and the Eastern bloc countries, which were part of the Warsaw pact. These blocks were considered in practice as a bipolar system for maintaining a balance of power. The collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s heralded the prospects for a new kind of thinking. However, the United States and its NATO allies opted for a triumphalist stance shaped by the prism of realpolitik and continued their policy of co-optation, coercion, or confrontation with their post-Soviet enemies (especially Russia and, more recently, China).
The Middle East and Africa, which had fueled Western economic growth through the extraction of oil and other minerals, remained largely under the yoke of authoritarian regimes as long as they pledged loyalty and fidelity to the West. The United States has 29 military bases in 15 countries in Africa, reflecting the way Washington views the region as an integral component of its self-generated “war on terror.” The West's willingness to support and finance authoritarian regimes in both the Middle East and Africa has bred the extremist ideologies that emerged to challenge the legitimacy of dictators who recklessly and wantonly repressed their own people while transferring local mineral wealth to masters. geopoliticians from Washington, London, Paris and Brussels. Those key regions of the global south were more beholden to their Western masters than to their own citizens.
In 2016, the Panama Papers revealed the collusion of elites in the global north (including the United States) with those in Central America, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Africa, Asia, and Latin America in diverting illicit wealth from the global south to off-shore tax havens. The net effect of resource extraction has been the deprivation of basic services (such as healthcare, education, housing and infrastructure) with which communities in the global south could improve their well-being; This, in turn, has given rise to unstable countries and regions, which are fertile ground for extremist ideology to flourish. Over the past two decades, the United States has led a “global war on terror” that, in part, has been the result of some of the policies adopted after the end of the Cold War.
The arrival of President Biden in 2020 represented a reconfiguration and repositioning of US foreign policy towards the south. For more than two decades, the global war on terrorism consumed a significant portion of American foreign policy attention (particularly in the Middle East and Africa). This allowed its main rival, China, to use its soft power on all continents (especially through investment and infrastructure development) to position itself as a hegemon waiting to take over from the United States as a world leader in 2049, according to the Chinese Communist Party's own political documents regarding its superpower ambitions.
The United States has launched initiatives in its backyard to improve relations with Latin America and reactivate transcontinental trade links, as well as to confront the persistent scourge of drug trafficking from the main production centers in Central and South America.
In Asia, the United States is playing catch-up in its efforts to contain China's soft power influence across the region. On May 12 and 13, 2023, President Biden organized a special summit between the United States and the Association of Southeast Asian Countries (ASEAN) in Washington, apparently to restore relations and secure the region, located in the sphere of influence of China, which continues to be of interest to Washington. Likewise, between December 13 and 15, 2022, a summit of African and American leaders was held in Washington in which President Biden committed to reforming the United Nations Security Council and where he proudly declared that “United States "United they go all-in in Africa", in reference to a poker expression in which the player announces that he is betting all his chips in a play. President Biden's allusion to poker in reference to Africa is perhaps symbolic of Washington's view of the continent as a prize to be won... and taken from China.
It is important to note that there is much more convergence than divergence when it comes to breaking down the positions of the American Democratic Party and the Republican Party in relation to the global south and other actors around the world. There is, for example, a certain degree of consensus among US political formations regarding the stance towards China and policies to contain and roll back the progress made by that country in its quest for superpower status. Regarding the Russian war in Ukraine, both the Republican and Democratic Parties are following the same sheet, despite Moscow's strategy to divide NATO members. If the Democratic Party is successful in the 2024 elections, there will be some continuity in its stance toward Moscow, albeit qualified by creating opportunities to provide President Vladimir Putin with an exit lane to retreat and save face; especially if the war remains stagnant and if the brave Ukrainian forces manage to maintain their positions and reverse Russian advances in their territory. In June 2023, the African peace mission to Ukraine and Russia was not openly condemned by Washington, indicating that there could be a small opportunity to begin de-escalating the crisis and launching a mediation initiative, as the former secretary has suggested. of US state Henry Kissinger, with the 2022 Ukrainian borders as a starting position for negotiations on how to address Moscow's territorial violations and to find a way to address the violence inflicted on innocent Ukrainian civilians.
If the Democratic Party maintains the US presidency and one or both houses of Congress, there will be some degree of continuity in terms of articulating reassuring rhetoric for the global south and the US commitment to economic cooperation, transcontinental trade and solving pressing problems such as climate change and violent extremism.
The Democratic Party will also seek some continuity in the attempt to straighten the relationship with China starting from the meeting held by US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken and Chinese President Xi Jinping in June 2023 and during which both committed to rebuilding the deteriorated ties between the two countries. Blinken said nothing about restoring military ties with Beijing to avoid miscommunication and a potentially fatal miscalculation, specifically on issues involving Taiwan and islands in the South China Sea.
All of this indicates that the Democratic Party will take a much more conciliatory approach towards the Southeast Asia region and will place more emphasis on economic cooperation and finding common ground to address climate change. The United States' relationship with India, for example, has increasingly focused on joint economic initiatives and cooperation to take advantage of the fourth industrial revolution (especially information technology and increased opportunities to develop artificial intelligence and machine learning).
The chaotic US withdrawal from Afghanistan (which, in August 2021, allowed the Taliban to resume their oppressive policies) indicates that the Democratic Party and a second term of the Biden Administration will take a much more cautious approach to military adventurism in the region to avoid being immersed in crisis situations that are difficult to escape. The Biden Administration has also demonstrated determination to use shuttle diplomacy to engage with partners in the Middle East and Africa. The 2020-2022 conflict in Ethiopia's Tigray region saw a vigorous diplomatic effort by Mike Hammer, the US special envoy for the Horn of Africa. This effort contributed in part to the authorities in Addis Ababa turning to the African Union (AU) to mediate the cessation of hostilities agreement signed on November 2, 2022 between the Ethiopian Government and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TLPF). ). On that basis, the Democratic Party and a second Biden Administration will continue to use diplomatic instruments to intervene throughout the African continent and, above all, where their interests are considered threatened.
For example, the violent April 2023 conflict in Sudan, which pitted two generals of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (FAR), saw Washington become a major player when it created an initiative mediation with Saudi Arabia and the United States. In May 2023, humanitarian ceasefire talks were held in Yida. The United States considers Sudan as a strategic partner when it comes to securing the Red Sea for its military and merchant operations through the Suez Canal and hence the initiative to mediate the crisis and convince both parties to reach a settlement agreement. convergence.
The US-Africa Strategy and the outcomes of the US-Africa Leaders' Summit in December 2022 provide a roadmap for how the Democratic Party will continue to work with the African Union to develop a Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Agenda that addresses food security across the continent. Additionally, Washington has signaled that it will borrow a page from the Chinese playbook and make critical investments in transportation and trade in order to boost the African Continental Free Trade Agreement, which will help increase intra-African trade. In addition, the leaders' summit identified a series of areas for continued cooperation, including increasing technological development (particularly in space), resolving cybersecurity challenges, and transforming international institutions (including the United Nations Security Council). In addition, President Biden pledged to work for the inclusion of the African Union in the G-20 group, which decides on global challenges. However, Washington has a reputation for peddling rhetoric and failing to deliver on its commitments, so African governments will do well to take such offers with a grain of salt and verify and follow up on commitments made if they want to advance their relationship with the United States.
If the Republican Party fails to win the presidency or the Senate, it will resort to the means available to it in Congress to reinforce control over the Biden Administration. He will deploy the range of legislative instruments at his disposal (in particular, oversight of the Foreign Affairs, Intelligence and Armed Services committees) to continue putting pressure on the Biden Administration on its position on the global south.
If the Republican Party manages to win the presidency and one or both Houses of Congress in 2024, it will adopt a much more hostile stance towards China, which will lead to an increase in the securitization of relations in the global south. Republican leader Kevin McCarthy has already expressed his intention to travel to Taiwan, in what would be a reproduction of the trip made by Nancy Pelosi, former head of the Democratic Party and former speaker of the House of Representatives, to Taipei, in August 2022. This indicates that the Republican Party will pursue a much more muscular foreign policy regarding Taiwan, with the consequent intensification of tensions in the Spratly Islands, in the South China Sea. In addition to Beijing and Taipei, these islands are also claimed by the Philippines, Vietnam and Brunei, which could trigger a regional conflict with China, and even drag Japan into the conflict. Such a stance would destabilize countries in the Asean region, which have conflicting loyalties with both Beijing and Washington.
The Republican Party will further accelerate its efforts to achieve a decoupling from China, a strategy proposed by President Trump and that seeks the interruption of economic ties for national and strategic reasons. Over the past two decades, American companies have systematically offshored their production to less expensive bases of operations throughout the global south (including China). As a result, China is now the world's largest manufacturer, and the Republican Party is much more open than the Democratic Party to advocating for the restoration of the United States as a global manufacturing center. The Republican Party remains a strong supporter of the decoupling strategy and has made some early efforts to disrupt manufacturing and production value chains (particularly in Southeast Asia), as evidenced by the divestment in technology company Huawei. However, such a decoupling policy is unlikely to gain traction in the global south, given the degree of integration of the world economy.
The Republican Party will use foreign policy and economic consolidation more forcefully as an instrument of coercion to assert its will in Central and South America, as well as Africa. It will make greater use of the United States' ability to impose economic and financial sanctions, relying on the continued prominence of the dollar as a reserve currency, given the tendency of previous Republican presidents to use this instrument.
The United States has had an asymmetric relationship with the global south through its hegemonic presence in the global economy and its ability to project hard military power. The Trump administration's efforts to retreat and impose a form of 21st century mercantilism are now being slowly reversed by the Biden administration. Both Democrats and Republicans show a certain degree of convergence in their stance toward the global south. Specifically, regarding China's growing influence in the global south, both parties agree on the need to respond and restore US manufacturing dominance.
However, there is also a certain degree of divergence between political formations; above all, in relation to the way it approaches its relationship with the global south. A post-2024 Democratic Party will rely more on diplomacy as the main instrument to engage with the global south. The Republican Party, given the actions of previous administrations, will use a much more aggressive foreign policy to engage with the global south; especially when it comes to containing China's growing influence. The global south will not be a passive spectator of Washington's efforts to assert itself around the world. There are already pockets of resistance and pockets of solidarity and economic cooperation among agents of the global south (such as the Brics group), which shows that the region will be better placed to contain the attempts carried out by the agents of power. in Washington to have unrestricted access to the countries of the southern hemisphere.
Tim Murithi is Head of Peacebuilding Interventions at the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation in Cape Town and Professor of African Studies at the University of the Free State and the University of Stellenbosch, as well as a Research Associate at the African Center for the Study of the US in Africa at the Univ. of the Witwatersrand.
