Rodrigo de Rato (1949) reached the Olympus of the most influential figures in the world when he was appointed managing director of the International Monetary Fund (2004-2007) after occupying the economic vice-presidency in the governments of José María Aznar (1996-2004). Back in Spain, he assumed the presidency of Caja Madrid, converted into Bankia. And there began the decline of his career. First, in May 2012 he left office in the box, which a few days later would be nationalized and would receive 20,000 million in public aid. Later, in 2018, he was convicted in the case of the so-called cards.
The Bankia crisis is still very present in memory, epitome of the great real estate and financial crisis. In his book, he questions the idea that Bankia was the big problem in the Spanish financial system.
I believe that the big problem was the indebtedness of the clients, which all the banks had. Bankia, on the other hand, did not create debt, on the contrary, under my mandate it provisioned 15,000 million euros. We were not the ones who gave the mortgages or the ones who gave the credits, but we reduced offices and personnel. Bankia was an attempt by the Bank of Spain to privatize the savings banks, 50% of the system, at a very cheap price so that private capital could endure or finance its future. That they all become private players with capital and with the old shareholders of the boxes reduced to 10% or 15% of the capital.
The problem is that it started late. It had to have started before 2008. And it started in 2011. And when things start late, they are more expensive. And then there was no time. The Bankia merger involved 300,000 million between seven entities and could not be done in 12 months.
I insist, he denies that Bankia was the big damaged piece of the Spanish financial system...
If in January 2012 a banker like Isidro Fainé, then president of CaixaBank, and an Economy Minister like Luis de Guindos wanted a merger of the two entities without aid, just a few months later, in May 2012, it could not be a problem. . If in May 2012 the man who replaces me, José Ignacio Goirigolzarri, asks for 18,000 million, which will not arrive until 2013, where was the urgency?
What was the agreement with La Caixa? In his book it says that they had it and Fainé wanted to change it.
We had accepted that the headquarters go to Catalonia, I doubted if I made that concession too soon. We had agreed to a co-chairmanship, Fainé and I, four years old. It was clear that the CEO was put by them, Juan María Nin, and we the vice president. La Caixa could not reach 50% of the new bank and we exceeded 20%. That was the balance. I believe that the agreement with La Caixa was good. And the government liked it. But then things cooled down.
Your book gives the impression that you were the victim of a conspiracy... Was Rato's head worth the 20,000 million Bankia public bailout?
We had met all the regulatory milestones set by the government. The decrees of Guindos. And yet we are asked for more. Why do I have to give more provisions than the man across the street? Why do my provisions have to be higher?
The markets had the idea that Bankia was the problem.
How do the markets identify you? Because of your stock listing? For the deposits? For the price of your bonds? Your stock starts to drop; your good clients start to march and the rating houses lower your rating. None of that happens to us. And that we had a minister speaking ill of us, which the governor of the Bank of Spain tells me; to the president of the second bank in the country speaking ill of us and to a government that gets the IMF to publish a note in which we are described by names and two surnames. And yet, our action does not move. It moves like the others, even better than average.
And the one who asks me to leave is the Minister of Economy and the president of BBVA, Francisco González, and then Mariano Rajoy, [the president of the government], who tells me that yes, I should go; Well I'm leaving. A suicide operation.
It's strange. In the book he explains that his friends rule. Before, the IPO, a true state operation, has the backing of the government of Rodríguez Zapatero and the big banks and big Spanish companies. How do you explain his interpretation that they want him out?
You describe a conspiracy, perhaps you have a better word, in which the government, the auditor, bank competitors, some regulator would participate...
Competitors don't. If they had called me to keep the BBVA deposits, I would surely have gone. At a time of crisis, because, of course, they were all losing money in Spain. The only ones who made money were those who had business abroad. But there is a certain fact, Guindos summons me to discuss my accounts with my competitors. Of course, I have a weakness and that is that Bankia has aid of 4,600 million from the FROB, the public fund. And Guindos tells me that he can make the FROB execute that debt. He tells me in March 2012. And he gives me goosebumps. I believe that there is a time when the Spanish government, and it is already with the previous government, goes behind the events. And that is why these constant and precipitous regulatory changes.
And does that explain the existence of an operation against you?
That is the least important. A justification is sought for a bank bailout. And at the same time there are some gentlemen, who are the ones who come after me, who say that if they assume that they want to ask for the bailout, they want 20,000 million to ensure that everything goes well.
Do you mean that his fall would have been instrumental?
What Cristóbal [Montoro, Minister of Finance in the Rajoy government] told me was: "I'm sorry Rodrigo, but you are collateral damage, we are going to throw you out." And I told them: "No, well no, you're not going to kick me out, I'm leaving."
A good part of his book is dedicated to his legal journey. She calls attention to the fact that a former vice president of the government questions legal security in Spain. In some passages, his complaints are very similar to those of the victims of the so-called Catalonia operation, such as the former president of Barça Sandro Rosell...
I am critical of impunity. I do not understand the operation of the Prosecutor's Office. I do not understand why prospective research is not pursued. I don't understand how secret investigations are not immediately punished. I don't understand how to negotiate with prisoners held as preventive. I don't understand the laxity with the leaks. And it has happened to me, I have been the object of prospective, secret investigations, of unsubstantiated accusations. Helpless. It happens to a lot of people. It is the deep state. And for the record that I am very anti-independence.
