Bertrand Badie, professor emeritus at Sciences Po University in Paris, has published Pour une approche subjective des relations internationales (Odile Jacob), in which he warns that classical geopolitics, based on the balance of powers or recourse to action military, it no longer works because subjective factors weigh more and more, as well as the role of societies. Author of dozens of books, Badie analyzes for this newspaper the conflict in Ukraine, two years after the Russian invasion.
Is the Russian threat against Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas taken seriously?
In my job I have learned to take everything seriously, even what seems like pure rhetoric, a joke or a provocation. The essential thrust of my book is that we are in a world dominated by a battle of meaning.
What means?
Since 1991, neither the former Russian Empire nor the Western world have managed to find a new and adequate formula for their relationship. And this mutual inability has had the main consequence of creating in Russia, defeated in the cold war, a terrible feeling of frustration, perhaps of humiliation. This episode of Moscow against Tallinn is the expression of this extremely strong subjectivity that has accumulated in both parties. Estonia feels the anguish of being forcibly reintegrated into the old Russian empire, and Russia is obsessed with the idea that the Baltic states are the spearhead of the domination that the West would like to exercise over the entire European continent.
Can Putin attack a Baltic republic, despite the fact that they are part of NATO?
I don't think so. I could be wrong because nothing is certain in international relations. Everything depends on the decision of an individual or a group of individuals. I would say it is unlikely for a very simple reason: Putin was surprised by the extent of the military defeat he suffered in Ukraine, when he thought he could conquer Kyiv in two or three days. I do not see how, alerted by this failure, he could set out on a still more difficult conquest. It would not only be attacking a neighboring country, but a member of NATO and the EU. But the fact that it is improbable does not mean to ignore it.
What do you think about?
If Putin expresses himself in this way, it is because the problem of the Baltic republics, of European borders and of Russia's relationship with the outside world has reached a state of dangerous paroxysm. Even if it doesn't resolve the conflict by arms, it has many other ways of creating tensions where non-military violence will be painful for everyone, including us Western Europeans.
Does it mean hybrid warfare, with the weapon of migrants, as Belarus did with Poland, or cyber warfare?
Yes, cyber attacks, disinformation, economic, political and institutional destabilization, demographic destabilization. In a globalized and interdependent world there are multiple ways to harm a State, even violently, without a war by military means. I'm no soothsayer, but an invasion of Estonia with tanks doesn't seem like a very convincing scenario to me.
Will his analysis change if Trump becomes president again?
The simplism and naivete of the reactions to Trump's speech bothers me a little. He is a political businessman. His strategy is to build the rhetoric that his constituents expect. It has underestimated the very serious crisis that the society of the United States is suffering, which translates into a very strong desire in the middle class to take revenge on a globalization that has not been favorable to it, should it withdraw from military interventions that have had more costs than benefits, and exasperation with allies that, in effect, cost them dearly. Trump, who wants to be re-elected, plays this game to the point of caricature.
Political marketing?
Yes, but it is political marketing of a new nature, which rebels effectively in excess and I would say even in the ridiculous. It's very cynical marketing. If he is re-elected, I think his politics will not necessarily reflect everything he has said.
Won't it drop a NATO country?
In his first term, his initiatives on NATO were not decisive. In his four years, apart from the catastrophic denunciation of the treaty with Iran in 2015 on the nuclear issue, the decisions he made were mostly facade ones, such as leaving Unesco, taking the embassy of Tel-Aviv in Jerusalem, insulting Theresa May or Angela Merkel, shaking Kim Jong-un's hand in front of the cameras, things of no great consequence. This man wants to show off, but not so much to reinvent the world. It is clear that there could be very surprising decisions, but, a priori, this great anxiety that is perceived seems a little excessive to me.
Will Russia lose this war?
Of course. Russia has already lost this war. What he is trying to do is compensate for his losses by means of skillful diplomacy that will allow him to avoid a total failure and, in the absence of an impossible complete annexation, to keep 16% of the Ukrainian territory.
Which scenario do you see as most likely? A deal? Will Ukraine accept to lose territories?
If you look at history, the end of wars has not been negotiated for almost two centuries. It did not happen in the two world wars. It was not the Paris Agreements that ended the Vietnam War, nor the Doha Agreements that ended the Afghanistan War. I don't think there is any negotiation. The Ukrainians will never agree to sign a document that recognizes the annexation of Crimea and the four occupied provinces. It is most likely the preferred formula since 1945, that of frozen conflict, with de facto, but not de jure, annexations such as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and to some extent also Kosovo.
