Some may have hoped to get answers during the World Peace Forum (WPF) in Beijing, held earlier this month. This annual event was inaugurated in 2012 at the prestigious Tsinghua University by then Vice President Xi Jinping, to show that China can contribute to solving the problems of war and peace worldwide. However, Western observers at this year's conference were surprised that Ukraine had been left behind, and disappointed that the only guests to discuss Ukraine at the forum were Russians (apparently no Ukrainians had been invited).
However, for all those who have been analyzing the evolution of the Chinese position, this should not have surprised them. Aside from attending the Peace Forum in Beijing, we have spent the past 18 months conducting numerous interviews with Chinese intellectuals and analysts from leading universities, think tanks, and party-affiliated organizations, trying to get to the bottom of the issues, and to understand China's position on the war in Ukraine. What we have found is that although there is a lively debate about the war - more than one might expect - the Chinese think very differently from the West.
The first lesson is that, for the Chinese, the war in Ukraine is not that important. They do not see it as a catastrophic war that is reshaping the world order, but as a conflict of powers between China and the United States. More importantly, many of them believe that the United States has used the war to try to corner China. They also expose how Japan and Korea have allegedly been pressured to sanction Russia, as well as the fact that they were invited to participate in the NATO summit in Madrid. Following the same logic, according to many Chinese analysts, the Europeans were persuaded to include China in NATO's strategic plan and to take tougher stances on their country's technology. On the other hand, the fact that Washington has failed to unite the rest of the world in its cause comforts most Chinese experts.
As one Chinese intellectual pointed out, unlike in the cold war, the West has had little success in mobilizing developing countries in its favor. He claims that a total of 157 countries do not support either the West or China on the Ukraine issue. Capitalizing on America's weak reputation and winning over these "non-aligned" countries has thus become a key goal of Chinese foreign policy.
This battle for the global south goes well beyond the question of war against Ukraine. As an alternative to American "feudalism," Beijing has crafted its own proposals in the form of a global development initiative, a global security initiative and a global civilization initiative, which were enthusiastically presented to forum participants, many of whom came from countries China is actively courting.
The second lesson is that China believes it has more to gain than lose by sticking with Russia. The presence of Russian experts at the Forum highlighted Beijing's pro-Moscow bias. But while Russian guests at the forum were honored with speaking turns, since February 2022 there has been a clear sentiment that Moscow is Beijing's junior partner at best. When asked to comment on Russia's military performance, almost all of the experts we spoke to reacted with derision. Quite a few seemed to think that Russia no longer deserved great power status.
This tactical tendency to be highly critical of the way Russia is waging the war goes hand in hand with a strategic desire not to see Putin humiliated or driven from power. Although there have been highly critical voices (one academic claimed that China has been the victim of a hybrid war waged by Russia, which included attempts to manipulate the Chinese media as well as to dupe the Chinese leadership into appearing to support the war more than they wanted to), the consensus is that China and Russia are united by a shared vision of a post-Western world order.
Third, many Chinese analysts seem to believe that the conflict in Ukraine has made war in Taiwan neither more nor less likely. The official line is that "Ukraine is not Taiwan," but nonetheless, many academics are watching the conflict closely to learn their lesson. Many were surprised by the unity and activism of the West with its sanctions and military aid to kyiv. However, they also noted that many of the arguments made about not wanting to fight a nuclear power directly would apply to China over Taiwan as well as Russia. Consequently, they think the West will adopt a counterweight strategy and arm Taiwan, and support local powers like Japan, rather than fight it directly.
The fourth lesson follows from the third. It is that economic interdependence will not protect China in the event of a confrontation with the West. On the contrary, Beijing must be prepared for sanctions. Unsurprisingly, there was a lot of talk at the Forum about economic security, supply chains, and sanctions. At one point, Dilma Rousseff, the former Brazilian president who now heads the New Development Bank, criticized Western attempts at "disengagement" and "risk reduction" and called for de-dollarization as a way to protect countries from Western sanctions and bullying.
In this sense, the vision of the world order that China presented at the WPF is largely reflected in its priorities on Ukraine. As in the forum, the war in Ukraine has given Beijing an opportunity to exploit Western weaknesses to make China feel more secure internationally, expanding its ties with the global south, fostering an image of a peacemaker and accelerating its efforts to become more economically self-sufficient. And, by giving its tacit approval to the Ukraine war while trying to present itself as neutral, China is trying to find a balance between maintaining its anti-war facade and pursuing outright revisionism.
A Chinese academic we spoke to in Beijing explained that something positive can come out of a negative situation. "As long as China doesn't need to arm Russia," he said, "people will continue to hope that Beijing can play a constructive role." Something that Western diplomats present at the forum should take into account.
Mark Leonard is co-founder and director of the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR).
Alicja Bachulska es investigadora, expert in China del ECFR
