On November 3, 2017, South African paramedic Gerco van Deventer was heading with three Turkish engineers to a power plant under construction 1,000 kilometers south of Tripoli, Libya. Van Deventer, a father of three, had arrived in the Maghreb in search of a quiet job, after years in Afghanistan. His search for calm went awry: his vehicle was intercepted by bandits and the four men were kidnapped. The South African took the worst part.
While the three Turks were released seven months later, Van Deventer was sold to the Support Front for Islam and Muslims (JNIM in its Arabic acronym), Al Qaeda franchise in the Sahel, and his trail was lost. Until before Christmas. On December 17, Malian security forces announced that a South African citizen had been released at the border with Algeria. He was Gerco. Six years and 43 days later, the South African returned home.
In addition to the Algerian government, the South African NGO Gift of Givers mediated, which provided a key piece of information: the initial ransom request of $3 million had dropped in a few days to $500,000. The resolution of Van Deventer's long captivity is the latest in a wave of releases of Western hostages – up to six “eternal” hostages, who had been in the desert for between two and more than eight years, have been freed in just one year – and confirms something else: the kidnapping industry in the Sahelian hornet's nest is changing.
Flore Berger, an expert on the Sahel at the Swiss think tank Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, confirms the change in the modus operandi of the JNIM, the main perpetrator of kidnappings in the region, and attributes the latest releases to the new Sahelian board after the withdrawal of the French troops of the Barkhane operation against jihadism in August 2022.
“Last year, the JNIM had many threats; In addition to his great rival, the Islamic State of the Great Sahara, he fought against the Malian armed forces and Wagner's Russian mercenaries. The jihadists did not want to prolong the kidnappings for so long but, frustrated that governments no longer pay ransoms as before, they published proof of life of their hostages, something they had not done since 2018, and lowered the amount demanded to promote negotiations. “Probably the JNIM needs money to cover so many fronts.”
The fragmentation of the group, which as it expanded from Algeria and Mali to Burkina Faso, Niger and northern Benin, has blurred its command center, has also diminished its capacity to manage such long-term kidnappings.
The change is important because the history of the last twenty years of the kidnapping industry in the Sahel explains the regional drift. If between 2003 and 2012 groups affiliated with Al Qaeda kidnapped almost one hundred Westerners, most of them tourists, and amassed almost 90 million dollars in ransoms, the instability in Mali starting in 2012 reduced the number of Europeans in the region but did not the extreme profit of one of the main sources of jihadist financing. Less kidnapping was done but with a higher yield in a golden age for the hostage trade.
A decade ago, the average figure to free a Westerner was two to six million dollars, in addition to the exchange for jihadist prisoners, while in the latest negotiations, officially denied, the fundamentalists asked for between three and half a million dollars.
It has not been the only change. The report “The invisible threat. Kidnappings in Burkina Faso”, published in March of last year, warned of a new shift in the jihadist kidnapping industry: more and more cases are occurring, their victims are politicians or members of the local elite and it is no longer just for money.
The deterioration of security in Burkina Faso explains the turn. According to data from the Armed Conflict Location and Events Project (ACLED), kidnappings in the African country have multiplied by 30 in five years. From eight incidents in 2017 it has increased to more than 219 in 2022. And last year was worse. Both Mali and Burkina recorded 400 kidnappings each, 97% of native citizens, from politicians to members of the local elite such as businessmen, merchants, large livestock owners or gold mine owners.
These are kidnappings and extortions that seek a quick outcome and therefore their perpetrators demand a smaller ransom than if it were a foreigner and the negotiations take place directly, without governments involved. “Often, the JNIM calls to negotiate directly with the family,” the report highlights, “they explain the situation and their demands, and indicate the price and date.”
The figure depends on the purchasing power of the family: between €450 and €1,200 for small merchants or business owners, between €3,000 and €4,500 for businessmen and from €12,000 if the captive is a large rancher or owns mines.
Although there have been cases of higher payments – up to €750,000 for the son of a wealthy local businessman – Berger highlights that, although the JNIM still receives money for some ransoms, financing is no longer its main motivation. “Jihadists use kidnappings as an instrument of war. The kidnappings of representatives of authority or politically influential natives serve to intimidate local power and facilitate its expansion and territorial domination.” And it works: according to official figures, in 2022, 40% of Burkinabe territory was under jihadist control
In addition to intimidation, the forced recruitment of new members and the need for specific specialists, such as doctors or nurses to treat sick extremists, are other reasons behind these express kidnappings.
Despite the change in trend in the African jihad kidnapping business, Berger calls for caution. “The region remains extremely dangerous for any Westerner. If there are fewer cases, it is because Westerners have almost all left or because they practically do not leave the capitals, but the threat is still very high.
