Talking about relations between both sides of the Taiwan Strait implies starting from a date: October 25, 1945. On that day, Chen Yi, on behalf of the Republic of China, received from Rikichi Ando, the surrender of the Japanese troops of the island and with it the government of Taiwan
Thus, the agreement that Chang Kai Chek had reached with Roosevelt and Churchill during the Cairo conference (1943) later ratified by the Potsdam Declaration (1945) was fulfilled. In that act, fifty years of Japanese occupation ended. The government of the Republic of China would proclaim that date as Recession Day, an anniversary to celebrate the return to the homeland of the province of Taiwan, a territory lost by the last imperial dynasty, the Qing dynasty (1644-1912), as result of the first Sino-Japanese war and the humiliating treaty of Shimonoseki (1895).
The Chinese Nationalist Party or Kuomintang (KMT) decided to provisionally establish a military directory with absolute powers commanded by Chen Yi in a climate of hostility towards the islanders. And it is that, as the historian Yu-Ting Lu has pointed out, the perception between islanders and continentals about reunification was very different. If for the Taiwanese it was a long-awaited return to their homeland, there was a strong bias in the KMT's rhetoric to reconquer a historically Chinese territory.
This gap only widened with the start of the second phase of the Chinese civil war between the Communist Party of China (CCP) and the Kuomintang in 1946. If since the nationalists arrived on the island, they had monopolized political participation and established an ethnic and xenophobic system, based on personal loyalty and nepotism, the start of the civil war on the continent allowed Chen Yi to initiate a process of repression that, although mainly directed against the left, had its target any challenge to his authority on the island.
This climate, marked by an ideological program of cultural hostility towards the Taiwanese, corruption in the Administration and police repression that made relations between mainlanders and Taiwanese difficult, reached its highest point with the events of February 28, 1947.
The violent search of a cigarette vendor on the night of February 27 will give rise to a dynamic of events that will open a deep wound between the islanders and the continentals. The discontent of the population and the violent reaction of the military directorate ended in an armed revolt that, in the context of civil war, the Nanking government was not willing to tolerate, for which reason it sent troops from the continent with clear instructions to restore the order. During the first days of March, the KMT army carried out a program of systematic repression against all types of dissent and, especially, against Taiwanese social leaders.
Another date, December 7, 1949, the Government of the Republic of China begins the great withdrawal. The KMT armies accompanied by those who had sided with the Nationalist side embarked for Taiwan. On October 1, in Beijing, Mao Zedong had proclaimed the People's Republic of China; months before, in August 1948, Chang Kai Chek had already started the first movements of the strategic withdrawal towards Formosa with the aim of regrouping and returning, one day, to reconquer the continent.
For decades, the international legitimacy of representation of the Chinese people was in Taipei. The Republic of China, with the support of the United States, had a seat and a veto in the United Nations Security Council, and except for the countries that were part of the socialist bloc and those that were not aligned, nobody recognized the People's Republic of China. From both sides of the Strait, the policy of “one China” is vindicated and military operations aimed at the defeat of the other are articulated. The best known are those that gave rise to the first two Straits crises (1954-1955 and 1958) but there were others, such as those carried out by the anti-communist Salvation Army (1951-1954) trained by the CIA.
During the first two decades of KMT rule, the island had begun a major transformation process. Assisted by American planners and with the long hand of the secret services that ensured the fight against dissent, the island entered the club of Asian tigers. The improvement in the standard of living of the population, the repression –the martial law established in 1949 would not be lifted until 1987– and the sinicization program constituted ingredients of a combination that allowed the construction of a narrative in which the Republic of China constituted a model successful in the face of the excesses of "communist China". One of the architects of the model, and in a way the person who laid the foundations for today's Taiwan, was Chiang Ching Kuo (CCK).
From the proclamation of the People's Republic of China in 1949 until the early 1970s, the achievements of the CCP government have been largely overshadowed by the various mass campaigns of Maoism. Parallel to the first bars of the cultural revolution (1966-1976), the weight of CCK in the government of Taipei increased and with its rise the reassessment of the strategy towards the continent. For CCK, the key was economic development and political-psychological warfare through the spread of the Chinese way of life in Taiwan. It was essential that China live a popular revolution in the Hungarian style, encourage it with infiltrated elements, and only later support it militarily.
CCK's rise to the top of power coincided with the White House's shift in position toward China. The commitments made by Nixon and Kissinger with the People's Republic made it possible, in the first place, for Taipei to be expelled from the United Nations in 1971 and, after that, Beijing began a broad process of normalization of relations. In the policy of diplomatically isolating the adversary, Mao seemed to have outmaneuvered his rival. When Chang Kai Chek died in 1975, only twenty-six states had diplomatic relations with the ROC.
The death of Mao Zedong in 1976 would open a stage of difficult transition in the leadership of the CCP that ended with the return of Deng Xiaoping and the beginning of a new stage in the history of the People's Republic of China. Among the messages launched in the first years of Deng's leadership, the Message to the compatriots of Taiwan (I/1/1979) has a special significance. Significant changes are observed in it: “liberate Taiwan” is replaced by “peacefully settle the Taiwan problem”. Deng had started a diplomatic offensive seeking understanding between both shores. For Taiwan, the “one country, two systems” formula was designed.
CCK's response to Deng, with whom he had spent days in Moscow during the First United Front, was "a country needs only a good system." Taipei's policy combined firmness (no contacts, no concessions, no negotiation) with the pragmatism of flexible diplomacy. However, both the economic development of the island and the policy of reform and opening of the continent exceeded the official positions. Taiwanese money began to flow into mainland China, via Hong Kong, unimpeded by Taipei.
The ROC presented itself to the world as "Free China" in opposition to the authoritarian regime of the CCP. However, subject to emergency legislation, only the local level was open to those not linked to the KMT. The opposition of various kinds was articulated in candidacies known as Dangwai (literally, from outside the party), and tolerance – within limits – during the CCK mandate encouraged the islanders to greater political participation. In 1986, with the consent of the KMT, the different opposition currents converge to create an opposition party: the Progressive Democratic Party (PDP).
The founding of the PDP, like the lifting of martial law (1987), the authorization of visits to the mainland (1987) and the press law (1988), were part of a plan to move towards a new time. If Deng Xiaoping had placed the accent on economic opening; CCK opted for the market economy, the multi-party system and the free press, as legitimizing instruments for its unification project. Fundamentals of a political war that, on both sides of the Strait, seemed to have substituted military plans for unification.
CCK's unexpected death on January 13, 1988 allowed Lee Teng Hui to ascend to the presidency of the ROC. Following the spirit of the CCK, Lee contributed to anchoring the KMT's political project on the island but, during his Administration, the State structures began a profound internal transformation largely to take advantage of the business opportunities offered by the opening of the People's Republic. and facilitate economic integration between both shores.
The Tiananmen protests in 1989, the subsequent international sanctions and the implosion of the socialist bloc in Europe seemed to offer an opportunity for the ROC in the international arena. In an interview with American journalists, Lee said: "The reunification of China by democratic and peaceful means has been the goal of the Government of the Republic of China (...) Since the incident on June 4, 1989 in Tiananmen Square, dissatisfaction and the impatience of the people in mainland China towards the policy and the regressive actions of the communist leaders are evident. It is not unthinkable that a major change could occur in mainland China in the near future."
During his first years in office, Lee's position on upholding the identity of the Chinese state in Taiwan, unification and the principle of "one China" did not differ from the traditional position of the KMT. In fact, the complex situation in the People's Republic in the period 1989-1992 generated a perception of relative strength in Taipei. During the Lee Administration, the National Unification Council (1990), the Foundation for Cross-Straits Exchanges (1991) were launched, and the Temporary Provisions effective during the period of national mobilization for the suppression of the communist rebellion (1991) were abolished. ) in a far-reaching movement because, by putting an end to the emergency legislation derived from the civil war, it seemed to want to establish the bases of a new understanding with the continent.
Also, during Lee's term, the so-called 1992 Consensus was established, the basis of which is precisely in a statement issued by the Continental Affairs Council of the Republic of China, which states: "Both sides of the Strait of Taiwan agree that there is only one China." However, the working meetings between the mainland and Taiwanese counterparts that began in 1992 were interrupted. First, due to the third crisis of the Straits (1995-1996) and later when Lee Teng Hui proposed in 1999 his “theory of the two States”. This concept promoted a formula similar to that adopted by the two Germanys between 1970 and 1990. According to Lee, the ROC and mainland China represented two separate jurisdictions, an idea that broke with the traditional position of the KMT.
But the break with the traditional postulates of the KMT went far beyond trying to increase its scope for foreign action. Lee promoted the "Taiwanization" of a national identity that had historically been linked to a strong Chinese identity, thus marking, with his policies, a path that made it possible to make the programmatic proposals of Taiwanese independence movement viable.
If the introduction of free elections was an important barrier in the unification process, the result of the 2000 elections only accentuated this difficulty. With the victory of Chen Shui Bian, of the PDP, the opposition won democratic elections and it seemed that the independence movement could advance towards its objectives. But Chen's presidency was marked by a People's Republic that, in spectacular economic growth, maintained a certain diplomatic cordiality with the US The balance of power in the Straits began to tip towards Beijing.
In this context of strategic weakness and growing tensions with China, Chen stated that there were two countries on each side of the Strait and delved into the identity lines initiated by Lee, and his policies help to understand the Taiwan of today. The development of a Taiwanese national identity was conceived as a weapon against China but, at the time, the PDP found no international support. Chen was called to order by Washington, and Beijing, for its part, approved the Anti-Secession Law (2005) defining its response to a hypothetical declaration of independence by Taiwan.
After a decade of tensions with China that wore down society, the course of Taiwanese politics changed in 2008 with the arrival of Ma Ying Jeou to the presidency. Within the framework of cross-strait relations, Taipei was openly in a position of strategic weakness vis-à-vis Beijing. The Ma administration sought formulas to build balances in the Strait from asymmetry. Unlike Chen, Ma's policy was based on the 1992 Consensus and the principle of "one China", betting on economic integration as a defense of the status quo and favoring economic growth in a context of economic crisis. This approach was supported by all Western countries with interests in the region, and the Singapore summit between Ma Ying Jeou and Xi Jinping (2015) was internationally defined as a historic milestone in cross-strait relations.
Domestically, Ma was severely criticized for his policy of economic integration with mainland China, although the truth is that, in a context of economic crisis and strong global economic interdependence, he did not have many alternatives. In any case, the independence movement managed to capitalize on the existing socioeconomic discontent – whose most evident manifestation was the Sunflower Movement (2014) – and managed to prevail in the 2016 presidential elections.
The figure and policies of President Tsai Ingwen reflect very well the identity contradictions of Taiwanese politics. After being sworn in as president before the image of Sun Yat Sen, considered the father of modern China, Tsai did not wait even for the first hundred days to deny the existence of the 1992 Consensus. In parallel, she has been underlining the commitment of her Government with the maintenance of the status quo. This contradiction has been pointed out by different observers as a danger to stability in the Strait. Of course, Beijing was quick to react, and Taiwan has seen its international room for maneuver cut short.
Unlike Chen Shui Bian, Tsai has a favorable context for belligerent foreign action around Taiwan's identity and independence. The confrontation between the US and China has allowed it to take a leap forward that ignores the real balance of power in the Straits. In keeping with the White House's policy in the region, Tsai is playing to turn Taiwan into a triumph for Washington in its game with Beijing. Confident in US military aid, she seems to forget that, the American friend, she can – as happened in 1971 – sacrifice her allies.
Tsai's participation in the recent local elections was focused on a confrontational discourse with China that seems to ignore the weight of material issues. She received a strong blow from the electorate. Local results do not have to carry over to the presidential elections. However, the management that the next Administration makes of some of the policies implemented by Tsai in relation to China will be key for the region. From the other side they watch intently, uncertain what to do to seduce a new generation of Taiwanese whose connection to mainland China is fading over time.
Andrés Herrera Feligreras, Public University of Navarra. Ferran Pérez Mena, Qili Fundazioa Foundation.
