Bertrand Badie, professor emeritus at the Sciences Po University of Paris, has published Pour une approche subjective des relations internationals (Odile Jacob), in which he warns that classical geopolitics, based on the balance of powers or the resort to military action , no longer works because subjective factors weigh more and more, as well as the prominence of societies. Author of dozens of books, Badie analyzes the conflict in Ukraine for this newspaper, two years after the Russian invasion.
Are you taking the Russian threat against Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas seriously?
In my job I have learned to take everything seriously, even what seems to be pure rhetoric, joke or provocation. The essential point of my book is that we are in a world dominated by a battle of meaning.
What does it mean?
Since 1991, neither the former Russian empire nor the Western world has managed to find a new and adequate formula for their relationship. And this mutual inability has had the main consequence of creating in Russia, defeated in the Cold War, a terrible feeling of frustration, perhaps of humiliation. That episode of Moscow against Tallinn is the expression of that extremely strong subjectivity that has accumulated on both sides. Estonia feels the anguish of being forcibly reintegrated into the former Russian empire, and Russia is obsessed by the idea that the Baltic states constitute the spearhead of the domination that the West would like to exercise over the entire European continent.
Can Putin attack a Baltic republic, despite being part of NATO?
I do not believe that. I could be wrong because nothing is certain in international relations. It all depends on the decision of an individual or a group of individuals. He would say it is unlikely for a very simple reason: Putin was surprised by the extent of the military defeat he suffered in Ukraine, when he thought he could conquer Kyiv in two or three days. I don't see how, alerted by that failure, he could launch into an even more difficult conquest. It would not only be attacking a neighboring country but also a member of NATO and the EU. But the fact that it is improbable does not mean ignoring it.
What are you thinking about?
If Putin expresses himself this way, it is because the problem of the Baltic republics, of European borders and of Russia's relationship with the outside world is reaching a dangerous paroxysm. Even if he does not resolve the conflict with weapons, he has many other ways of creating tensions in which violence, without being military, will be painful for everyone, including us Western Europeans.
Are you referring to hybrid war, with the weapon of migrants, as Belarus did with Poland, or cyberwar?
Yes, cyber attacks, disinformation, economic, political and institutional destabilization, demographic destabilization. In a globalized and interdependent world there are multiple ways to harm a state, even violently, without a war with military means. I'm no fortune teller, but an invasion of Estonia with tanks doesn't seem like a very convincing scenario to me.
Will your analysis change if Trump is president again?
The simplism and naivety of the reactions to Trump's speech bothers me a little. He is a political businessman. His strategy is to construct the rhetoric his constituents expect. The very serious crisis that American society is suffering has been underestimated, which translates into a very strong desire in the middle class to take revenge for a globalization that has not been favorable to them, to withdraw from military interventions that have had more costs than benefits, and an exasperation in the face of allies who, in fact, cost them very dearly. Trump, who wants to be re-elected, plays this game to the point of caricature.
Political marketing?
Yes, but it is political marketing of a new nature, which rebels effectively in excess and I would say even in ridicule. It's very cynical marketing. If he is re-elected, I think that his policies will not necessarily reflect everything he has said.
Won't you let a NATO country fall?
In his first term, his initiatives regarding NATO were very little decisive. In his four years, apart from the catastrophic denunciation of the 2015 treaty with Iran on the nuclear issue, the decisions he made were mainly facade, such as leaving UNESCO, moving the embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, insulting Theresa May or Angela Merkel, shaking hands with Kim Jong-Un in front of the cameras, things without major consequences. This man wants to show off but not so much to reinvent the world. It is clear that there could be very surprising decisions, but, a priori, this great concern that is perceived seems a bit excessive to me.
Will Russia lose this war?
Of course. Russia has already lost this war. What he is trying to do is compensate for her losses through skillful diplomacy that will allow him to avoid total failure and, in the absence of complete annexation impossible, keep 16% of Ukrainian territory.
Which scenario do you see most likely? An agreement? Will Ukraine accept losing territories?
If you look at history, the end of wars has not been negotiated for almost two centuries. It did not happen in the two world wars. It was not the Paris agreements that ended the Vietnam war, nor the Doha agreements that ended the Afghanistan war. I don't think there is negotiation. Ukrainians will never agree to sign a document that recognizes the annexation of Crimea and the four occupied provinces. The most likely is the preferred formula since 1945, that of frozen conflict, with de facto but not de jure annexations, such as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and, to a certain extent, also Kosovo.
You propose “moving from a world dominated by verticality to a new horizontal configuration”
For me it is absolutely fundamental because if you look at today's conflicts, most of them are linked to the harmful effects of verticality, to the principle that the Euro-American world considers itself the center of the world and dictates the norm for the entire international system. That no longer works, neither culturally nor demographically nor sociologically. It is convenient to draw conclusions from the new world and see that the main consequence of globalization is interdependence. The weak will continue to depend on the strong. But the great novelty of globalization is that the strong depend more and more on the weak, in the field of energy resources, raw materials, in the demographic field, even in religious matters. But we are far from seeing the beginning of the solution. When the need for horizontality became evident, the strongest backed down, creating the G-7, reaffirming the UN Security Council. Western leaders continue to lecture everyone. But that's over. It does not work.
Has that influenced the war in Ukraine?
Yes. Putin has managed to transform his military defeat into a diplomatic victory because he has been able to speak to the Global South to tell them that he himself has been a victim of Western hegemony, that his defeats are explained by pressure from NATO, the same one that Southern countries are victims. Without reaching an alliance, he has allowed her to create the conditions for collusion.
