In 1567, Felipe II sent Fernando Álvarez de Toledo, third Duke of Alba, to the Netherlands to punish the rebels, persecute Protestant heretics and modernize finances. He was a man of the highest confidence, and also of Carlos V. The six years that this complex mission lasted, which ended in failure, and, especially, the military campaigns that took place between April 1572 and December 1573 are the central axis of Punishment is necessary. The Duke of Alba and the Flanders revolt.
Àlex Claramunt, director of Desperta Ferro Historia Moderna and author of Rocroi and the loss of Roussillon (2012) and Farnesio, the lost opportunity of the Tercios (2014), dives into what happened from Dutch sources and offers a complete vision of the causes of the flamenco revolt against Spain.
For the author, what drove the duke's actions at all times was the reason of State, not religious fanaticism. He was an excellent soldier and, therefore, strictly carried out the orders of Felipe II on the ground, waiting for the monarch to travel to Flanders to attend to his vassals. The deaths of Prince Carlos and Queen Isabel, in 1568, and the outbreak, shortly after, of the rebellion in the Alpujarras prevented that trip. Alba, who was a military man, not a politician, was forced to govern one of the most problematic regions of Europe.
When it comes to analyzing the causes, Claramunt goes beyond recent historiography. We are not just facing a religious conflict or a territorial rebellion. The social and economic crisis played a determining role in the revolts. The Netherlands had been through three years of extreme winters, crop failures, famines, and natural disasters. Diplomatic conflicts with England reduced trade and fishing, in such a way that, in the coastal provinces of Holland, Flanders and Zeeland, famine added to poverty. In addition, in this situation, the grand duke imposed a series of tributes, which caused major discontent.
As is well known, coexistence between the Spanish troops and the population was not easy. Housing and feeding more than ten thousand soldiers from the tercios was a major source of tension. Even the Catholics, happy with their presence, refused to welcome them into their homes. The rebels, however, felt they were subjects of the king and aspired to achieve religious tolerance and respect for local privileges. Somehow, they looked forward to the arrival of the monarch, which never happened, to address these issues. Said absence, interpreted as contempt by many, accentuated the distance with the Hispanic monarchy.
In the words of Claramunt Soto: "In 1572, the population of the Netherlands, mostly Catholic, had to choose between siding with Alba and his troops or with William of Orange and the beggars of the sea." Cities in the Netherlands, and many others, could have defended themselves against William of Orange, the main aristocrat opposed to the policies of Felipe II, but the unpopularity of the Duke of Alba and his policies was such that the loyalty of the Dutch vanished.
We find ourselves before a renovating study of an apparently hackneyed subject. The rebellion in the Netherlands now appears in three dimensions thanks to a multitude of elements that allow for a more nuanced and complex vision.
