It is a matter of days before Sweden's blue and yellow flag will fly alongside those of the other 31 member countries of the Atlantic Alliance at its headquarters on the outskirts of Brussels. It will be a symbolic act, but, in geographical and military terms, it will represent one of the greatest recent changes in terms of security in the region.
Virtually the entire coast of the always disputed Baltic Sea will belong to partners of the military organization, a reversal with respect to the current situation or during the Cold War, when it was mostly under Russian control, which should not lead the allies to fall into temptation to see it as NATO's lake, several analysts warn regarding the frequent use of this expression, which has made fortune in the heat of the accession processes of Finland and Sweden to the Alliance.
From the point of view of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, the entry of the Nordic country is a relief, since it significantly improves their strategic position. Even if Russia seized the Suwalki Corridor, the strip between Poland and Lithuania that separates the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad from Belarus, they would no longer be geographically disconnected from the Allies. And Sweden will also provide the strategic island of Gotland, located between the Swedish peninsula and the Latvian coast, which will significantly strengthen NATO's ability to control the Baltic.
Stockholm's abandonment of 200 years of neutrality to join the Alliance "is a defeat for Russia because one of Vladimir Putin's supposed reasons for invading Ukraine was to prevent NATO from approaching its doors and now he is going to have it." closer than ever,” highlights Sven Biscop, analyst at the Egmont Institute in Brussels. “But we cannot say that we are now in control of the Baltic. Yes, we are stronger. But I would avoid saying that it is now NATO's lake because the challenges are enormous and Russia also has access to it,” he recalls.
Such a representation “does not reflect the reality of the Baltic,” agrees John R. Deni, a researcher at the Institute for Strategic Studies, linked to the United States military, who cites, for example, the recent damage to underwater gas pipelines. “The truth is that coastal states face significant threats that mere membership in NATO will not ameliorate.” On the contrary, these allies “face a regional security dynamic that will require refining and increasing their military capabilities,” he warns.
The current Russian naval fleet in the Baltic does not seem to have the capacity to hinder allied supply routes, but "other types of threats arise", from hybrid attacks to small amphibious assaults, special operations and threats to civil or military objectives, Deni details. in an article for Carnegie Europe. Moscow also maintains its ability to carry out submarine operations, such as attacks on energy connections between the Baltic countries, with its base in Murmansk in the North Sea, and also has “formidable capabilities,” including missiles and nuclear weapons. , in Kaliningrad. “No, the Baltic is definitely not NATO's lake” with the entry of Sweden, concludes the North American researcher, in line with another analysis by the prestigious British defense think tank Royal United Services Institute.
From a purely military point of view, with its 32nd partner the Alliance adds a more powerful partner than one might think, Biscop points out in a telephone interview. “By referring to Sweden as a neutral country we do not associate it with a military power, but from a legal point of view, it means that you have to have powerful military forces, since it implies that you have to be able to defend your neutrality against any assault. The same thing happens with Switzerland,” he points out.
Although the trigger for their demand to join NATO was the large-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, in 2014, when Moscow occupied Crimea, it was the trigger for a series of political decisions – some, such as the reinstatement of compulsory military service, adopted by a progressive government – which include the remilitarization of the island of Gotland and denote the seriousness with which Stockholm took the geopolitical changes that were beginning to take shape. Until a few years ago known as a “humanitarian superpower”, the Nordic country is also an arms exporter with a powerful industrial base. “So – concludes the Egmont Institute analyst – let's not present it as a helpless neutral ally. “Sweden is an asset for NATO.”
