Pável K. Baev (Vladivostok, 1957), a member of the Oslo Peace Research Institute (PRIO), believes that Russia is not in a position to stop the latest Ukrainian offensive and reverse it, due to the growing human and material shortages of Your army. But this political scientist and military expert, trained in the Soviet Union, goes further in his analysis. He thinks that, once the war is over, it will be very difficult for Europe to deal with a defeated, convulsive and dangerous Russia. In an interview with La Vanguardia, Baev dares to speculate about the eventual collapse of the Putin regime, the one responsible for the disastrous Ukrainian adventure. Russian history teaches that one of the scenarios could be a combination of military mutinies and regional and social unrest, leading to a palace coup.
Has the success of the latest Ukrainian counteroffensive surprised you? What is your military and political analysis?
It has not surprised me. It has encouraged me to think beyond that dominant strategic theory that envisions a long, stuck war. My interpretation of this apparent paralysis in July and August is that the hostilities were increasingly fluid. Talk of fluid paralysis might sound like a contradiction in terms, but that was exactly what was happening. Russian positions along an overlong front showed increasing weaknesses. The Ukrainians looked at it carefully, and in the first week of September they struck a blow against one of the vulnerabilities, to spectacular effect.
Do you think that the Russian army will be able to react and push the Ukrainians back again?
No. The Russian forces, heterogeneous, do not have the capacity for a new offensive. The regular battalions coexist with Wagner's mercenaries and various paramilitary groups. It is becoming more and more obvious that the capabilities of artillery, the main weapon in the advance of the beginning of summer, are being reduced. Shell arsenals are running out. And the tubes of the big guns have to be replaced, which is, technically, almost impossible.
To what extent are we witnessing an American war, given the massive and decisive help from Washington, both in arms and in intelligence?
It is obvious that the United States is one of the parties to the conflict, like almost all European countries, but the war remains, first and foremost, a Ukrainian affair. The help is essential, but it is only the Ukrainian soldiers who are facing the Russian aggression and advancing to liberate territories. And it is only Ukrainian cities that suffer from indiscriminate Russian attacks.
From the beginning, you were very skeptical about the ability of the Russian forces to achieve Putin's objectives. Seven months after the invasion, how has your analysis evolved?
It did not take a great analyst to see already, at the end of February, that the Russian offensive could not achieve its objectives. They needed at least three times as many troops and they didn't have that many. Nor did it take much insight to realize, in the middle of summer, that the paralysis was unsustainable. The Russian forces were exhausted and no relief arrived, while the Ukrainian forces were growing in number and quality. At this moment, it could be said that the course of the war has changed and that the defeat of the Russian detachments west of the Dnipro River, which were reinforced against all strategic logic, will take place, at the latest, in the coming months. This will allow Ukraine to quickly deploy and launch a new offensive in the south, towards Melitopol.
From a geopolitical perspective, what will be the consequences of this war for Europe?
An extremely dense fog of war covers this geopolitical perspective beyond the next success of the Ukrainian forces. It is easy to predict what a Ukrainian victory will look like, but it is difficult to assess the risks of a Russian defeat. Europe has achieved a new unity in the face of Russian aggression, but agreeing to help Ukraine is much easier than deciding how to deal with a defeated, seriously troubled and dangerous Russia.
Do you think that the Putin regime's days are numbered?
Yes, this war is definitely Putin's war. He can still maintain that the defeat in the Kharkiv region is simply a "regrouping" (of Russian troops), but the loss of Kherson will be much more difficult to explain in that way. Clearly, he is to blame for this announced disaster. Many sectors of the elite will want to carry it on their backs. They will proclaim his innocence to escape punitive sanctions. It is difficult to foresee exactly how the regime will unravel. Russian history is very rich in examples and precedents. Most likely, we will see a combination of military mutinies, regional unrest, social unrest, and a palace coup.
