Very opportunely, in full debate in recent days on the progress of the Ukrainian counteroffensive, the Russian army, after a month of bombing the Kharkiv region, has been able to launch an attack on the city of Kupiansk, forcing the evacuation of 11,000 civilians from 53 towns. This is the same scene as the spectacular Ukrainian coup in September 2022, which caught Russian forces by surprise and out of supplies.
This comes at a time when the main Ukrainian effort in the south, in the province of Zaporizhia, is almost at the same point as it was in early June, when it began a counteroffensive that led many to think it would be forceful and swift. Where did this idea come from? Guilty can be sought, but the question today is another: is the counteroffensive going ahead or does it have no future?
Several ideas fueled the expectations that the war would end soon: the serious problems of the Russian army, the Ukrainian combativeness and the mirage of a hundred Western tanks that would make the difference. It also contributed that Kyiv – cheered on by the occasional US military – spoke insistently of recovering Crimea, as if the most expensive piece on the board were within reach.
In the Pentagon, where they know the situation well, a few days ago they took the liberty of pointing out the evidence that the war will last throughout the fall and part of the winter. And Democratic Congressman Mike Quigley called the briefings he had had with allied military in Europe "sobering," that "this is going slower and slower than anyone would like" and that it is "the most difficult time in the war". Indeed, the summer will end, the weather will change and everything can slow down again.
Already before beginning the attack, the layout of the Russian defensive lines in the south was made public to the whole world (thanks to Western technological input). The Ukrainians now argue that there are too many mines, forcing them to change tactics to reduce the number of casualties (which they do not report). The Institute for War Studies of Washington (ISW), the great benchmark in this war, points out that the Russians practice an "elastic defense", based on withdrawals and counterattacks, which is exhausting. The Russian preparations in the south would have been very efficient, while the Wagner group entertained the Ukrainian troops in Bakhmut (they have turned the tables, attracting Russian reinforcements to Bakhmut, but this battle is still an episode).
According to the Ukrainians, if they had received more weapons and much earlier, they would have attacked last spring and many lives would have been saved. From his point of view, the biggest problem is not having enough weapons to change conditions. It is not about the much-discussed F-16 fighter jets – which could perhaps arrive next spring – but about missiles that can break Russian supply lines, a need that points to the fact that Kyiv is still in the early stages of the counteroffensive. . More Franco-British Storm Shadow missiles would be missing, such as those that attacked the Chongar and Henichesk bridges linking Crimea with continental Ukraine on August 6. They were not completely destroyed, but the expertise of the Ukrainian aviation (one of the best kept secrets of this war) was demonstrated, which the day before escaped in time from a Russian bombardment of the Starokonstantyniv airfield.
Volodimir Zelensky is now asking for German Taurus cruise missiles (500 kilometers in range), which has reopened the political discussion in Berlin due to fears that their shipment will contribute to an escalation with Moscow, a fear shared in Washington. Frustration with the counteroffensive is leading the debate among politicians and analysts to scenarios "Korean style", a possible armistice that would imply the division of the country. For Kyiv, a prospect of eternal war.
Such a forecast to end in a draw may be premature. Ukraine still has the initiative and Russia instead has had to dig in. It must be remembered that it has not been able to complete the conquest of the four Ukrainian provinces it claims, and that – recently recalled the Kremlin spokesman, Dmitri Peskov – it has included in its Constitution: Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia and Kherson.
The offensive on Kupiansk this week does not immediately respond to any of these four objectives. It contains the revenge effect, yes, and also the effect of causing problems for the Ukrainian troops. A victory is also necessary at a time when Moscow is under attack by drones. But situations like this have already been seen, and will continue to be repeated.
War doesn't just happen in the trenches, and in this sense the Ukrainians still own the story. Its attacks with aerial drones on Moscow and other Russian territories, and naval drones against Russian ships and infrastructure in the Black Sea are blows that show Russia's deficiencies, its limited anti-aircraft defense capacity, the problems in the Ministry of Defense (the coup of the Wagner group in June, the disagreement between some commanders and, at least according to the ISW, the lack of reserve troops) and, therefore, rotations in the units at the front, which leads to speculation about the possibility that a day the lines break at some point. It may or may not happen, but in any case it does not seem like it is the moment.
