They are the two communities in which the Popular Party has its worst electoral records. In fact, in 2015 the PP won the general elections despite being sixth in Catalonia and fifth in the Basque Country. In 2016 he also won despite being fifth in both communities. It is an electoral syntagm that the PP designed an electoral war machine to win Moncloa without having to be competitive in the Basque Country and Catalonia. And yet, precisely because of these historical difficulties, any new movement or signal in relation to the blue car in these territories should be audited. We know the Basque Country and Catalonia very well professionally on the ground. Their movements in votes for the PP are few, they do not usually have a decisive weight in their final result, but qualitatively they work in general as two advanced indicators of the victories of the PP. A top-level electoral anemometer that measures the speed of the wind, as well as its flow and ambient temperature.
And what does the speed tell us? That the PP has today consolidated a victory similar to that of Rajoy in 2015-2016. This is what they are seeing in the latest polls this weekend. Moving between Rajoy's low fork (123) or high (137). These figures, which we anticipated a year ago in our first war room, today are a demographic consensus. Some examples to measure its flow: historically the results of the PP in Spain in the bipartisan era used to be about 22 points above its result in Catalonia. In 2015-2016, with the right divided between PP and Cs, the gap was reduced to around 18.5 points. In 2019, with the right fragmented between PP, Vox and Cs, the margin was about 12.5 points. Today the PP returns to its 2015-2016 positions.
It can be seen even in the last barometer of the CEO who gave the PP a strong rise of around 12.5% of the votes (range 11-14%). This result, together with an average of 30% in national polls, raises, eureka, the gap of 18.5 points that we were talking about, which, as you can see, draws a scenario that is quite coherent with the time of the divided right, in which that the PP was fighting for dominance on the right with a single rival, only now it is Vox and before it was Cs. The rise in the case of the province of Barcelona in the polls should leave no doubt about the indicator: the PP rises in general from 7% in 2019 to 13.3%, doubling its 2 deputies to 4.
Now let's go to Euskadi to measure the ambient temperature through a simple example. It may surprise you, but this past September the PP was in Álava, beware, with 22.3% the first political force in general elections. Signal: the PP could win again in Álava a decade later. The last time was in 2011 with 27.17%, echoes of an absolute majority. In the last two elections, the PP had been left without a seat. When in 2015-2016 it achieved the second position (18.80%, 20.44%). Today, after that frothy month in which he was leading, he is fighting for the second position in a technical tie at 19%, attention, with the PSE-EE.
If you analyze the poll of polls, as well as all the political mathematics published with its different methodologies, all the polls agree that, for almost two years, the PP has been ahead of the PSOE in the polls 70% of the time, with the parenthesis between January and April-May due to the crisis in the party's leadership. Everything beyond the "Feijóo effect" and effect blows. Polls can be informative, performative and deformative but, above all, polls are always more stable than political news. Conclusion: six months after regional and municipal elections that will define who will win the general elections with more than 140 seats, no strategy implemented in these almost two years has changed the sign of the party. Walking in circles like sheep. It is dangerous to fight against an effect, you abandon your project and your journey without also achieving anything about it. Even Euskadi and Catalonia advance for this reason today the victory of Feijóo, as they did before with Rajoy.
