Taiwan is the most likely location for a US-China clash to take place. According to a joint communique with China in 1972, the United States "recognizes that all Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait hold that there is only one China and that Taiwan is a part of China" and "does not challenge that position." Nevertheless, Washington reaffirms the US interest in a peaceful solution to the Taiwan issue. Since the 1970s, official US policy has been "strategic ambiguity," meaning that Washington will not commit to coming to Taiwan's defense in the event of a Chinese attack. However, that strategic ambiguity is accompanied by Washington's repeated declaration that it opposes any unilateral attempt by Beijing or Taipei to change the status quo.
That is, the United States wants to deter a Chinese invasion to seize Taiwan and, at the same time, discourage Taiwan from declaring formal de jure independence. Such a policy has been described as a dual deterrence that seeks to prevent either side of the Taiwan Strait from unilaterally changing the existing situation. Recently, the United States appears to have altered that policy. When asked if the United States would come to the aid of Taiwan in the event of an attack on the island, President Joe Biden has declared on at least four public occasions that such a commitment exists. However, these statements have been later refuted by officials of his own Administration, who affirmed that, in reality, there had been no change in official US policy. Of course, the statements have caused much confusion and bewilderment in Beijing, where officials perceive the United States as having unilaterally changed its stated policy and, in doing so, violating formal and informal understanding and commitments with Beijing.
Washington's policy can be described as extended deterrence. Extended deterrence seeks to protect an ally or client from a third party attack. Direct deterrence, on the other hand, seeks to prevent an adversary's attack on one's own country. Obviously, for a country to engage in extended deterrence requires a more credible commitment than in the case of direct deterrence. Few people will doubt a country's will to fight to defend itself against a foreign invader. However, it is more questionable that that country has the means and the will to defend an ally or client, when that decision could entail a high cost. Neither Taipei nor other capitals need to be reminded of what happened to US support for friendly governments in Saigon and Kabul, or allies like the Kurds in northern Syria. And, most importantly, enhanced deterrence requires that the country undertaking such a policy actively demonstrate its credibility and resolve to fulfill its promise to defend an ally or client.
On the surface, the policy of strategic ambiguity contradicts such a requirement. In effect, that policy holds that the United States may or may not come to Taiwan's aid if the country is attacked. A country truly determined to defend an ally or client would not say that it can or cannot defend its protégé. If I want to discourage a stranger from attacking my wife, I will affirm that I am willing to fight him if she touches her. I will not say that I could fight with him. A sincerely committed advocate would never say such a thing. Strategic ambiguity undermines the credibility of Washington's commitment to Taiwan. While that policy gives Washington leeway to decide whether or not to intervene, it also makes its intentions less clear to Beijing, Taipei and other capitals. In the jargon of political scientists, deterrence is a binary choice: commit without question or not. There is no middle ground by introducing a yes or a but. Anything short of an irrefutable commitment undermines the credibility of the country that engages in deterrence.
So why does Washington want to adopt a policy of strategic ambiguity? An unchallenged commitment to defend Taiwan can create what sociologists call a moral hazard. That is, create incentives for others to perform the behavior that you want to avoid. For example, if a government offers comprehensive insurance for automobile accidents, it may inadvertently encourage more reckless driving among motorists who will no longer have to pay out-of-pocket for reckless behavior. Similarly, an unchallenged commitment by the United States to defend Taiwan could encourage Taipei to declare its formal independence, prompting an attack by Beijing, just the event Washington is trying to avoid. In fact, that same caution prevented London from declaring allegiance to France and Russia before World War I for fear that Paris and St. Petersburg would use British support as carte blanche to provoke Berlin and Vienna. Moral hazard, moreover, is related to Taiwan's incentives to defend itself. If the United States is defending the country, what incentives will Taipei have to get involved in its own defense? Taiwan could become a freeloader and engage in parasitic behavior.
As just indicated, the expanded deterrence policy must be made credible in the eyes of officials in other countries. And how to make it credible? With words and also with deeds. Political scientists have pointed to the verbal signals by which the leaders of the country involved in deterrence repeatedly, clearly, and forcefully communicate the intention to come to the aid of the ally or client. By adopting such behaviour, they compromise their own personal reputation and that of their government with the announced course of action and thereby subject themselves to so-called hearing costs in case of breach of commitment. Audience costs refer to the internal political repercussions that a leader may suffer if he does not keep his promises, such as defending an ally or client. Those political repercussions can be the result of criticism from the media, attacks from the political opposition and, of course, rejection by voters at the polls. Thus, it is possible to appreciate whether Washington is serious about defending Taiwan by examining the public statements of US leaders. The clearer, more frequent, and authoritative the statements are, the more credible Washington's commitment will be, since those who make them will be knowingly exposing their reputations and their political fortunes to possible rejection if their announced intentions fail to materialize.
However, it is often said that words are carried away by the wind. They are often dismissed as hollow, and must be supported by the facts. As already mentioned, a country can try to make its commitment to an ally or client credible in the eyes of third parties by carrying out tangible actions; especially, actions that involve great costs for himself. The most visible and credible examples of this type of action are, for example, the signing of a formal security treaty, the establishment of a joint military command with the protected country, the construction of military bases there and, finally, the deployment of own troops on the front lines of that ally or client. Any lay observer can appreciate for himself the level of US commitment to Taiwan's defense by examining and comparing those metrics with those of other US allies such as South Korea and Japan. On the eve of World War II, Adolf Hitler dismissed threats from London and Paris to intervene on Poland's behalf in the event of an attack on the country. He regarded these statements as empty threats because neither Britain nor France had deployed troops in or near Poland capable of effectively resisting the German invasion.
The indicators just mentioned clearly indicate that the US commitment to Taiwan is weaker than its commitment to South Korea and Japan. Naturally, one may wonder if Washington's intention is to really defend an ally or if the intention is something else. According to a joke heard in some circles, the United States is ready to fight the Russians in Ukraine down to the last Ukrainian soldier. In other words (and like other previous episodes, such as the Russian invasion of Afghanistan and the conflicts in Vietnam and Korea), we are facing proxy wars. Washington armed and supported the mujahideen to fight the Russians in Afghanistan; Moscow and Beijing backed Hanoi to resist the United States in the Vietnam War; and Moscow helped Beijing and North Korea against the United States in the Korean War. In all these conflicts, the great powers have tried to distract, trap, tie up, and exhaust their adversaries without actually entering the fray themselves.
Referring to extended deterrence, would the United States and its NATO partners have behaved the way they did if they really wanted to prevent a Russian invasion of Ukraine? Would his threat of deterrence to Moscow have been more credible if he had announced a troop deployment rather than simply supplying arms and ammunition for Ukraine's defense? It is known that the United States has placed express restrictions on the shipment of weapons to Ukraine, such as limiting the range of missiles or artillery capable of reaching Russia.
Taipei is not unaware of possibilities like the ones just mentioned. Both Taipei and Beijing know that the US policy towards Taiwan is a derivative of its policy towards Beijing. In other words, Taiwan is of secondary importance to the United States, which values Taiwan not because the island is intrinsically important to it, but because it is important to Beijing. Taiwan officials are not so naive as not to perceive that they are playing the role of a pawn in the Sino-American competition, and that Washington periodically plays the Taiwan card to gain a bargaining chip with Beijing. The Taiwan question favors Washington if it is not resolved, as it provides a bargaining chip and provides a permanent goad with which to annoy Beijing. Now, as I ask again below, why should Beijing accept such a situation and leave the dispute unresolved for generation after generation?
The officials and people of Taiwan are well aware that in the event of war, it will be they who will suffer the most devastating consequences. The island's economy will be ruined, and many of its inhabitants will be killed and injured. And there is the geographical fact that, whatever the outcome of a possible war with China, Taiwan will have to continue to live side by side with its close neighbor, while the Americans can always come home. This geographic fact also indicates that the stakes are much higher for Taiwan and China than for the United States. The closer a crisis or dispute is to one's own country, the greater its interest and, consequently, the greater its determination to stand firm. Even setting aside the question of nationalism, why should Beijing care less about Taiwan than Washington cared about Cuba (with its various plots to kill or overthrow Fidel Castro and, indeed, its actions during the crisis of the 1962 Cuban missiles that brought the world to the brink of nuclear war)? Those parallels with the war in Ukraine should be self-evident.
Simply put, while the US has more military capability than China, it's pretty clear that Beijing has more interest in Taiwan's status than Washington. Furthermore, it is resolve, determination, dedication to one's cause, and willingness to suffer deprivation that ultimately matter more than mere military capability in deciding the outcome of a war. The lessons of the Vietnam and Afghanistan wars suffice to prove this.
This debate raises another question. The policy of strategic ambiguity and dual deterrence has worked for more than forty years as it has maintained peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. This policy is based on a friendly Sino-US relationship based on mutual trust, and is also conditioned by the significant military and economic power of the United States. In addition, it entails a patience on the part of Beijing that allows it to put aside the question of Taiwan for the moment and focus on more priority issues. It is important to note that Washington's policy of deterring a Chinese military attack on Taiwan and, at the same time, discouraging Taiwan's formal independence has the effect, and indeed the intent, of perpetuating the status quo, Wa's preferred situation. ¬shington, who prefers a divided China to a unified one with Taiwan under Chinese control. Now, why should Beijing put up with this situation that amounts to perpetuating its national division and secession from Taiwan? Even if it is Washington's preferred situation, why should Beijing accept it, especially when its military capacity is growing and Washington is now trying to deny it the fruits of economic compromise?
Put bluntly, as China closes the military capabilities gap with the United States, the prospect of war becomes less intimidating or thankless. And, as the United States tries to isolate China economically and bans the export of advanced technologies to that country, Beijing's economic incentives to engage with Washington are diminishing as well. Also, as its domestic market grows, Beijing has less need to rely on foreign exports, including exports to the United States.
One last ingredient in this ever-changing mix is Taiwanese public opinion. The island's inhabitants increasingly identify as Taiwanese rather than Chinese, encouraging politicians with a pro-independence program. At the same time, Taiwan's economy has become more integrated with that of China, the destination of more than 40% of exports. Thus, the policies that divide the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have distanced themselves (at least when comparing the Kuomintang government headed by Ma Ying Jeou with the current government of Tsai Ingwen, the leader of the Democratic Progressive Party, PDP, who defends the cause after Taiwan's independence), although their economies have become more integrated, with Taipei being much more dependent on China than vice versa. The choice facing Taiwan's officials and people is increasingly posed as a dilemma of whether to prioritize politics or prioritize economics (i.e., pursue the political goal of independence or economic rewards). of further integration with China).
With a shifting military and economic balance placing the country at a great disadvantage, time is not Taiwan's ally. So why is Taipei resisting a deal with Beijing when its bargaining position can be expected to deteriorate in the future? One explanation is that public opinion in Taiwan is in favor of independence and that politicians, if they want to be elected, must reflect that opinion. Another explanation (the two are not mutually exclusive) is that many Taiwanese believe that the United States will come to their defense. Therefore, Beijing is not wrong in concluding that Washington is the main stumbling block in resolving the Taiwan issue. He is also not wrong from his perspective in refusing to renounce the use of force, because that threat has been the main and most effective way to stop Taiwan's politicians from carrying out the wishes of their people and, in fact, to get Washington to pressure Taipei not to declare independence.
As just mentioned, Taiwanese public opinion shows great resistance to Beijing's calls for reunification. And, as time goes by, as young people enter the electorate, the prospects for a peaceful reunification seem, in the eyes of Beijing, more and more difficult given this trend in Taiwanese public opinion; This, in turn, increases the likelihood that Beijing will use force to seize Taiwan.
In addition to these developments, American public opinion has shifted sharply toward anti-China. Although Democrats and Republicans rarely agree on an issue, they agree on a strong-arm policy with China. At the same time, Chinese citizens seem to have become more nationalistic. They criticize their government for not taking a tougher line on Taiwan and the United States. Being perceived as soft on the Taiwanese issue can be a serious liability for any official in China. The confluence of these trends indicates that we are heading towards a very dangerous time. Domestic partisan politics, public opinion, economic disengagement, and the shift in the military balance are an explosive combination that increases the danger of armed conflict in the Taiwan Straits.
Steve Chan. University of Colorado, Boulder.
