The Vietnam War was much more than jungle ambushes and helicopter raids. There were also large battles that pitted thousands of combatants from both sides and that, due to their magnitude, attracted the attention of the American public, which was trying to understand why its soldiers fought and died in Southeast Asia.
One of those great battles took place in January 1968. The US was at a decisive moment in Vietnam, after three years of direct intervention. General William Westmoreland, commander in chief of the North American forces in the Asian country, was convinced, by the data collected by his intelligence, that the communist troops were preparing a major offensive.
His conviction was based on the scraps of information that American intelligence had been gathering in the previous months: increase in North Vietnamese recruitment, arrival of Chinese and Soviet weapons, movements on the Ho Chi Minh route... But he lacked conclusive data on when and where. the alleged offensive would take place.
For General Westmoreland, however, the signs were clear. He believed he had the answer: Hanoi troops were preparing an attack on the misnamed Demilitarized Zone (known as DMZ), the border between North and South Vietnam. The increase in enemy activity in that area since 1967 was the most obvious symptom.
The Khe Sanh military enclave was a strategic point, since it was the westernmost base in the DMZ. It was located in the province of Quảng Trị, on a small plateau next to the village that gave it its name. Furthermore, Khe Sanh was only eleven kilometers from the border with Laos. That position and its landing strip made it a fundamental point to control the infiltration of North Vietnamese forces along the branches of the Ho Chi Minh route.
The continuous fighting around Khe Sanh led Westmoreland to increase the garrison to six thousand soldiers. Primarily, Marines from the 26th Regiment of the US Marine Corps (USMC). To improve the defense of the base, the Americans occupied positions on hills 558, 881, 861 and 950 (known as such because of their height).
Additionally, to increase support for those troops, the general ordered the start of Operation Niagara, an intense bombing campaign against known North Vietnamese positions in the DMZ.
The decision to castle at Khe Sanh was not shared by the US military leadership in Vietnam. Marine Lieutenant General Robert E. Cushman, responsible for combat operations in the DMZ, was in favor of abandoning the base because of the risk that his troops would be surrounded. But Westmoreland was clear in his refusal “to grant the enemy a psychological victory by ceding ground.”
Westmoreland's suspicions were not entirely misplaced. Indeed, the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) had gathered forces near Khe Sanh; in total, about twenty thousand soldiers from the 304th and 325th divisions, led by General Trần Quý Hai, a veteran of the war against the French.
The North Vietnamese troops also had significant artillery support that allowed them to practically cut off traffic on Route 9. Thus they dealt their first blow against the Marines: by blocking that road, the Americans had to take the supplies they needed by helicopter. base.
Additionally, a North Vietnamese lieutenant showed up at Khe Sanh with a white flag, announcing that a major attack was imminent. David E. Lownds, the colonel in command of the base, hesitated to believe the deserter's confession, but, as a precaution, he ordered his men to be alert, which would buy him precious time.
The cards were laid on the table thirty minutes after midnight on January 21, 1968, when the North Vietnamese attacked Hill 861 with rocket and mortar fire. It was the prelude to a battle fought for that position between three hundred North Vietnamese soldiers and two hundred marines, who fought hand-to-hand for five hours until the assailants withdrew.
Just then a bombardment began on Khe Sanh and the rest of the positions in the hills. The North Vietnamese howitzers hit the base's weapons depot and blew up 1,500 tons of ammunition. The explosion also destroyed the base's dining room, as well as several helicopters parked on the premises.
In total, on the first day of fighting, fourteen Marines were killed and forty-three were wounded. From there, the Khe Sanh base attracted the attention of the entire world during the 77 days that the siege lasted. The Americans managed to send reinforcement contingents by air, which included the presence of rangers (special forces) from South Vietnam.
Bombing the base and fighting in the nearby hills became something of a routine over the next few weeks. The defense of the compound was a priority issue for General Westmoreland and the White House. The interest in defending Khe Sanh at any cost was maintained even when, nine days after the start of the bombings against the USMC enclave, the great Tet offensive began.
In fact, Westmoreland considered that the Tet surprise attacks on the main cities of South Vietnam – such as the capital, Saigon, or Hue – were nothing more than a distraction from what was happening in Khe Sanh. As a sign of his determination, the general ordered an increase in the bombing of Operation Niagara. During these attacks, almost 115,000 tons of bombs were dropped, an amount comparable to the conventional weapons used against Japan in 1945.
So many resources to defend Khe Sanh hid, in reality, the fear of Westmoreland and President Lyndon B. Johnson that the Marines would be defeated in a humiliating way, as had happened fourteen years earlier with the French troops in Ðiện Biên Phủ, the battle which certified the end of French colonial rule in Vietnam and all of Indochina.
Westmoreland's concern reached such a point that he proposed the use of tactical nuclear weapons to avoid such a defeat. The general designed Operation Fracture Jaw to use the atomic card, but the White House ruled it out for fear of an escalation with the Soviet Union and China.
The comparison with Ðiện Biên Phủ also permeated the American press. The reference to the French defeat was constant in the media, which paid great attention to the siege of Khe Sanh. As an example, 40% of the headlines about the war during February and March 1968 focused on the situation at the base, even though the Tet Offensive was also being fought.
The reality had nothing to do with the fears of the press and the White House. At all times, the Marines maintained control of the hills near Khe Sanh, so the enemy could not gain those elevated positions to bombard the base at will with their artillery (as had happened with the French in 1954).
In addition to air and artillery support from nearby allied troops, the arrival of food and ammunition by air for the defenders was vital. At Ðiện Biên Phủ, the French needed about 150 tons per day, and their limited aviation could only provide an average of one hundred. Instead, the US managed to deploy a large number of helicopters and transport planes that brought 18,000 tons to the besieged.
Demonstrating once again the warrior pride that has made them famous, the Marines always referred to Khe Sanh as “the so-called siege.” They considered that their situation could never be compared to that of the French, since they were always well supplied and maintained their main defensive positions.
Despite the imposing US deployment, the North Vietnamese worked hard throughout the month of February 1968 to conquer Khe Sanh. They won small victories such as the assault on a small special forces base in Lang Vei – near the Marine positions – which saw the use for the first time of a dozen NVA tanks against US troops.
On February 23, Khe Sanh received the worst bombardment when the North Vietnamese launched 1,300 artillery rounds that killed ten Marines and wounded 51 others. The purpose of the shelling was to conceal that NVA sappers were digging trenches to approach the base. Two days later, the Marines discovered the ruse when the attackers were only 25 meters from their defensive perimeter.
Starting in March, US intelligence detected that the NVA was withdrawing troops to send them to other fronts of the Tet offensive. Despite the withdrawal, the North Vietnamese artillery continued to punish the positions. Furthermore, on April 1, after two months of planning, Westmoreland ordered the launch of Operation Pegasus.
Through this action, the general sought to lift the siege by sending a joint force of the USMC and the Army. The Marines advanced overland along Route 9, while the US Army's 1st Cavalry Division conducted a series of heliborne assaults to clear the way.
On April 8, the relief forces contacted their colleagues in Khe Sanh: the siege had ended, but not the fighting in the region, which continued until early July. In total, 274 Marines died defending the base, another 1,215 US soldiers died in aid operations to the enclave, and around 8,000 were injured. While their South Vietnamese allies had 2,000 casualties.
The fallen in the communist ranks are more difficult to estimate due to the lack of records, but, at the time, the Americans estimated that they had killed between 10,000 and 15,000 enemies.
Hanoi's intentions with the assault on Khe Sanh remain a matter of debate. The famous General Võ Nguyên Giáp stated that the Marine base was not important in itself, but only a distraction to draw US forces away from population centers in South Vietnam.
Other historians have favored a view more similar to Westmoreland's. They consider that the North Vietnamese mobilization of so many troops was not simply to distract attention, but perhaps sought to emulate the victory of Ðiện Biên Phủ to force the United States to seek a negotiated solution to the war.
In any case, as Max Hastings indicates in his book Vietnam. An epic tragedy, 1945-1975 (Criticism, 2019), excessive concern for Khe Sanh helped destroy Westmoreland's reputation as a military commander in Vietnam. He paid excessive attention to the situation in the DMZ, which made it easier for communist forces to surprise the Americans and South Vietnamese with the Tet Offensive. It was undoubtedly one of the contributing factors to his removal from command of combat operations.
