"The military industry finds it difficult to feed the war in Ukraine"

Michel Goya, retired colonel and PhD in History, has been analyzing conflicts for more than twenty years for the French army and as the author of books, the last two on Ukraine and Gaza.

Oliver Thansan
Oliver Thansan
26 April 2024 Friday 17:26
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"The military industry finds it difficult to feed the war in Ukraine"

Michel Goya, retired colonel and PhD in History, has been analyzing conflicts for more than twenty years for the French army and as the author of books, the last two on Ukraine and Gaza. Son of a professional Basque cyclist who defected and took refuge in France, Luís Goya, who died in a fall shortly after he was born in 1962, Colonel Goya carried out missions in Africa, the Balkans and the Pacific . He is a commentator on the LCI channel, specializing in international politics.

As a military historian, what surprises you most about the war in Ukraine?

The war itself, because it represents an anomaly. I was one of those who saw it as unlikely, since it did not correspond in the least to the way the Russians and the Soviets proceeded, generally quite cautious. Sometimes very brutal, but always cautious. They only got involved if they knew each other so strongly that there would be no opposition. In my analysis I forgot the assumption that mistakes are made, even from rationality, if it is totally biased. There are other historical examples.

Which?

When Hitler declared war on the US, for example. There was nothing that pushed him to declare it. They hadn't attacked him. The same when Hitler invaded the Soviet Union. The Germans made many strategic mistakes.

The war in Ukraine is an industrial war, you yourself always talk about a war of military stocks. can you explain

It is indeed an industrial war. The military revolution took place between 1850 and 1950. It was the emergence of large-scale industrial warfare. After World War II, things haven't changed much. If they put Marshal Chuikov (Battle of Stalingrad) in charge of the Russian army in Ukraine, he would immediately understand what is going on.

There were no drones then.

True, but there were many more light aircraft. This war is very consuming and destructive [of armaments], like the Second World War. The difference is that then a new plane could be manufactured in two years, or a tank in one year.

Does it refer to the term between conception and manufacture?

Yes, two years could pass from the time it was designed until it left the factory. Now it is totally impossible. Five or ten years may pass, so you fight with the old man.

Is technological sophistication to blame?

Yes, sophistication greatly extends timelines and is much more difficult to produce. In World War II, the Americans manufactured hundreds of airplanes every day.

It depends on the old material.

exactly Not much is technically innovated during the war. You were talking about drones, but they are relatively small objects that can be handcrafted and adapted to old material. What impresses me is that in this war they are fighting with teams that I knew during the cold war, in the eighties. The tanks are the same, maybe slightly improved. Since it is a very destructive war and production is weak, it is forced to resort to stocks. If this war has lasted so long it is because the Russians and Ukrainians had stocks. If not, it would have ended a long time ago.

And from now on?

Industrial wars can be very short, lasting several weeks, if one of the opponents is much stronger and prevails. If there is balance and they begin to entrench themselves, to settle, the war of movement becomes a war of positions. Then we no longer count in weeks but in years. It happened in Korea or in the war between Iran and Iraq. Also in the First World War. It is a kind of war that lasts for years and, as is the case in Ukraine, the military industry finds it very difficult to feed. Hence the importance of having stocks.

In this scenario, the most likely hypothesis is a frozen conflict, as in Korea or Cyprus, with Russia retaining the conquered territories?

It's a pretty likely hypothesis. We see on the ground that it is very difficult to move the front line. It has barely moved since mid-November 2022. Since early 2024, the Russians, who are on the offensive, have conquered the equivalent of two-thirds of the principality of Andorra. Only this in four months of effort. It's tiny.

How do you see Biden's strategy, so gradual? Would things really change drastically with Trump if he comes back to power?

US policy is quite cautious. It can be seen that they want to dose their military effort so that Ukraine resists. In military terms it is called "fixing" the opponent, but no more, for fear of an escalation. You don't want to go too far against Russia because you're afraid of the consequences, a nuclear escalation, which nobody wants, or consequences for the rest of the world. That is why they have limited aid and are not sending the F-16s. As for Trump, even without him military aid was blocked for six months. The United States is a very random ally. Trump's particularity is uncertainty. The problem for the US is that it has to watch other fronts. The European is not necessarily his priority. They have Korea, Taiwan and China, which they are very worried about. Their priority is Asia, the Pacific.

Will Congress' unblocking of this last colossal aid alter the course of the war?

It will change some things and provide a boost to the Ukrainian army, which is urgently short of artillery ammunition, but it will not fundamentally alter the situation. It may allow Ukraine to resist better, but it will not really change the balance of power.