“The Bundeswehr, the army I am allowed to lead, is quite diminished,” General Alfons Mais, head of the German army, wrote in an emotionally charged social media post the day Russia attacked Ukraine. “We all saw it. to come and we were not able to make our arguments count, nor to draw or apply conclusions from the annexation of Crimea. It's not a nice feeling! I'm fed up."
Almost a year after that famous message from the general, the German armed forces are more diminished than ever as a result of all the material sent to the Ukraine. Ammunition stocks would only last a few days, instead of the 30 recommended by NATO. The radio equipment used by the soldiers is 40 years old and analog, making it easy to intercept. Of the 350 Puma infantry fighting vehicles, only 150 are operational. The Bundeswehr doesn't even have enough Band-Aids, according to a December report by Eberhard Zorn, inspector general of the armed forces.
To experts and military personnel, the dismal state of the German military is hardly news, but until Russia's attack on Ukraine the German leadership did not care enough to do anything about it. War in Europe seemed unthinkable. The political leaders saw how the army was reduced to a force capable of deploying several hundred men to help fight in international conflict hotspots such as Afghanistan or Mali, but without the capacity to defend Germany itself or fulfill its obligations to the NATO.
A year ago, it seemed that the shock of the Russian invasion would lead to a swift sea change in the Bundeswehr. Three days after the attack, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz let the world know that Germany was determined to have a strong and advanced army by announcing in parliament a "turning point" that included the creation of an additional fund for 100,000 million euros for the armed forces, twice the annual defense budget. He also promised to meet the NATO target of defense spending of 2% of GDP. "That speech was a real shock," says a high-ranking German military officer. At last the armed forces would be a priority for policy makers.
Eleven months later, the soldiers are frustrated again. So far, the military hasn't seen much of that promised massive investment. Germany has ordered 35 US-built F-35 fighters that will replace the existing fleet of Tornado fighters, but they will not be delivered until 2027.
Defense Minister Christine Lambrecht resigned on January 16 after a series of blunders. She was to have overseen a major reform of the military, but she preferred to take small steps. "We have lost a decisive year," says Christian Mölling of the German Council on Foreign Relations, a think tank. Mölling believes that when he delivered his speech, Scholz was unaware of the magnitude of the armed forces' problems.
The entrenched malaise is such that the position of defense minister is seen in Berlin as a “career killer” or an “ejection seat”. Scholz tried unsuccessfully to convince a high-level politician to take Lambrecht's place. Boris Pistorius, who was sworn in on January 19, was Lower Saxony's interior minister. On his second day on the job, he had to justify Scholz's evasions about sending heavy tanks to the Ukraine.
Pistorius will not have a moment's rest. He must rebuild the German army, continue to help Ukraine and, at the same time, fulfill his commitments to NATO, says Rafael Loss of the European Council on Foreign Relations, another think tank. On January 1, Germany assumed command of the Very High Readiness Joint Force (VJTF) of the Atlantic Alliance. It is a brigade of 11,500 soldiers, more than half of which are contributed by Germany. However, if the VJTF were to be deployed, the German contingent is so poorly equipped that it would have to divert materiel from other Bundeswehr units. It would hardly be operational within 48-72 hours, as required by NATO.
Germany has also pledged to make 30,000 fully equipped men and women available to NATO by 2025. Experts doubt it can do so. The German armed forces are made up of a total of about 183,000 soldiers, compared to almost 500,000 at the end of the Cold War, when West Germany spent almost 3% of its GDP on defense. Three decades of underfunding and an increasingly bloated bureaucracy have taken a heavy toll. However, to rebuild the German army requires more than money. Soldiers - and their commanders - must not continue with a feeling of being fed up. Otherwise, the armed forces will not attract the men and women necessary to reach the projected 203,000 soldiers by 2032.
© 2023 The Economist Newspaper Limited. All rights reserved.
Translation: Juan Gabriel López Guix
