The vote is the result of a combination of short-term factors (the campaign, the performance of the leaders, electoral promises, the expectations created by the polls...) and long-term ones. These second ones are not as visible as the first ones, since they operate, so to speak, like an underground current, in front of the waves and the foam that can be seen from the mainland.
There is a long-term factor that is increasingly important in the Spanish vote: the national question, that is, the opposition between the mononational and plurinational conceptions of Spain. The constitutional status quo falls somewhere in between: there is a strong decentralization of spending and the autonomous communities enjoy many powers, although our Constitution does not recognize plurinationality or adopt a truly federal structure.
During the first two decades of our democratic period, the national question did not produce great political effects beyond Catalonia and the Basque Country, which have always had their own party system, different from Spain as a whole. If the public opinion data prior to the arrival of the Popular Party to power in 1996 are analyzed, it is verified, for example, that the degree of pride in being Spanish does not explain the ideological and partisan orientations of citizens on the left-right axis. . The intensity with which belonging to Spain was felt varied greatly within each ideological block, to the point that there were hardly any systematic differences.
However, since the beginning of the 21st century, coinciding with the absolute majority of José María Aznar, it is observed that the national question is coupling to the classic division between left and right. At present, we can fairly accurately anticipate the ideological position of the citizen knowing his degree of Spanishness (and vice versa). Little by little, there has been a growing territorial divergence based on national identity. The autonomous communities that are less Spanish supporters have become more to the left, and those that are more Spanish supporters, more to the right. In an article from a few months ago, I drew attention to the surprising fact that Catalonia and the Basque Country are two of the most leftist regions in Europe. In the same way, it could be said that the undeniable shift to the right of Andalusian society, a stronghold of the PSOE for decades, has a lot to do with its becoming a Spanish bastion in reaction to the Catalan independence movement.
This coupling between ideology and national identity has contributed to the increase in the levels of political polarization, as well as the intensification of conflicts between the center and the periphery. Catalan and Basque nationalism, on the one hand, and Spanish nationalism, on the other, constitute the two extremes of this opposition. They represent two opposed political visions with ramifications of all kinds that reach the cultural terrain, lifestyles and moral values. Without going any further, support for the monarchy, which for a long time was relatively transversal in society, today is overwhelmingly concentrated on the right.
The right-wing has clearly opted for the mononational model (and, in the case of Vox, centralist as well). The left of the social democracy (Sumar) advocates the plurinational model. And in an uncomfortable and ambiguous central position remains the PSOE, which recognizes a plural and diverse Spain, but is reluctant to take the step of plurinational recognition, probably because the social democratic electorate is internally divided, hence its doubts and ups and downs, but also his integrating and inclusive spirit against the right.
This scheme is the one that best explains the political alignments that have occurred since the motion of no confidence in 2018. Then, for the first time, an alliance materialized, at different levels, between the PSOE, its left, and non-Spanish nationalist groups. The Popular Party has denounced that alliance in the most gruesome terms possible, resurrecting the specter of anti-Spain (made up of reds and separatists).
The confrontation has been resolved in the elections last Sunday. Despite the fact that the policy of alliances has caused the PSOE all kinds of problems and tensions, its support has increased with respect to the November 2019 elections. It is true that it has lost the elections by a narrow margin, but, in the Insofar as it has avoided the absolute majority of the Spanish right, the result can be considered a success.
What is interesting is that the growth of the PSOE has been concentrated precisely in the territories in which Spanish nationalism has less social presence. Compared to the November 2019 elections, the PSOE has won 968,771 votes, of which 43% come from Catalonia. If we speak generically of the "Catalan countries" (adding Valencia and the Balearic Islands), the percentage rises to 62%. In terms of population, however, these three communities are only 30%. Something similar has happened in the Basque Country (the PSE has risen six points), although the final effect is weaker due to its low population weight.
The Spanish right wing believes that alliances with nationalist parties pose the greatest threat to the future of Spain. They think that Spanish disaffection must be subjugated. The left, on the contrary, aspires to some kind of persuasion and integration exercise. Despite the virulent campaign of Spanish nationalism, it seems that there are still more citizens who opt for the inclusive solution.
