The forgetfulness of Sabra and Chatila

After the atrocities of Nazi Germany or the Empire of the Rising Sun or the My Lai massacre in the Vietnam War, the cruelest face of humanity in its recent history had two names: Sabra and Chatila.

Oliver Thansan
Oliver Thansan
03 November 2023 Friday 10:26
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The forgetfulness of Sabra and Chatila

After the atrocities of Nazi Germany or the Empire of the Rising Sun or the My Lai massacre in the Vietnam War, the cruelest face of humanity in its recent history had two names: Sabra and Chatila. The Muslim neighborhood in the south of Beirut and the refugee camp that was set up on its outskirts to welcome Palestinians expelled from Israel was the scene between September 16 and 18, 1982, of one of the bloody massacres of civilians committed by Christian militias. Lebanese with the full connivance of the Israeli Army that occupied the country at that time.

The latest studies estimate between 3,000 and 3,500 Palestinians murdered in that episode, considered by the United Nations as genocide against the Palestinian people in a historic resolution of its General Assembly that same year. The majority of the documented victims were women, children and the elderly, who also suffered rape, amputations and all types of humiliation.

As a vain justification for barbarism, revenge was appealed for the assassination of the elected Lebanese president Bashir Gemayel, belonging to the Lebanese Phalanges, a conservative formation made up mostly of Maronite Christians. Encouraged and protected by the Israeli forces with the argument that militants from the Palestine Liberation Organization were also hiding in Sabra and Chatila, a large group of Phalangists entered the neighborhood and the refugee camp to torture, rape and murder. to its inhabitants.

This was determined by a commission of inquiry commissioned by Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin to the president of the Supreme Court of Israel, Yitzhak Kahan, to investigate the role of the IDF in the massacres. The Kahan report, as the conclusions of this exhaustive investigation were called, not only offered details about the massacre, but also directly implicated senior officers of the Israel Defense Forces, the chief of its General Staff and the man himself. Defense Minister, Ariel Sharon.

In its Recommendations and final comments, which we reproduce in full, the report advises purging responsibilities – administrative, not criminal – on various prominent figures in the Army, the Mossad and Sharon himself, who was effectively removed from office a week after the report was made public. report, in February 1983. However, that did not prevent him from returning to Shimon Peres' cabinet a year and a half later and continuing his political career until becoming prime minister, a position he held between 2001 and 2006. The initiatives to prosecute him in abroad or by international justice before his death were also unsuccessful.

"Recommendations

”With respect to the following recommendations concerning a group of men who hold senior positions in the Government and the Israel Defense Forces, we have taken into account the fact that each of these men has held many positions to his credit. public or military services performed with sacrifice and devotion in the name of the State of Israel.

However, if we have come to the conclusion that it is our responsibility to recommend certain measures against some of these men, it is because we recognize that the seriousness of the matter and its implications for the foundations of public morality in the State of Israel demand them.

”The prime minister, the foreign minister and the head of Mossad

”So far we have established the facts and conclusions regarding the responsibility of the prime minister, the foreign minister and the head of Mossad. In view of what we have determined regarding the extent of each of their liability, we consider that it is sufficient to determine liability and there is no need to make further recommendations.

”Major General of the Northern Command, Amir Drori

”We have previously detailed our conclusions regarding the responsibility of Northern Command Major General Amir Drori. Major General Drori was tasked with many difficult and complicated tasks during the week that the Israel Defense Forces entered West Beirut, missions that he had to fulfill after a long period of difficult war.

”He took certain measures to put an end to the actions of the Falangists, and his fault lies in the fact that he did not continue with these actions. Taking into account these circumstances, it seems sufficient to us to determine the responsibility of Major General Drori without resorting to any other recommendation.

”The Minister of Defense, Mr. Ariel Sharon

”We have confirmed, as detailed in this report, that the Minister of Defense has a personal responsibility. In our opinion, it is appropriate for the Minister of Defense to draw appropriate personal conclusions arising from the defects revealed in respect of the manner in which he discharged the functions of his office and, if necessary, for the Prime Minister to consider whether or not he should exercise his authority under Article 21-A of the Basic Law, according to which 'the Prime Minister may, after informing the Government of his intention to do so, remove a Minister from office'.

”The Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Rafael Eitan

”We have reached serious conclusions regarding the acts and omissions of the Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Rafael Eitan. He is about to complete his term in April 1983. Taking into account the fact that an extension of his term is not being considered, a recommendation regarding his continuation in office is of no practical importance, and we have therefore resolved that it is sufficient to determine liability without making any additional recommendations.

”The director of Military Intelligence, General Yehoshua Saguy

”We have detailed the various very serious omissions of the Director of Military Intelligence, Major General Yehoshua Saguy, in the performance of the duties of his office. We recommend that he not continue as director of Military Intelligence.

”Division Commander Brigadier General Amos Yaron

”We have previously detailed the extent of Brigadier General Amos Yaron's responsibility. Taking into account all the circumstances, we recommend that Brigadier General Amos Yaron not serve as a field commander in the Israel Defense Forces, and that this recommendation not be reconsidered before three years have passed.

”During the course of this investigation, deficiencies in the operation of several Army agencies have been revealed, as described in the chapter that deals with this issue. Appropriate lessons must be learned from these deficiencies and we recommend that, in addition to internal control in this matter, an investigation into the deficiencies and how to correct them be carried out by an expert or experts, who will be appointed by a Minister of Defence.

”If in the course of this investigation it is determined that certain persons are responsible for these deficiencies, it is appropriate to draw appropriate conclusions in this regard, either in accordance with the relevant provisions of the military legal code or otherwise.

"Final comments

”In the witness accounts and in several documents, emphasis is placed on the difference between the usual battle ethic of the Israel Defense Forces and the battle ethic of bloody clashes and combat actions between various ethnic groups, militias and fighting forces in Lebanon. The difference is considerable.

”In the war that the Israel Defense Forces waged in Lebanon, many civilians were injured and many lives were lost, despite the efforts made by the Israel Defense Forces and its soldiers not to harm civilians. On more than one occasion, this effort caused additional casualties among the troops themselves.

”During the months of the war, Israeli Defense Forces soldiers witnessed many scenes of carnage, destruction and ruin. From their reactions (of which we have heard) to acts of brutality against civilians it would seem that despite the terrible sights and experiences of war and despite the soldier's obligation to behave as a combatant with a certain degree of callousness, soldiers of the Israel Defense Forces cannot lose their sensitivity to atrocities perpetrated against non-combatants, whether out of cruelty or to give vent to feelings of revenge.

”It is regrettable that the reaction of Israel Defense Forces soldiers to such acts has not always been strong enough to put an end to despicable acts. It seems to us that the Israel Defense Forces should continue to promote awareness of the basic moral obligations that must be fulfilled even in conditions of war, without harming its combat capability.

”The circumstances of combat demand that combatants be tough, which means prioritizing perseverance in the objective and being willing to make sacrifices, to achieve the objectives assigned to them, even in the most difficult conditions. But the end never justifies the means, and basic ethical and human values ​​must be maintained in the use of weapons.

”Among the public responses to the commission were those who expressed dissatisfaction with the conduct of an investigation into an issue that is not directly related to Israel's responsibility. The argument was put forward that in previous cases of massacre in Lebanon, when the lives of many more people were lost than those who fell at Sabra and Shatila, world opinion was not shocked and commissions of inquiry were not established.

”We cannot justify this approach to the question of conducting an investigation, and not only for the formal reason that it was not we who decided to conduct the investigation, but rather the Israeli Government decided on the matter. The main objective of the investigation was to bring to light all the important facts related to the perpetration of the atrocities; Therefore, it has importance from the perspective of Israel's moral strength and its functioning as a democratic state that scrupulously maintains the fundamental principles of the civilized world.

”We are not deluded into thinking that the results of this research will convince or satisfy those who have prejudices or selective consciences, because this research was not intended for those people. “We have made every effort and spared no effort to arrive at the truth, and we hope that all people of good will who examine the matter without prejudice will be convinced that the investigation was carried out without prejudice.”