The fatigue of enlargement is behind us. For more than a decade, failure to enlarge has been the EU's mantra. Croatia's accession in 2013 was the exception that confirmed the rule. Jean-Claude Juncker, president of the European Commission (2014-2019), famously declared that no country would join the EU during his term. But everything has changed with the invasion of Ukraine
European countries (with the exception of Hungary) now generally see enlargement as an appropriate way to respond to the new geopolitical reality. In June 2022, the European Union (EU) granted Ukraine and Moldova the status of candidate countries in response to Russian aggression. This brought the issue of enlargement back to the fore and once again focused attention on the other candidate countries in the Western Balkans. By deciding to start negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova in December 2023, the EU has formally embarked on a journey towards an as yet undefined future.
In the past, enlargement was considered the EU's most powerful foreign policy tool and represented the bloc's famous “transformative power.” By accepting new members, or even more so by providing new countries (e.g. southern and later central and eastern Europe) with a credible prospect of membership, the EU exerted enormous influence: it exported its values and norms, It promoted its economic and social model and stabilized its neighborhood. Enlargement has been an indispensable part of the EU's success story. And it is no coincidence that it stopped coinciding with the loss of attractiveness to the world of the community idea in the last two decades plagued by crises. The main motivation for continuing with enlargements comes from the fear that the EU is in danger at its core, rather than from the hope that by accepting new members Europe will take another step towards “ruling the world” (Mark Leonard).
More than the projection of power and influence abroad (or the transformation of the neighbourhood), what drives the current debate is the self-transformation of the EU in the enlargement process. The expansion of European integration has always been linked to its deepening. However, with the “European polycrisis” (in the words of colleagues at the Center for European Policy) and the rise of Eurosceptic and far-right forces across the continent, the deepening agenda is rapidly facing increasing obstacles. greater. To expand, the Union needs to change; This mantra is repeated multiple times. In particular, in circumstances where the prospect of Ukraine joining the bloc appears as a decisive moment.
Even those who do not regularly follow EU policy have become familiar with the idea of its absorptive capacity. Such an idea refers to one of the key conditions of enlargement: the capacity to absorb new members in political, institutional and economic terms. As much as enlargement is necessary for geopolitical reasons, the EU must do its homework before moving ahead with accepting new countries. Since June 2022, enlargement has become a key word for a new battle over the future (or even the purpose) of the community integration process with an intensity never seen since the attempt to approve the European Constitution in 2004. The prospect of enlargement constitutes an inevitable shift in the political balance of power in the EU: between big and small, East and West, rich and poor, statists and free marketers. A great transformation awaits the Union: some countries want it, others fear it; and there are very few who doubt that it is brewing.
The question of the EU's transformative power in reverse (the ability to transform itself, not just the new members) will decide whether or not (and in what form) enlargement will occur. There is no consensus on this; and the coming months and years (especially just after the European elections) will decide the community's direction. The member states agree on the existence of a geopolitical justification for enlargement. According to the June 2023 Eurobarometer, 53% of EU citizens support enlargement in principle, while 37% are against it. The numbers in favor may not be overwhelming, but they signal the reversal of an underlying trend.
The scope and magnitude of the challenge is comparable only to the big bang enlargement that occurred in 2004. Now, although the geopolitical arguments in favor of enlargement are even stronger today than twenty years ago, the process is likely to face to more obstacles than then. The most important of these relate to the competing views among member states on the future transformation of the Union and the role that enlargement could play in achieving this.
The renewed interest in enlargement has been sparked by the collapse of the European security architecture as a result of the Russian war against Ukraine. The most spectacular thing is that leaders of countries that in the past showed little enthusiasm for enlargement have completely changed their tune. In a speech in Bratislava in May 2023, French President Emmanuel Macron, who in 2019 blocked the opening of accession talks with Albania and North Macedonia, said that “the question is not whether we should enlarge... but how we should do it.” Three weeks earlier, in a speech in the European Parliament, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz declared that “we have chosen a bigger Europe,” and explained that this is not a question of altruism but of ensuring lasting peace in Europe after the Zeitenwende of the Russian war of aggression. As the communiqué from the informal EU summit held in Grenada on 6 October states, “enlargement is a geostrategic investment in peace, security, stability and prosperity.”
However, understanding of how to meet the geopolitical goal of enlargement varies across Europe. France's Copernican turn on enlargement has to do with the fact that, unlike what happened in the past, France now considers enlargement as a catalyst for European sovereignty and not as an impediment to that traditional objective. French. In February 2023, Catherine Colonna, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, stressed that “Ukraine will be stronger. and Europe will be strengthened by Ukraine.” In France's opinion, the EU with Ukraine could become a powerful geostrategic agent in an increasingly competitive environment and a pillar of the post-2022 European security architecture; above all, because the powerful Ukrainian army will complement the EU's efforts to increase its military weight. Community enlargement towards the East constitutes, therefore, an important and almost indispensable step to make France's long-cherished dream of a “powerful Europe” come true.
However, this dream is not shared by the countries of central and eastern Europe; and this to a lesser extent even than in the past. The Russian war has shown how indispensable the United States is for the security of the EU. That overwhelming impression has not been neutralized by the recognition that the Union must prepare for a post-Biden United States that will make greater community cooperation on defense and security necessary, or even inevitable. In Poland and the Baltic countries, political elites consider NATO enlargement rather than future EU accessions to be the geopolitical priority.
There is a growing perception among member states that enlargement is not the only answer to the current geopolitical challenges facing Europe. Security guarantees for Ukraine and Moldova are an important part of the conversation, and EU countries should work closely with the United States and other G-7 members to develop a security partnership and meet Ukraine's long-term military needs. term. In this context, the new geopolitical nature of the EU will be revealed. The inclusion of Ukraine (as a future EU member and key ally) in European efforts will be of vital importance given the country's industrial potential, its strategic role and the current level of cooperation.
The EU will also have to create new financial instruments to cover joint procurement and develop military production in the Union. The European Peace Fund, which has played an important role in refinancing member states' supplies to Ukraine, is far from sufficient. The idea of a 100 billion defense fund launched by Commissioner Thierry Breton will not be easily received. The question of where the money will come from (from the common debt, national contributions or new EU own resources) will loom large in the debate. It may be that only the pressure of the possibility of European solitude in the face of the growing Russian challenge will help to reconcile supporters and skeptics of a geopolitical EU. That would be a vehicle for a major transformation of the bloc, one that would complement and be reinforced by its most recent push toward enlargement.
Successive rounds of enlargement have always caused changes in the geographical balance of power within the bloc. The accession of Spain, Portugal and Greece reinforced the southern flank, while in the 1990s the central-northern bloc received a boost. The most momentous was the enlargement of the EU towards the East. The inclusion of the countries of the former communist bloc led to an expansion towards the East that accentuated Germany's central position and reinforced its economic weight. France's skepticism regarding further enlargement was not unrelated to that experience of Paris's relative loss of power in the EU, which became much less Carolingian. The current geopolitical justification for enlargement does not diminish the importance of the EU's internal geostrategic considerations about how the bloc's expansion will affect its center of gravity. Quite the contrary, its perspective has already led to the formation of new coalitions within the Union that will influence not only the enlargement policy, but also the general community agenda.
In particular, the decision to grant Ukraine and Moldova the status of candidate countries has pushed member states, which were more focused on the southeastern neighborhood than the eastern one, to act. Although new support for enlargement may help revive the moribund accession process of the Western Balkan countries, Ukraine's dominance in the political debate and its enormous geopolitical relevance have threatened to overshadow the Balkan cause. In June 2023, Alexander Schallenberg, Austrian Foreign Minister, announced a new grouping of member states, the Friends of the Western Balkans, which includes Austria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Slovakia and Slovenia. and that it wants to take advantage of the current momentum towards enlargement to accelerate the integration of the EU's southeastern neighbors. The countries of the group signed the Göttweig declaration in June 2023, which underlines that “it is vital that the EU makes full use of the enlargement policy also as a geostrategic tool” and states that they want “to see our partners in the Western Balkans in the EU table as often as possible, whether formally or informally, as participants or observers.” Germany is not part of the group, but Berlin has made it clear that the Balkan countries should not be left out and that an enlargement that does not include them will be politically problematic. Speaking in the European Parliament in May 2023, Scholz called on the EU to fulfill the promises made to the Western Balkans and accelerate their integration.
There is no Ukrainian (or Eastern European) Friends group. However, Nordic and Eastern European states believe that Ukraine's accession will be the real turning point for the EU and (as much as a merit-based approach is essential) that Ukraine is a special case. With the change of government in Poland, closer cooperation in the Nordic-Baltic context does not seem like a distant possibility. The countries of northeastern Europe share a geostrategic approach to community enlargement and have very important interests in Ukraine's accession to the EU. They emphasize the need to ensure respect for the rule of law and democratic norms (now that Poland has returned to the fold) and the proper functioning of the single market. They also view enlargement from a security perspective and take a pragmatic approach to institutional arrangements so that the EU is prepared for enlargement. As highlighted in the presentation by Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, the new Government perceives cooperation with Nordic and Baltic partners as a priority in its foreign policy strategy. Furthermore, Tusk stressed his importance in his investiture speech before Parliament in December 2023 (in which there was no mention of Germany). There is no doubt that shaping the EU enlargement agenda could be one of the key ambitions to try to achieve in that format.
However, the oft-cited shift of the EU's center of gravity to the East has yet to materialize. However, the possible expansion towards the East and Southeast of Europe and the changes that it will entail in the balance of power of the bloc has raised alarm bells among some Western European countries. Former Portuguese Prime Minister António Costa explained that “every eastward enlargement means that the center of Europe's attention shifts to Eastern Europe. It is not necessarily a bad thing, but it is essential that we give greater impetus to the Atlantic Alliance.” In May 2023, Portugal invited an informal group of countries with strong Atlantic ties (including Spain, France, Ireland, Belgium, the Netherlands and Denmark) “to debate issues of common interest and establish the appropriate balance between continental projections and Atlantic Europe”. The group has no concrete plans, but its formation reflects concern that the economic cost of enlargement could be detrimental to its interests.
The idea of an institutional reform of the EU is subject to another debate and another dimension (perhaps the most important) of the planned (and enlargement-driven) transformation of the bloc. Although the Lisbon Treaty provides the institutional basis for an enlarged EU (preparing the Union for enlargement), there is already an active debate on how to adapt the EU's institutions and decision-making processes. France and Germany stand out as the countries that are pushing for the debate to move forward. A group of independent experts convened by Paris and Berlin has presented a detailed reflection paper on how to prepare the EU for enlargement. Furthermore, Annalena Baerbock, German Foreign Minister, hosted the Europe conference at the beginning of November to discuss EU reform and enlargement. In fact, France and Germany seem to see enlargement above all as an opportunity to undertake EU reform, which they consider to be an unfinished business regardless of any new accession.
Especially for France, the incorporation of new member states into the EU is not only a response to geopolitical challenges, but also a way to carry out a profound transformation of the European project. In his speech in Bratislava in May 2023, Macron stated that the EU needed to expand and “rethink its governance and objectives very thoroughly.” In the words of Joseph de Weck, enlargement can be the lever that allows Macron's vision of a fiscally powerful EU, more self-sufficient in military terms and more geopolitical, to come to light. French experts saw Brexit as a similar opportunity for a “European renaissance.” From a technical point of view, perhaps enlargement is not the most precise term for what might await at the end of that path, which could rather be a reconstitution of the EU with new countries on board.
The French idea would include extensive use of the principle of differentiated integration. According to Laurence Boone, French Secretary of State for European Affairs, “we have to think about differentiated integration.” However, Paris has not gone into defining the areas in which European integration could or should advance in smaller groups; nor whether and how closer cooperation in a smaller format would be possible in areas affecting the single market; nor what that would mean for the EU budget. Now, if the EU decided to move forward with that concept, the new members would enter an entity that would differ greatly from its current design.
The center-left German government is in favor of deepening European integration, as demonstrated by the long-term goal of creating a “federal Europe” enshrined in the 2021 coalition agreement, but its focus is on institutional effectiveness and cohesion. , more so than in a multi-speed or multi-level Union. In a speech in Prague in August 2022, Scholz explicitly said that enlargement depended on institutional changes and mentioned the extension of qualified majority voting used by the European Council (rather than unanimity voting), in particular in foreign policy and taxation. However, extensive use of differentiated integration capable of transforming the EU is not among Germany's priorities. Meanwhile, Portugal has floated the idea of a Europe a la carte, proposing the idea of an EU as a house with many rooms with different sets of tenants.
The Nordic countries, Poland, the Czech Republic and the Baltic countries are skeptical of major institutional changes. Some have even openly or tacitly expressed the suspicion that the ambitious agenda favored by Paris and Berlin is actually aimed at preventing enlargement, rather than enabling it. Whether or not that is the case, it is clear that the reform agenda could slow down the enlargement process. The new Polish government led by Tusk has modified its discourse in relation to the EU (it has declared that its objective is to “accelerate the process so that Poland is once again fully present in the EU”), but a fundamental change of significance cannot be expected. regarding an institutional review. During a visit to Brussels in October 2023, Tusk declared that “regardless of the French and German positions [on Union reforms], no revolutionary changes are needed.”
The two key points of the reforms will be the decision-making procedures (qualified majority voting) and the guarantees of respect for the rule of law. It is unlikely that a large group of countries will accept new members if these problems are not resolved. However, there is also significant opposition to making far-reaching changes in those areas, and that opposition is likely to increase in the future.
Take the case of qualified majority voting. Scholz has argued that unanimity voting and the use of veto power by countries risks preventing the Union from moving forward and that that risk will increase with more new members. For Germany, gradually moving towards majority voting will allow Europe to be “able to maintain itself on the international stage.” In May 2023, nine member states (Germany, Belgium, Slovenia, Spain, Finland, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands), later joined by Romania, launched the Group of Friends to Promote Qualified Majority Voting in the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy. The group wrote that it “is convinced that EU foreign policy needs adapted processes and procedures to strengthen it as a foreign policy actor.”
However, many countries, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, remain very skeptical or directly opposed to the extension of qualified majority voting. Austrian Chancellor Karl Nehammer has declared that the EU “will never fit into a template system like that of the United States.” Smaller and medium-sized countries already considered that Brexit changed the balance of power within the EU to their detriment. In theory, the so-called “bridge clause” of the Lisbon treaty allows for the extension, without the need to modify the treaty, of qualified majority voting if it is agreed upon unanimously. However, such an attempt will inevitably bring up debate on the weighting of votes in the European Council as smaller countries are likely to insist on strengthening their voting power. And that is impossible without a change in the treaty.
The puzzle of qualified majority voting illustrates the risk that institutional reform poses to the enlargement process. The countries most in favor of enlargement are those that most fear the debate on EU reform. And their interest in enlargement does not necessarily compensate for the possible negative consequences that the development of the EU transformation could bring. The financial and political derivatives of an EU in the process of enlargement are no less important. A Union with Ukraine (and other countries) will need more financial resources; but net and frugal contributing countries do not want to spend more. On the other hand, countries opposed to deeper integration have been against the Union acquiring new central powers, an inevitable consequence of greater redistribution (as in the case of the Next Generation Fund). A larger budget will require additional own resources (perhaps imposed at community level), which would be a powerful signal of how broadening and deepening go hand in hand.
Finally, there is broad consensus that the rule of law must remain the non-negotiable criterion for accession. For member states, the possibility of countries joining the EU that could undermine the bloc's value system and rules-based order appears to worry them even more than the potential negative impact on the bloc's decision-making. The experience with the illiberal regimes in Hungary and Poland has often been cited as a warning that the EU institutions are not able to effectively manage problems related to democratic backsliding. Strengthening the Union's instruments to protect the rule of law (such as EU budget conditionality and Article 7) appears as a key precondition for accession; above all, for Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and Ireland (which are part of the informal group of Friends of the Rule of Law), as well as for Germany and France. Still, ideas about how to protect the rule of law and address violations remain vague. With unanimity required for any significant change, the EU appears to be heading towards long and open negotiations, with the potential to contradict the self-proclaimed urgency of making bold decisions for geopolitical reasons.
The prospect of the next community enlargement could be the trigger for a new major transformation of the bloc. However, it is not at all clear which direction its vector will point. Whether the EU is finally ready for enlargement does not depend on any objective standards or the adoption of any of the concrete recommendations put forward by experts or politicians. The true measure of their absorptive capacity is whether member states can reach some political consensus on when to expand and under what conditions. Unless the member states manage to reach a grand agreement that takes into account their respective positions, as well as the geopolitical context in which Europe finds itself, the EU will not be able to accept new countries, even if all the boxes on the list are ticked. annual evaluation of the Commission.
At the beginning of 2024, it is an open question whether and how the EU will be able to reach a consensus on all these issues. Enlargement may be perceived as a geopolitical necessity, but it gives the impression that achieving it means squaring the circle. There is no doubt that populist and far-right forces will mobilize public opinion against enlargement; and the European elections in June 2024 will be the scene of a fierce battle also regarding this fundamental challenge. The results of a survey on the perception of enlargement carried out by the European Council on Foreign Relations in six member states (Germany, France, Denmark, Poland, Romania and Austria) are disturbing and constitute a warning. A large number of European citizens believe that Ukraine's accession to the EU will undermine rather than strengthen Europe's security (average 45% vs. 25%). In the case of the Western Balkan countries, opinions are equally gloomy, since few Europeans consider that their possible accession will mean an increase in the security benefits of the EU (23% compared to 33% who think otherwise). contrary). Overall, the fear that accepting new members could drag the EU into conflict appears to be greater than the conviction that its membership will isolate Europe from Russian or Chinese influences.
However, in most countries, between 20% and 40% of respondents have no opinion or are indifferent to the prospect of Ukraine's accession and enlargement in general. This signals the existence of a large sector of Europeans who can be convinced that their own future depends – as never before – on the EU's determination to make use of its main asset: the integration of its European neighbors in the sphere of peace and economic prosperity. |||
Piotr Buras is director of the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), Warsaw; senior policy researcher
