Historians, wrote the poet Heine, are backward-looking prophets. We journalists cannot explain the present by disregarding the past, which is its context. The sudden electoral advance with which Pedro Sánchez tries to dilute the organic malaise in the PSOE and save the Moncloa furniture before the arrival of some barbarians who do not read Kavafis, depends not so much on the campaign that Ferraz conceives – presumably: concentration of the left-wing vote in a single candidacy and a replica, we'll see if it's successful, of the famous anti-fascist alliance with which Pablo Iglesias attended the previous regional elections in Madrid– as well as an intelligent reading of the results of 28-M.
Apparently, the ship is sinking in the sea and the captain, before a probable rebellion of the crew, has ordered to advance – at full sail – towards Finisterre. All sailors, since the time of Ulysses, know it: on the high seas, solar mirages are as common as sirens' songs. The storm can suddenly change calm. And vice versa.
In the face of unforeseen events, it is convenient to have a map that indicates the destination, even if there is no guarantee of reaching Mainland. In Moncloa they have projected the results of 28-M and believe that, despite the sensation of the Apocalypse, there is a Cape of Good Hope.
To a large extent, its salvation depends on Andalusia, which, although it is no longer the barn of votes of yesteryear, can prevent the debacle from ending up as such or, perhaps, turn the hypothetical triumph of the Genoese admirals into a bitter, lame and limited victory. equivalent to the one that, at that time on the side of the left, conditioned the legislature that has just expired.
It is well known: the Second Republic arrived in Spain after local elections that led to a change of regime. The crisis, according to historians, however, came from a long time ago. Its remote origins date back to the Restoration period, whose functional collapse would have precipitated the end of the Alfonsine monarchy.
Are we, saving the distances, in a similar situation? The interpretation that they make in the circles of Madrid of the political photo of the 28M contemplates it like this. But if the voting statistics in Andalusia are analyzed, the improbable may become possible. It all depends on the voters and the approach to the battle. Neither the date nor the environmental framework help.
The electoral balance of the PP in the South of Spain – one of the pillars of the Feijóo project – has been excellent. Moreno Bonilla has managed to increase by 433,109 (11% more) the votes obtained in the 2019 municipal elections, when, months before, thanks to a three-way carom -PP, Cs and Vox-, he reached the Quirinale de San Telmo despite that the southern PSOE retained almost all its shields and municipal defenses.
From this point of view, 28-M means ratifying the hegemony achieved by the PP almost a year ago now. It expands its institutional dominance in all the capitals – it will govern without problem in seven, including Seville –, it advances in the medium-sized cities (Algeciras, Jerez, Marbella, El Ejido) and it will reign in six of the eight provincial councils. Vox contamination will be minimal and quite punctual. If it is not absolute political centrality, it is quite similar.
The indisputable progress of the PP, however, has not completely broken the ground of the socialists in the South. The PSOE has saved two councils –Seville and Jaén– and, in relation to the last regional elections, it is improving. From the meager 24% achieved on 19J, when Moreno Bonilla obtained the absolute absolute, nine points have grown, reaching 33% of the votes.
Five points now separate the PP from the Andalusian socialists. Last year the distance was close to 20%. Juan Espadas, Ferraz's secretary in Andalusia, clung to these data on Sunday night to ward off the emotional impact of 28-M. Unsuccessfully.
Moncloa, in a move of urgency and extremely high risk, has decided to grant all organic power in the South to the Minister of Finance, who is going to decide the electoral lists. The order is to face the battle of July 23 in the (suicidal) way of César Borgia. The possible success of the operation requires, however, getting the electoral strategy right. It's not an easy thing.
A campaign aimed at amplifying the photo of Columbus -with two of its three protagonists- does not seem to work in Andalusia. Two factors help to understand it. In the first place, the fear that Vox could cause in the South was neutralized on 19J: the majority of Moreno Bonilla, which attracted 16% of the socialist votes for this reason, prevented the ultramontanes from entering San Telmo and influencing Parliament in the Quirinale. finite cause.
From being the referees of the first legislature of Moreno Bonilla, Vox has become part of the landscape. His music sounds, but it's ambient. The second reason is purely empirical: if the Socialists have improved compared to the situation of a year ago, despite the collapse of 28M –loss of the mayoralties of Huelva and Seville; 248 councilors less–, Vox advances in slow motion, without it being possible to infer from this fact a greater or growing political influence.
Santiago Abascal's party, just as it happens in Madrid, is no longer relevant. Its growth may be extensive –96,711 more votes, better penetration at the local level– but it does not reach 7% of the votes. It lacks relevant mayoralties and even in the capital Seville it is not necessary for the investiture of the new mayor, José Luis Sanz, who, heading the list with the most votes, can be perfectly elected by the Plenary in a second vote.
In fact, compared to 19J, the ultramontanes have lost support, going from 13 to 6.8% of the vote. Maintaining at the same time that the Andalusian PSOE can save Pedro Sánchez and turning the timid advance of the ultra-right into the great axis of the campaign is a contradiction in its own terms. The events of 28M deny it.
What factors will depend on the omen and the prophecy of the elections this July in Andalusia? Fundamentally two elements: one material and the other environmental. The first is linked to the loss of provincial councils by the Socialists.
Once these corporations are constituted, the middle managers, the militancy and the voters (clientelist section) of the PSOE will be left without institutional footholds, without salaries and without budgets to sustain their territorial influence. Given the inbred nature, and the deep family culture of the socialist clientele in inland Andalusia, this factor may cause the demobilization of the party bases before the July elections. They have already lost.
The second element, so to speak, is sentimental. The Socialists, five years after leaving San Telmo, have just been relegated in a good part of urban Andalusia and in provinces such as Huelva or Cádiz, where they controlled almost all the levers of political power.
Although the global statistics do not seem calamitous with respect to 19J – an electoral setback of 3.56% in relation to 2019 is not Armageddon – the emotional feeling within the party's command structure is very reminiscent of the drama of an ancient Greek tragedy.
There is also a third problem: the division and civil wars between the parties located to the left of the Socialists have caused their electoral quota to drop in the last eleven months from 12 to 9%. They neither grow nor add up. Epic fail.
The potential vote of a bloc between the PSOE and the left in Andalusia could reach -if they concur in a coalition- 42.2% of the votes. Only 2.6 points below the sum of both rights. The future, like destiny, depends on factors that we do not control as much as on our own confidence and will. And of these ingredients neither the socialists nor the left are left over in Andalusia. To be a prophet, it is enough to be a pessimist.
