The scene disclosed this week was completely planned. On one side, the leader of the Lebanese Hizbullah, Hassan Nasrallah, who had kept a complete silence on Gaza. In front of him, two of the political leaders of Hamas and the Islamic Jihad. On the wall, photos of the Iranian Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, and Ayatollah Khomeini. But the message is not new. Iran has never denied support for the Palestinian cause and the so-called "Axis of Resistance", the network of politico-military organizations that finances the region and that, together with the Syrian Government, has in common the anti-Israeli position and anti United States One of their goals is to regain control of the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem, the third holiest site after Mecca and Medina, in Saudi Arabia. They have even set a deadline: 2040.
Hours after the attack by Hamas on October 7, the cities of Iran were filled with posters saying that the liberation of the Palestinian territories is near. But the celebrations in front of the population do not match the prevailing message that has come out of Tehran: it does not aspire to participate in military operations, it does not seek a war, but it does intend to escalate the tension in the region.
US Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated on October 12 that there was no evidence of Iran's involvement, while the organization's foreign relations chief, Ali Baraka, profiled the Russian channel RT when it said that those familiar with the plan could be counted on the fingers of one hand and that half an hour after the attack Hamas informed the Palestinian factions, Hizbullah, Iran and Turkey.
"If the crimes of the Zionist regime continue, the Muslims and the resistance forces will become impatient and no one will be able to stop them," Ali Khamenei said this week, in an attempt to distance himself from the decisions of the allies, a trend historical although not always real. President Ebrahim Raisi did the same, saying that Iran's priority in international politics is Palestine, but armed groups "make their decisions". The head of the Parliament's security committee, Vahid Jajal Zadeh, stated that he was in contact with the "friends of Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Hizbullah", and that "they do not expect us to carry out military operations".
On October 24, the Fars news agency claimed that the latest attacks on US bases in Iraq and Syria were a deterrent message for Washington not to intervene in the war between Hamas and Israel. The US Navy has two aircraft carriers with strike groups deployed in the region.
"Today at the headquarters of the United Nations in New York I say frankly to the American establishment and its military, who are managing the genocide in Palestine, that we do not welcome the expansion of the war in the region, but the I warn that if the genocide continues they will not be saved from the fire", assured Thursday the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hussein Amir Abdul·lahian before the General Assembly. Abdul·lahian also had a message about the civilian hostages of Hamas: Iran is willing to broker, along with Turkey and Qatar, the release of more than 6,000 Palestinian prisoners.
The supreme leader is the one who, under the 1979 Constitution, heads foreign policy. But, while Ali Khamenei can set the guidelines – such as giving the go-ahead to negotiate the Nuclear Agreement – he does not decide alone. In addition to the narrow and powerful circle of advisers, international policies are discussed in the Supreme Council of National Security, where, in addition to the heads of the three powers (presidency, justice and Parliament), the main commanders have a seat of the army and the Guardians of the Revolution, ministers, the ambassador to the UN and some other people. But on a day-to-day basis this policy is more complex and dynamic. And never linear. Analysts speak of a great internal debate between actions that oscillate between "institutional consensus" and internal "competence", which is evident very often. That is why many times the messages coming out of Iran do not match, or even clash.
Former Foreign Minister Muhammad Javad Zarif claimed in a private interview in 2021, which was leaked to local media, that Iranian foreign policy, especially in the Middle East, was increasingly influenced by the Revolutionary Guards and especially by the Quds Force, in charge of missions outside the borders and that after the death of the legendary chief, General Soleimani (killed by a US drone when he had just landed in Baghdad in January 2020) are in charge of Ismail Gani, a man who has kept a lower profile than his predecessor but who, they say, has focused his work on coordinating the actions of the "Axis of Resistance," Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Houthis Yemenis, Iraqi Shia militias and Hizbullah, militarily the jewel in the crown.
Zarif also explained that currently in Iran the "battlefield" always comes before "diplomacy". The same idea was expressed by the current Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hussein Abdul·lahian, who assured that if the US had decided to negotiate the nuclear agreement it was because of Iran's capabilities on the ground and the influence in the Middle East
Abdul·lahian belongs to a new generation of diplomats who fought in the war against Iraq at a very young age. If Zarif represents the classic school of diplomacy of the Islamic Revolution, Abdul·lahian is considered close to the Guardians of the Revolution, especially the Quds Force. He has called himself a "soldier of Soleimani", and when he was deputy minister for the Arab world he assured that he always consulted the general before undertaking a visit. His Arabic is much better than his English, and before assuming the ministry he assured that one of the objectives was to "consolidate the achievements of the resistance axis". Abdul·lahian has the confidence of the supreme leader, but especially of the Guardians of the Revolution, and his message should possibly be read in this context. It is not for nothing that his statements are often the harshest to come out of Iran. He went so far as to warn that if the "carnage in Gaza" took place, read the ground incursion into the strip, Tehran would be forced to act.
But if it came to that, would the Iranians be willing to get involved in a war? "No to Hamas, no to Hizbullah, I give my life for Iran" has been heard shouting at protests for years. The Government knows very well that the policy that seeks to consolidate its regional power is rejected by a fairly large sector that, while usually supportive of the Palestinian cause, finds it difficult to understand why it is necessary to invest millions of dollars in these groups while the life of Iranians is getting worse.
Despite some incendiary messages, Iran never acts in a suicidal way. He is pragmatic when he has to be and his moves abroad are always calculated. A logic that Hizbullah is starting in southern Lebanon, with several days of clashes with the Israeli army.
Can it get out of hand? Without any doubt. But perhaps the one who explained it best is the head of the UN mission, who assured that they would only intervene if Israel directly attacks Iranian territory. What Tehran decides with allies without revealing intentions is another matter, but greater instability in the region is possibly not in its interest.
