The vote is the result of a combination of conjunctural factors (the campaign, the attitude of the leaders, the electoral promises, the expectations created by the polls...) and long-term. These second ones are not as visible as the first ones, given that they operate, so to speak, like an underground current, in front of the swell and the foam that is observed from land.
There is a long-term factor that is increasingly important in the Spanish vote: the national question, that is to say, the opposition between the mononational and plurinational conceptions of Spain. The constitutional status quo is at an intermediate point: there is a strong decentralization of spending and the autonomous communities enjoy many powers, although our Constitution does not recognize plurinationality or adopt a truly federal structure.
During the first two decades of our democratic period, the national question did not produce major political effects beyond Catalonia and the Basque Country, which have always had their own party system, different from Spain as a whole. If we analyze public opinion data prior to the arrival of the Popular Party in power in 1996, it is verified, for example, that the degree of pride in being Spanish does not explain the ideological and partisan orientations of citizens in left-right axis. The intensity with which belonging to Spain was felt varied greatly within each ideological block, to the point that there were hardly any systematic differences.
Nevertheless, since the beginning of the 21st century, coinciding with the absolute majority of José María Aznar, it has been observed that the national question is being coupled to the classic division between left and right. At present, we can predict with great accuracy the ideological position of the citizen by knowing his degree of Spanishness (and vice versa). Little by little, there has been a growing territorial divergence based on national identity. The less pro-Spanish autonomous communities have become more left-wing, and the most pro-Spanish, more right-wing. In an article a few months ago, I drew attention to the surprising fact that Catalonia and the Basque Country are two of the most left-wing regions in Europe. In the same way, it could be said that the undeniable right-wing of Andalusian society, a fief of the PSOE for decades, has a lot to do with the fact that it has become a Spanish bastion in reaction to Catalan independence.
This coupling between ideology and national identity has contributed to increased levels of political polarization, as well as to the resurgence of conflicts between the center and the periphery. Catalan and Basque nationalism, on the one hand, and Spanish nationalism, on the other, constitute the two extremes of this opposition. They represent two opposed political visions with ramifications of all kinds that reach the cultural terrain, lifestyles and moral values. Without going any further, support for the monarchy, which for a long time was relatively cross-cutting in society, today is overwhelmingly concentrated on the right.
The right has clearly opted for the mononational model (and, in the case of Vox, centralist as well). The left of social democracy (Sumar) advocates the plurinational model. And in an uncomfortable and ambiguous central position is the PSOE, which recognizes a plural and diverse Spain, but is reluctant to take the step of plurinational recognition, probably because the social democratic electorate is internally divided, hence the doubts and vaivens, but also its integrative and inclusive spirit towards the right.
This scheme is what best explains the political alignments that have taken place since the motion of no confidence in 2018. Then, for the first time, an alliance materialized, at different levels, between the PSOE, its left and the non-Spanish nationalist groups. The Popular Party has denounced this alliance in the most truculent terms possible, resurrecting the specter of anti-Spain (made up of reds and separatists).
The confrontation was resolved in last Sunday's elections. Despite the fact that the politics of alliances has caused the PSOE all kinds of problems and tensions, it has increased its support compared to the elections of November 2019. It is true that it has lost the elections by a narrow margin, but, to the extent which has avoided the absolute majority of the Spanish right, the result can be considered a success.
The most interesting thing is that the growth of the PSOE has been concentrated precisely in the territories where Spanish nationalism has less social presence. Compared to the November 2019 elections, the PSOE won 968,771 votes, of which 43% came from Catalonia. If we speak generically of the Catalan Countries (adding Valencia and the Balearic Islands), the percentage rises to 62%. In terms of population, however, these three communities are only 30%. Something similar has happened in the Basque Country (the PSE has risen six points), although the final effect is weaker due to the low population weight.
The Spanish right-wing parties believe that alliances with nationalist parties pose the most serious threat to the future of Spain. They think that Spanish disaffection must be subjugated. The leftists, on the contrary, aspire to some kind of exercise of persuasion and integration. Despite the virulent campaign of Spanish nationalism, it seems that there are still more citizens who opt for the integrative solution.
