The results of May 28 have drawn an optimistic landscape for the right in the face of a demotivated left that let slip territories where its management loosely approved. For this reason, the diagnosis of what happened on 28-M necessarily determines the prognosis for the next generals. For example, did the conservative bloc vote on May 28 in the context of the general election, while the progressive party lived the electoral date with the intensity of some locals?
If this is what happened, then the scenario of 23 July is much more open than the outcome of 28-M suggests. But what if what really happened is that the left-wing electorate also went vote in the key of generals, taking into account the plebiscite on the management of the central government that the PP raised and that Pedro Sánchez boldly picked up?
In this second case, the July general elections would be held with a clear advantage for the right, although within a wide range of possibilities. For example, if the result of the municipal elections were repeated (something unlikely, since in those elections the vote is dispersed in multiple local lists that are not presented in the general elections), the PP and Vox would win, yes, but by a distance unsalvageable from the absolute majority. And just by adjusting the results of 28-M to the electoral spaces that add up the two blocs in the legislative ones - although maintaining the vote share of PP and PSOE -, the translation in seats would bring the right closer to 170 deputies. In other words, close enough to try to form a government with the active or passive support of some regionalist forces.
However, if the previous precedents regarding the traffic between municipal and general ones are followed, the spectrum of possibilities expands to surprising extremes. For example, in the 1999 local elections, the PP and the PSOE tied for around 34% of the votes, which, translated into seats, would have meant 143 for the Popular and 142 for the PSOE. Nevertheless, nine months later, the PP achieved 10 more points in the electoral quota while the PSOE repeated the same percentage. The result was an absolute popular majority of 183 seats.
Well, if the same pattern were to be reproduced now – even dividing that percentage rise on the right between the PP and Vox – the Popular would add up to 170 seats on their own. Feijóo would get around 40% of the votes, and Vox, a little less than 10%. It seems a rather improbable result (the three right-wing parties added up to just over 43% in the 2019 general elections), although not impossible if you look at the legislative elections of 2011 (when the conservative vote touched 50%) .
Now, along with that precedent (or that of the socialist defeat in the local and autonomous regions of 2011), other scenarios are presented that have had very different evolutions. In 1995, with an agonizing socialist government, the PP won the local elections with a margin of almost five points and conquered regional power in Madrid and Valencia. However, in the legislatures of March 1996, the Popular Party only improved its result in the municipal elections by three points (from 35% to 38%), while the PSOE improved by nearly seven points (from 30% to 37%). In other words, a tie in votes in the general elections and an insufficient majority (of 156 seats) for the popular.
Something similar, although in a very different context, occurred in the transition between the municipal elections of 2007 and the general elections of 2008. In that case, the PP improved its electoral share by more than four points, but the PSOE grow twice as much: nine points up to 44% of the vote in legislatures. And although the municipal vote awarded the popular 154 seats and the PSOE just over 140, the socialists finally added 169 deputies to the generals.
If this pattern is repeated now on the current electoral map, the result in the next general elections would give a slight advantage to the right (of maybe six seats), but it would leave the PP and Vox with less than 160 deputies, far from the absolute majority. On the other hand, the PSOE and Sumar – with more than 150 seats in total – could retain the central government with the support of their usual partners.
