Front page of The New York Times of February 26: The CIA has a network of 12 secret bases in Ukraine, on the border with Russia, fully operational. "Without these there would have been no possibility of us resisting the Russians", according to a former official of the secret services of Kyiv quoted by the newspaper of the United States.
Financial Times, eleventh paragraph of a front page story on February 28; a senior Defense official of a European country: "Everyone knows that there are Western special forces in Ukraine - it just hasn't been officially recognized".
Le Monde, March 2: The United Kingdom kept 350 troops for several months for special operations that assumed "a high political and military risk." And they have published more cases of sending soldiers on qualified training missions. These are examples that the affected governments have not denied.
Drums of war They highlight what is happening on the ground without the citizens having been warned or consulted. A dangerous escalation that approaches the possibility of a greater conflict.
For much less, wars have been declared in the past. It is not, therefore, for lack of excuses that it has not happened, but because of strategic and political considerations. It is in this context that Emmanuel Macron, the French president, uttered his words without ruling out any scenario, including sending troops, to prevent a Russian victory. The French press has explained that Macron brought Pulcinella's secret to the public light. Apart from its internal usefulness, verifying the Russian sympathies of the extreme right of Marine Le Pen, it was intended to highlight the refusal of Olaf Scholz, the German chancellor, to deliver missiles to Ukraine, because this would entail sending military personnel to the war scene, which had not been an obstacle for other governments.
In France, they criticize Germany for only acting internationally and militarily if the US does so first. It happened again with the crisis in Ukraine. Berlin felt trapped between two opposing empires and made a choice when it had no choice.
Macron exhibits military muscle, is the only nuclear power in the European Union and moderates the economic complex vis-à-vis Germany. He takes the greatness out for a walk and suggests that he may be the nuclear umbrella that Germany and Europe would need in the face of the Russian threat.
But he also and to the same extent states that he wants to take advantage of the upcoming military spending festival. There is a lot of money at stake. There are many who even expect it to be the main economic and technological engine of Europe in the future.
The manufacture of arms is an important business for France, the world's second exporter, but with little predicament among its neighbors and partners in Europe, who barely buy 10% of the total, the majority, a single country, Greece, and for a single product. They prefer the American friend, who has more arguments, coercive and commercial. It already happened to him when Australia canceled a submarine contract in favor of the US in 2021.
How are European partners now supplied? Well, mostly with imports from the USA, although apparently not in sufficient volume, judging by the vehemence of the complaints of Presidents Donald Trump and Joe Biden.
The argument for the escalation of armaments in Europe is the combination between the aggression of Vladimir Putin's Russia in Ukraine and doubts about the deployment of the US military in Europe, especially if Trump regains the presidency. A disjunctive that is already a classic of European politics since the end of the Second World War.
The American and NATO military cover against the threat of the Soviet bloc always had as counterpart or compensation, offest, in the language of the 1960s and 1970s, in the form of arms purchases in Washington.
And to achieve compensation, in each crisis the US pretended to withdraw the troops and the nuclear umbrella, such as when the Berlin Wall was built in 1961, or during the escalation of the Vietnam War. The Europeans ended up giving in, especially the Germans, who bought without even knowing what they had ordered and paying for it in advance. Now the episode is repeated and Europeans are confused about how to pay the bill.
It remains to be seen what remains of the European rearmament program and the intention that the suppliers are mainly European. It seems difficult that its modest war industry, relative to that of the great leader, the US, will sufficiently tempt EU governments.
Meanwhile, the option to spend more on weapons is beginning to shake up European politics. The German finance minister, the liberal Christian Lindner, has announced a budget deficit of 25,000 million, to which must be added the increase in defense spending. The division is served by the Berlin Government, which fears that the social cuts will further strengthen the electoral strength of the far-right.
The prime minister of Denmark, the social democrat Mette Frederiksen, has been very explicit, asking for cuts to the welfare state and fewer tax cuts for more defense spending.
They follow the line of Ursula von der Leyen and the European Commission, who propose a large military investment program that, in theory, will be manufactured in Europe. It will be with the permission of the US.
In Spain, politics is now busy with other things – the Government seeks stability and the opposition denounces the apocalypse of the end of the State – and the sweet economic situation invites us not to think about these debates, but everything will come. The drums of war are also of austerity.
