We might have imagined, with the reopening of China and the resumption of face-to-face contact between politicians, diplomats and businessmen, that Sino-US tensions would ease into a succession of dinners, summits and light talks. Yet the atmosphere in Beijing today makes it clear that the world's most important relationship oozes more bitterness and hostility than ever.
Through government corridors, Communist Party officials denounce what they perceive as harassment by the United States. They say their intention is to beat China to death. Western diplomats describe an environment tinged with intimidation and paranoia. At Beijing's exclusive Diaoyutai resort for state guests, multinational executives attending the China Development Forum fear the repercussions for their businesses of further disengagement. The only point of agreement between the two parties is that this eventuality would mean decades of estrangement in the best of cases and that the worst, a war, becomes increasingly likely.
Each part follows its own inexorable logic. The United States has adopted a policy of containment, although it refuses to use that term. He sees an authoritarian China that has gone from a one-party rule to a one-man rule. President Xi Jinping is likely to remain in power for years and is hostile to a West he sees as declining. At the national level, he pursues a repressive policy that challenges liberal values. He has broken promises to show restraint in projecting his power abroad, from Hong Kong to the Himalayas. Last month's meeting with Vladimir Putin confirmed that his aim is to build an alternative world order more favorable to autocrats.
Faced with such a situation, the United States understandably accelerates China's military containment in Asia, rejuvenating old alliances and creating new ones (such as the AUKUS pact with Australia and Great Britain). In the area of trade and technology, the United States has enacted an increasingly broad and strict embargo on semiconductors and other products. The goal is to curb Chinese innovation so the West can maintain technological supremacy: why should the United States allow its inventions to be used to make a hostile regime more dangerous?
For the Chinese leadership, such an attitude amounts to a plan to paralyze China. America is, in their eyes, exceptional. He will never accept that any country, whether communist or democratic, reaches a position of power like his. The United States will only tolerate China if she is submissive, a "fat cat, not a tiger." China's military alliances in Asia make China feel surrounded within its own natural sphere of influence. Red lines agreed upon in the 1970s, when the two countries restored relations, such as those on Taiwan, are now trampled on by ignorant and reckless US politicians. Chinese rulers consider it prudent to increase military spending.
In relation to trade, they consider the US containment unfair. Why deprive a country whose GDP per capita is 83% less than the United States of vital technologies? Officials and businessmen were horrified a few days ago by the spectacle of a TikTok, a subsidiary of a Chinese company, crucified at a US Congress hearing. While some Chinese liberals dream of emigrating, even Western-educated, cosmopolitan technocrats now staunchly condemn flaunting wealth, promote self-reliance and explain why globalization must serve Xi's political priorities.
Faced with two such entrenched and opposed visions of the world, it is naive to think that a greater dose of diplomacy will be enough to guarantee peace. The meeting held last November in Bali between President Joe Biden and Xi eased tensions, but the deeper logic of the confrontation was soon reaffirmed. The spy balloon crisis (Chinese officials mock the US for shooting down what they call a "naughty balloon") has made it clear that both leaders need to look tough at home. The United States wants China to adopt measures to control the rivalry, such as hotlines and protocols on nuclear weapons, but China sees itself as the weaker party: why bind itself to the rules set by its bully? There is nothing to suggest that the hostilities are going to subside. The 2024 US election will show that bashing China is a bipartisan sport. Xi is facing a slowing economy and has linked his legitimacy to a vision of a "rejuvenated" and muscular country.
Faced with such an adversary, the United States and other open societies should adhere to three principles. The first is to limit economic decoupling, which according to the IMF could cost between a manageable 0.2% of global GDP and an alarming 7%. Trading in non-sensitive sectors also helps maintain routine contact between thousands of companies, thereby reducing the geopolitical divide. The embargoes should be reserved for sensitive sectors or areas where China exercises absolute control because it is a monopolistic supplier: they represent a small fraction of Sino-US trade. Wherever possible, companies straddling the two sides of the Cold War, such as TikTok (accused of spreading Chinese disinformation), should be delimited, sold or spun off, rather than forced out of business.
The second principle is to reduce the chances of war. Both parties are caught in a “security dilemma” in which the rationale is to strengthen one's own position, even if the result is that the other party feels threatened. The West is right to seek military deterrence to deal with the growing Chinese threat: the alternative is the collapse of the US-led order in Asia. However, seeking military dominance around hotspots (especially Taiwan) could cause accidents or confrontations that could get out of control. The United States must try to deter a Chinese attack on Taiwan without provoking it. That will require wisdom and restraint from a generation of politicians in Washington and Beijing who, unlike the US and Soviet leaders of the 1950s, have no personal experience of the horrors of world war.
The final principle is that the United States and its allies must resist the temptation to resort to tactics that make them like their autocratic opponent. In this rivalry, liberal societies and free economies have great advantages: they are more likely to create innovation and wealth, and to inspire legitimacy within and beyond their borders. If the United States sticks to its values of openness, equal treatment for all, and the rule of law, it will find it easier to maintain the loyalty of its allies. The United States must make it clear that its dispute is not with the Chinese people, but with the Chinese government and the threat it poses to peace and human rights. The most determining struggle of the 21st century is not just a question of weapons and microprocessors, it is also a fight for values.
