The independence electorate has returned, although with other aspirations and concerns. In reality, it had never completely gone away, but the data from the latest annual ICPS survey – with series spanning more than 30 years – confirm that the disappointment and bitterness generated by the failure of the process has hit rock bottom and the pro-independence electorate is beginning to reactivate. For example, the rate of voters who feel close to Junts or Esquerra has grown for the first time since 2017. And the most important thing about this increase is that it has broken a trend that seemed unstoppable for six years.
This evolution is also reflected in the mood of the supporters of independence. Their perception of politics as a commitment has doubled in the last year and their distrust of that activity has fallen four points. But if there is one piece of information that clearly reveals this emotional recovery, it is related to future expectations: in 2022, more than 43% of pro-independence supporters anticipated abandoning the process; In 2023, that figure has fallen almost 21 points and the number of those who trust that independence will knock on the door very soon has even grown slightly.
The apparent paradox lies in the positions on secession. Since 2017, supporters of separating from Spain have fallen seven points in the face of a binary dilemma between rupture or continuity. They represent less than 40%, compared to those who wish to continue being part of the State, who today exceed 52%. In fact, assuming they can choose between several options (region, autonomy, federal or independent State), the defenders of secession have fallen more than ten points in the last decade (up to 34%).
Now, those rates need to be put into perspective. For example, the decline in support for independence has slowed in the last three years. It surpassed 46% in 2018, but has been stable above 39% for 36 months. And that figure (as well as preferences for secession in a broader panel of options) remains well above those recorded before the outbreak of the process. For example, in 2007 only 31.7% would have supported independence in a referendum. And in the case of choosing between several territorial relationship options, those in favor of breaking with Spain today assume between 15 and 20 points more than two decades ago.
So? Where is the independence universe heading? The main clue is offered by the survey itself. As of today, 57% of independence supporters – 22 points more than in 2017 – hope that the process ends with an agreement so that Catalonia enjoys more self-government (and 30%, furthermore, want it). That is, that is the new expectation of the majority of the secessionist bloc, which represents at least a third of the Catalan electorate (the “determining minority” that ensures autonomous power).
In view of these data, does it make sense for pro-independence groups to seek to mobilize this potential contingent of voters by focusing on the demand for a new process? Or should they set their goals on self-governance and identity? Especially since the latter has also rebounded: in 2017, more than 44% of the citizens of Catalonia defined themselves as more or only Catalan. That rate fell below 40% in 2020, but today it is close to 44% again.
From there, the survey allows us to sense the parallels with two very different scenarios: Quebec and Ripoll. In the Canadian province, the referendum no longer gives votes (the Quebec Party lost the 2014 elections resoundingly when it proposed a new consultation). On the other hand, identity and competencies, yes. The non-secessionist nationalists of Avenir Quebec, who govern that territory, include among their objectives obtaining “powers in immigration” (the same as Junts) and “full control of the foreign worker program”, in addition to reinforcing autonomy, language and Quebec values. That is, the defense of identity against the new threats of globalization.
In this sense, the coalition led by François Legault uses a measure that links with the atmosphere that is breathed in Ripoll and other parts of Catalonia: Law 21 on “the secularism of the State”, a legislation that prohibits the display of religious symbols by all officials (from teachers to police officers). The measure has especially angered the Muslim community, but “it has maintained the support of around two-thirds of Quebecers since it was approved,” according to a survey by the Association for Canadian Studies.
Thus, self-government to preserve identity in the face of its new antagonists (today non-EU immigrants): that is the vector that brings together the nationalist electorate everywhere and that conditions the infinite struggle waged by ERC and Junts, and perhaps also by the Aliança Catalana de the mayor of Ripoll, in the independence space. The ICPS survey reveals that 45% of Catalans – and more than 50% of Junts voters – believe that the entry of immigrants should be limited. The main reason: "they don't accept our customs." And those rejection rates are close to 60%, according to some studies by the CEO.
