Pedro Sánchez's presidency is marked by Catalonia since the motion of censure and later by the necessary support from ERC. Only at specific moments has he pulled the support of other groups, but it is clear that governance continues to flow through the ERC, even though the river is always turbulent. If Catalonia is the backdrop for Sánchez's mandates, the dialogue table is the spotlight that lights up the stage. Without it, its protagonists know that there is only fade to black.
The dialogue table thing is like the Casablanca gendarme who is scandalized because people play at Rick's place. His alleged goals are further than what politics gives of itself today. His participants knew it from the beginning. But that does not mean that the table is useless. If it is now a year since the twelve sentenced by the Supreme Court were released from prison, it is partly because that instrument exists. If Catalan society and politics have returned to normality, it is thanks to the commitment to this dialogue that ERC and Moncloa maintain. Without a doubt, the situation would be worse without her. Whether the table is a failure or not depends on what each one expects (or has sold) and each one with their expectations.
What is the dialogue table for? The independence movement sold it as the way to achieve what had not been achieved unilaterally. But to believe that an amnesty and an independence referendum would come from here is tremendously naïve. For what reason would the PSOE, contrary to these two demands, have to offer them to satisfy rival parties? How would it justify it to its own voters? On a political level, the table set an objective that both parties knew would be difficult, almost impossible in the short term, such as finding a common proposal to be voted on in Catalonia. The independence movement explained to their supporters that it could be a referendum with one option defended by the PSOE and another that would be secession. And the socialists interpreted before the parish itself that the Statute could be modified and voted on. In any case, the PSOE will not submit anything to a referendum that is not also defended by the ERC because they know that this would be a covert plebiscite on independence. So that tour is what it is. tending to zero.
But on the table are put more peremptory matters and nothing minor. ERC calls it “ending repression” and improving the quality of democracy. And there is much to do there. First, it is about reversing some of the judicial consequences of the fall of 2017. In addition to pardons, Sánchez has been in favor from the beginning of modifying the crimes of sedition and rebellion in the Penal Code. If it has not been applied, it is for two reasons: first because some of his collaborators, including Carmen Calvo, insisted just before the pardons that he keep that ace up his sleeve. And second, and more importantly, because ERC, whose support is necessary to approve this modification, did not see it clearly. Instead, at this week's meeting between Minister Félix Bolaños and Minister Laura Vilagrà, that door was opened at the proposal of the ERC.
It is not an easy path because the Government's intention has always been to lower the penalties for rebellion and sedition, but to create an aggravated version of disobedience. This last crime now involves fines or disqualification, in such a way that the penalties for Artur Mas for organizing 9-N are almost equal to those of Quim Torra for not taking down a banner. The changes, which would benefit those accused of rebellion or sedition, such as Carles Puigdemont or Marta Rovira, could harm others awaiting trial for disobedience, such as Minister Roger Torrent, former Minister Natàlia Garriga, or ERC leaders Lluís Salvadó or Josep Maria Jove. So even if the Republicans agree to explore that avenue, the negotiation will be tough.
There is another course of action. Sánchez knew from the beginning that one of his main challenges would be to renew a judicial leadership inherited from the PP years, with its main organs in the hands of the conservatives, who are reluctant to change them. The current parliamentary majority could try to find alternatives. It has been possible to change the composition of the Court of Auditors and the result is already evident: that body, previously very belligerent against the independentistas, has now accepted the endorsement of the Catalan Institute of Finances to cover the bail for the cause on the foreign action of the procés . The open fronts are many. The Contentious Chamber of the Supreme Court, which has undergone some changes in its composition that have tilted it to the right, has to decide on the pardons. And, in the hypothetical case that these are questioned, those affected could resort to the Constitutional Court for protection, just where Sánchez is trying to settle another battle so that the majority of its members become progressive. If anyone is scandalized by all this, look at what is happening in the US with abortion.
The table also allows a bilateral relationship between the central and Catalan governments, something that also upsets some, but which existed for many years between CiU and Moncloa, outside the PP or PSOE, to negotiate territorial interests. It is obvious that the results of the table could be much higher. And it is ERC that is under pressure to achieve more striking effects. But the protagonists of the dialogue, be it Sánchez, ERC or even Junts at some point, know that this table, for now, is not really a table, but rather a runway for the procés. Which is not little.
