The new global disorder order was clearly revealed at this year's meeting of the World Economic Forum, held between January 15 and 19. Chinese officials and businessmen now only attend in small numbers and fear deviating from the dogmas of the Communist Party. Russia's oligarchs are not admitted to the magic mountain. And an India and a Saudi Arabia given to arrogance perceive the multipolar world as full of opportunities.
Looming over all of this was the possibility of Trump's return to the presidency, a prospect made more likely after his victory in the Iowa caucuses on January 15 and Ron DeSantis' withdrawal from the presidential race on January 21, as well as after the victory over Nikki Haley in New Hampshire on January 23. A U.S. lawmaker working behind the scenes to calm allies says foreign governments “are scared by what they see on social media about American democracy.”
There are ten months until the presidential elections. Just as financial markets place bets on future events, the world is beginning to prepare for the consequences of a second Trump presidency. From what we see, it will include tariffs, the possible abandonment of support for Ukraine and Taiwan, a transactional approach with other allies, aggressive negotiation with enemies and a further deterioration of global norms.
All changes in the American government create discontinuities in foreign policy: Richard Nixon went to China, and Ronald Reagan told the Soviet Union to tear down the Berlin Wall. However, a change from a Biden administration to a Trump administration would be especially important given the chasm separating their policy positions and the chaotic global circumstances in which the change would occur, with an increasing number of wars. The number of state conflicts, more than fifty, is at its highest level since 1946, according to the Oslo Peace Research Institute.
The Biden administration has sought to reinvent America's role for the 2020s and beyond. He has envisioned a superpower that remains globally engaged and maintains close ties with its allies. At the same time, it is more selfish in trade, more cautious in economic security, and more selective in deploying military force, especially soldiers on the ground. The achievements of that approach include a revitalization of alliances in Asia and the coalition supporting Ukraine. Despite this, global disorder has increased: deterioration of the rules-based world order; chaos in the Middle East, parts of Africa and Afghanistan; and unabated isolationist pressure in American politics and public opinion.
Biden officials insist there is no sign yet that their foreign counterparts are "hedging" their bets on a new presidency. They travel the world to reassure foreign governments. The US government insists that it will soon get Congress to approve a new financing package for Ukraine. However, as the time of what is set to be a close election approaches, the effectiveness of the Biden doctrine may diminish. It will become difficult to make commitments that extend beyond 2024, including a commitment to a two-state solution in the Middle East. So some governments are already drawing up alternative plans for a Trump-ruled America.
A second presidency of his will be different from his first, because the world is more chaotic and because Trump is less likely to tolerate official obstruction of his political program. There is talk of the likelihood of a 10% blanket tariff, as well as the suspension of "permanent normal trade relations" with China, which will lead to even higher tariffs than current ones.
For some politicians and countries with whom Trump is ideologically aligned, his presidency will be good news. In Israel, Beniamin Netanyahu, if he manages to hold on to power until 2025, could expect unconditional support and dismissal of Palestinian aspirations for a state of their own. Soul mates, like Viktor Orbán, will undoubtedly be warmly welcomed in the Oval Office. Trump also has a soft spot for Saudi Arabia under its de facto ruler, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Narendra Modi, Prime Minister of India, maintains strong relations with Trump, so India expects continuity in politics and less criticism in civil liberties. Even some democratic and liberal Western allies seem relaxed. "There is nothing to worry about," insists Scott Morrison, former Australian prime minister, who claims that Trump helped the world "wake up" to the threat from China. "When Australia faced China, they were very supportive. And that was hugely important."
Beyond that, Trump's chaotic style and unstable personality make predictions difficult. Nevertheless, it is possible, and surely essential, to try to outline a possible approach of that president, the most transactional of all, with respect to those who he might end up classifying among "consumers" (supposedly ungrateful allies), "thugs" (unpleasant adversaries), and "losers" (countries you don't care about).
Most allies will be seen by Trump as consumers. They will receive unsentimental treatment: an assessment of the extent to which they are "taking advantage" of the United States; for example, maintaining a trade imbalance with it or spending negligible amounts on the armed forces. Scrutiny could be uncomfortable (see graphic). We calculate that, of the 38 US allies in NATO and Asia, the United States had trade deficits with 26 in 2023, and also 26 spent less than 2% of GDP on defense in the last year for which figures exist, giving them a poor score on two fundamental measuring sticks for Trump.
Some countries are already trying to increase their attractiveness in relation to these figures. A German government official outlines his tentative approach to any Trump administration: Germany's defense spending will skyrocket following the creation of a $109 billion special military fund, making it no longer a "freeloader"; It is now spending $14 billion on American F-35 aircraft, and the country has shifted from piped Russian gas to importing liquefied natural gas, largely purchased from American suppliers.
Consumers who are not able to defend their position will come under pressure. They are very likely to be threatened with tariffs or withdrawal of security commitments. Mexico could be one of those affected. Since the Trump administration replaced the North American Free Trade Agreement with its own agreement, in force since 2020, the trade deficit has increased.
In response, some consumers are considering ingratiating themselves by resorting to unorthodox diplomacy. A Western leader says that, judging from the experience of Trump's first term, the easiest way to influence him is for a country's royal family and sports stars to shower him with attention. France captivated him with a military parade on July 14; Great Britain offered him a state visit in which the queen participated.
There are a couple of allies especially vulnerable to Trump's thinking about alleged freeloaders. For its size, Taiwan maintains a large trade surplus with the United States that amounted to $45 billion between January and November 2023. Although it has increased defense spending to 2.5% of GDP, it continues to depend on a huge military presence. American in Asia to deter a possible invasion by China. He has just elected William Lai Ching-te, a president who challenges China, but Trump may question whether Americans should fund their defense or die for that cause. Last year he complained that Taiwan was "taking away our business."
The other vulnerable ally is Ukraine. Objectively, American support for Ukraine is a great deal: with cumulative American war aid less than 10% of the annual defense budget and no American casualties, the United States is tying up the Russian military and hurting its economy. Most of the money spent on weapons for Ukraine remains in the United States. Still, Trump may view the war as a drain on American resources and try to pressure Ukraine into reaching a peace deal with Russia.
Abandoning Taiwan and Ukraine would have profound consequences for US alliances. Failure to defend Taiwan would set a precedent for other Asian allies such as Japan and South Korea and, since the country is part of an "island chain" around China, would frustrate regional defense plans. Betraying Ukraine would leave Russia and its leader, Vladimir Putin, in strengthened positions and raise questions about the United States' commitment to NATO, even if Trump did not explicitly renege on American security guarantees. Trump told Ursula von der Leyen, the head of the European Union Commission, in 2020 that the United States would not come to Europe's aid if the continent was attacked, a senior EU official recently said, adding : "Also, NATO is dead, and we will leave, we will abandon NATO."
What about those Trump may perceive as bullies? America's enemies and adversaries probably expect threats to obtain concessions and also periodic openings to reach transformative "deals." Let us remember Trump in 2019 crossing the border with North Korea, a country that he had previously threatened to "incinerate." Among bullies, Russia can expect the friendliest of treatment given Trump's admiration for Putin. China's expectations are lower, given the disappointment caused by previous negotiations with Trump and because mutual hostility is already built into the policies of both countries.
During the first Trump administration, Iran faced “maximum pressure” sanctions and the assassination of Qasem Soleimani, a key military chief; but Trump did not respond when Iran attacked Saudi Arabian oil facilities. What is most likely now, given the chaos that Iran is causing in the Middle East, is that aggressive sanctions will be imposed on the regime, which could be tempted to maintain its proxy wars throughout the region.
Trump's approach to bullies is destabilizing, which creates opportunities: it is conceivable, for example, that he will try to lure Iran and its proxies into a regional peace deal; After all, his government mediated the Abraham Accords between Israel and several Arab states in 2020, contrary to accepted beliefs. Although the agreement between Israel and Saudi Arabia is the one most likely to succeed. However, the same destabilizing potential increases the possibility of miscalculations. Trump's bias in negotiating with adversaries may create opportunities for deals, but there is a risk that others will be more adept than him. "My biggest fear is that Putin and Xi are much smarter than Trump," says a European official.
The third group of countries is the largest: countries that are neither allies nor close adversaries of the United States. Trump could dismiss them as losers. The Biden administration has encountered more aggressive behavior from America's enemies in Europe and the Middle East, but has remained selective in its use of force. This was illustrated by his withdrawal from Afghanistan. And, in places where the United States has little interest, conflicts have erupted with ferocity: the civil war in Sudan, the new "coup belt" across sub-Saharan Africa, and the new war between Armenia and Azerbaijan. That same chaotic quality creates opportunities: think of the reshaping of the global energy system and the rise of the illicit oil trade.
A Trump presidency is likely to see a further erosion of global norms across everything from trade to human rights, and contribute to making everything worse. For poorer countries with weak national institutions, it can mean a greater prospect of conflict. And global organizations are unlikely to be able to fill the void.
If he wins the 2024 elections, Trump would take office in January 2025, almost exactly one year from now. This is too little time for the Biden administration to make binding commitments, meaning its credibility and agency over world events risks fading as the months go by. The situation is greatly worsened by Republican obstructionism, as demonstrated by the senseless freeze on aid to Ukraine. On the other hand, a year is also too short a time for countries waking up to the possibility of Trump's return to put in place any kind of alternative to the United States, from trade rules to an additional nuclear deterrent. At the very least, the United States abandoning its responsibilities will create a vacuum. And the world is realizing that twelve months are not enough to fill it.
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Translation: Juan Gabriel López Guix
