The RUSI institute in the United Kingdom may be unknown to the general public, but in the field of defense and security, it is the oldest in the world. And a reference. Also when talking about the nuclear issue. Matthew Harries (London, 1987) directs its program on proliferation and nuclear policy, and warns: the world is entering “uncharted waters” very different from those of the cold war. And it is that Russia raises its nuclear arsenal; The West doubts that it will be used; Ukraine, meanwhile, asks to have more weapons.
Does the Ukraine war usher in a new nuclear age?
The war in Ukraine does not open a new nuclear age, but confirms that we are already in it.
Why?
Vladimir Putin's threats accelerate trends that have been developing for a decade or more. The major powers in the international system have serious conflicting interests among themselves, and nuclear deterrence plays an increasing role in achieving those interests.
What interests?
The key point, broadly speaking, is that Russia is not happy with the post-cold war settlement in Europe and is trying to change it even by force. And China is not happy with the security order in East Asia and is trying to change it so far not with large-scale force, but potentially in the future.
What consequences does it have?
It means that the post-cold war attempt to build a new international order where nuclear weapons took a backseat is giving way to a time when the main task will be to reduce the risks of a world in which nuclear weapons are more relevant.
Is a new cold war between powers entering?
I don't know if “cold war” is a useful term, because many aspects of this confrontation are different, although we are entering a very dangerous nuclear phase that can last for years.
Is a nuclear war, or the use of nuclear weapons, a real possibility? The words of Ramzán Kadírov pressuring Putin with this have generated alert.
Any conflict involving a nuclear-armed state brings with it some possibility of escalation to the use of nuclear weapons, and thus Russia and NATO have been careful not to enter into direct conflict.
Only for that?
Not only: neither side wants a full-scale Russia-NATO conventional war.
Biden says that today the nuclear danger is at its worst since the Cuban missile crisis in the 1960s, is that correct?
The threat today is serious, but different. I don't think it's useful to make comparisons.
In what way is it different?
On the one hand, there was no such conventional war in Europe during the cold war, which means that we are in uncharted waters. And on the other hand, cold war nuclear arsenals were larger, more diverse, and more closely integrated into conventional military planning than they are today.
Has the nuclear arsenal evolved in this time so much as to break the balance between the nuclear powers?
New strategic technologies, including non-nuclear strategic capabilities, are potentially making deterrence more complex and could open more avenues for escalation. However, I still believe that nuclear weapons are in a category of their own and that some basic deterrents have not changed.
What do you want to achieve with so much mention of the nuclear threat?
Putin and Russian officials want to use the fear of nuclear weapons to force Ukraine and the West to scale back their war efforts. The task of politicians is to determine what is just intimidation and at what point nuclear threats can be real.
And to what extent are they real?
It is difficult for me to see a scenario in which the use of the nuclear weapon serves Putin's interests, although it must be recognized that he has already launched what appears to be a highly self-destructive and reckless war for him. Figuring out how Putin assesses his own interests is not easy.
With nuclear non-proliferation rules and practices in place, is it possible to lower nuclear tension even if the war in Ukraine doesn't end?
It will be politically very difficult to reach a formal arms control agreement with Russia in the short term, and indeed it will be difficult to persuade China to join a formal pact as long as its nuclear numbers remain low even if they appear to be increasing rapidly. It will be important to pursue informal, low-level risk reduction measures and keep gun control dialogues open even if conversation becomes exceptionally difficult.
