Can the legislature be wrong? Of course! Without this possibility it could be said that there is no freedom. The right to error is an expression of the free exercise of any political, social, professional, civic action, etc. Not only can we be wrong: we have the right to be wrong. It is convenient not to do it; it is good to avoid the error, but the human condition grows in the framework that makes the error possible. The legislator can be wrong and hence the greatness of the rectification. What is needed is to humbly acknowledge the error and then rectify it to avoid the damage that may result. The mistake is a right; rectification a duty.
Now, the role of justice in the face of possible errors by the legislator is being discussed. Passionate topic that is at the base of the life of a rule of law. The legislator can be wrong and the judges too. Moreover, the jurisdictional order is constituted on the presumption that judges can err in their interpretation of the legal norm. Therefore, the aforementioned jurisdictional system provides as a normal and guarantee for the citizen that the decisions of the judges can be appealed, at least in their first instances. And, in fact, many and many judicial decisions are reviewed in second and subsequent instances, which therefore recognizes that the judges who had issued them had been wrong; that is, they had misinterpreted or misapplied the law or rule that was at the base of the conflict being prosecuted.
Judges and legislators can be wrong and, in fact, they are wrong. In some cases, the correction comes from the judicial review itself and in others from the rectification of the legislators themselves. In the performance of these dominates the consideration that the norm developed by them produces effects different from those that had been proposed. The rectifying norm intends to recover the meaning of what was wanted with the norm initially dictated.
Therefore, neither the error of the legislator nor the discrepancy expressed by the judges should be magnified. Both of them coexist in the scenario of possible mistake as a servitude typical of a rule of law.
But it must also not be forgotten that, doctrinally, the will of the legislator constitutes a fundamental way for the interpretation of the legal norm. Sometimes, the time elapsed blurs or dilutes what the will of the legislator was at the time when dictating a law; but when the interpretation has to be produced in relation to a rule of full relevance, the confusion should not appear. It is well known what was wanted by the legislator.
In spite of everything, other principles and values can or make it difficult to judicially redirect the unwanted effects of the standard to be applied. Then you have to recover the rectification tool, without unnecessary complexes. Everyone, legislators and judges, knows and practices rectification as a tool that best serves the interests that they have to defend. It is necessary to ennoble the rectification; It's good, it's very exemplary. How many times has it been by way of judicial review when doctrine has been established that has delimited the field of rights and duties of citizens? How many times has only rectification allowed legislators to respond to the needs and ambitions of society? Rectifying say that it is wise. But, above all, it is the expression of a democratic servitude.
