The four scenarios presented in the graph constitute the synthesis of expert and observer assessments of a Ukrainian counteroffensive. But they are not mutually exclusive. On the contrary, there could be several at the same time, some complementing others. As Kyiv has already announced, the operation will be played “on several boards” at the same time. One of them is already in sight: the series of attacks on Russian territory from the Ukrainian northern border, not only based on bombing but this time with incursions (in which Kyiv has taken great care that Russian opposition militiamen are the carry them out) and the drone strikes on Moscow fulfill the plan outlined long ago by the Ukrainian chief of staff, General Zalushnyi, to make the Russians feel the war in their own country.
The main objective – as it has been declared – is to break into the so-called land bridge in the occupied south that connects Donbass with Crimea, to split the Russian forces in two and cut off their supply lines – the railway and the M-14 highway, mainly – towards the southern bank of the Dnieper and the peninsula. Naturally, this area is the one that has been most fortified by Russia. Is that where the Ukrainian onslaught can be expected?
The war in Donbass has been the complete opposite of modern warfare: trenches and an urban battle longer than Stalingrad. The meaning of the stubborn – and failed – defense of Bakhmut is still unclear. Everyone claimed to wear down the enemy forces there, but the human cost may have been higher for Ukraine, especially considering – as bad as it sounds – that Russia mainly used mercenaries from the Wagner group accompanied by ex-convicts.
The Ukrainians are now expected to give priority to an intelligent warfare mode (mosaic, according to Pentagon doctrine and terminology), which implies more mobility and the use of technology – rapid and coordinated data management, added to precision projectiles. and long range – over firepower, something in which Russia, with its industrial capacity, has an advantage. That includes consistent use of drones, lacking fighter jets to cover the traditional-style offensive. Unless there are surprises, the announced supply of the F-16s is not expected at this time.
On the other side of the lines, everything is unknown. But it would be naive to think that Russia has not had time to correct mistakes, re-equip and prepare a long-term strategy, believing that time is running in its favor. In this sense, the criticisms of Wagner's boss, Yevgeny Prigozhin, of the Russian Ministry of Defense as if it were inhabited by useless should be taken as pure trompe l'oeil.
