Geography is geography: when Finland and Sweden join the Atlantic Alliance, overcoming Turkey's reluctance, Russia will be the only Baltic Sea state outside the Atlantic Alliance. "And their respective military capabilities will change the balance in the Baltic region, favoring Moscow today, while giving strategic depth to the defense of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia," says Justyna Gotowska, coordinator of the Center for Eastern Studies in Warsaw. .
The foreseeable incorporation into NATO of two states, a symbol of neutrality during the cold war, is seen as a time bomb by some or as a palatable reaction to the Kremlin and its expansionism, as Vladimir Putin's response would show, which was limited to draw another –and they go– “red line” for the future. The Russian leader declared on Monday that the entry of Finland and Sweden does not pose "a direct threat" to Russia, except if it involves "the expansion of military infrastructure."
Is there a chance that Finland and Sweden will host new military installations – including missiles – once they join the Atlantic Alliance? His current political landscape leads one to think not. Sweden, especially, has approved the entry request within the respect of certain arms limitations. It's been 200 years without waging a war -the one between Swedes and Norwegians in 1814-, an unusual event for a great European state, and a solid anti-nuclear tradition.
"The ruling Social Democratic Party has already made it clear that it will oppose the creation of permanent NATO bases or the installation of any nuclear weapons on Swedish territory," observes Mats Engström, a researcher at the European Council on Foreign Relations. Finland has also made it clear that it will not accept the type of “military infrastructure” to which Putin alluded, in a clear attempt to maintain the historical good neighborly relations of the cold war –Finland borders Russia 1,340 kilometers–.
The Stockholm and Helsinki arguments are clearly preventive: it is not a question of harassing Russia but of dissuading it from an eventual intervention in the Baltic region, where the Atlantic Alliance has three pawns, the weakest piece on the chess board: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.
"For the Atlantic Alliance, having guaranteed access to the territories of Sweden and Finland lowers concerns about the defense of the three former Soviet Baltic republics, which reduce the chances of a successful attack by Russia," estimates Ian Bond, foreign policy director of the Center for European Reform and former British ambassador to Latvia.
No area is potentially as dangerous to NATO as the Baltic. Moscow could invoke arguments very similar to those used to invade Ukraine, starting with the rights of the million Russian citizens scattered in the three Baltic states (25% of the population of Latvia and Estonia, 4.5% of Lithuania).
Beyond the neighborhood, Sweden and Finland make a significant military contribution, which suddenly counteracts the Russian superiority in the Baltic. These are two very modern armies –Sweden has been spending 2% of GDP on defense for years– and they had already been regularly participating in Alliance military maneuvers in the region–“it can be said that they were militarily integrated into it,” estimates a community diplomat. Sweden provides a territory of great strategic value such as the island of Gotland, home to a regiment that has been greatly reinforced since its creation in 2018 (from 400 to 4,000 troops today). "If you dominate Gotland, you can control all air and naval movement in the southern Baltic Sea," the regiment's commander, Colonel Magnus Frykvall, told the New York Times. Everything, of course, just in case...
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