In 1978 Spain was experiencing full political effervescence. The process of transition to democracy, begun after the death of General Francisco Franco, was about to be completed with the approval of the Constitution that, since the summer of 1977, had been being drafted and debated in the Cortes. However, its text was not liked by the most conservative civil and military sectors, especially the blue ones (Falangists), since they considered that its approval would be the beginning of the disintegration of Spain, since in its article 2 it recognized the right to autonomy of “nationalities and regions”.
The articles of the Magna Carta were not the only reason that generated discomfort. The terrorist escalation by ETA (66 murders in 1978) and the GRAPO (9 murders), the economic crisis, with its social consequences, and, above all, the inability of the elite of the Armed Forces to protect and control the process of change political, reflected in the legalization of the Communist Party when the President of the Government Adolfo Suárez had promised not to do so, had increased the tension of these sectors with the Executive.
The first element that defined what would be known as “Operation Galaxy” were the men who launched it. And, of them, the most prominent was Civil Guard Lieutenant Colonel Antonio Tejero Molina.
Born in Malaga on April 30, 1932, Tejero had entered the General Military Academy in 1951, being part of the X Promotion. That is to say, he belonged to that subgroup of officers of the General Military Academy that the historian Fernando Puell de la Villa links with the harshest postulates of Francoism, and closer to the mentality that the provisional lieutenants embodied.
These ideological characteristics were overstated in Tejero due to his professional career. In February 1975, at only 42 years old and with the rank of lieutenant colonel, he was appointed head of the 512th Command of the Civil Guard, based in Vitoria (Álava). There he would remain until the beginning of the following year, when he went on to command the most complicated Command in Spain: the 511, with headquarters in San Sebastián (Gipuzkoa). In this destination he attended the beginning of the ETA terrorist offensive, which had as its fundamental objectives the members of the Civil Guard and the Armed Police, and the pre-autonomous process in the Basque provinces.
Precisely, his refusal to accept the ikurriña led to his dismissal by the Minister of the Interior Rodolfo Martín Villa in January 1977, after which he was appointed head of the 251st Command of the Civil Guard (Málaga) in February. He again would have problems with his superiors, by preventing a demonstration, previously authorized by the civil governor, on October 8, 1977. That same night Tejero was fired and arrested.
The soldier was released on the 12th, on the occasion of the festival of the Virgen del Pilar –patron saint of the Civil Guard–, and became “available” in the city of Badajoz, within the II Zone of the Civil Guard . A few months later, in February 1978, he received an important command: the Headquarters of the Destination Group of the General Directorate of the Civil Guard, on Guzmán el Bueno Street (Madrid).
He achieved this destiny thanks to the influence of a blue man: José Utrera Molina, former minister general secretary of the Movement in Franco's governments. The favor can only be explained by the excellent relations that the lieutenant colonel maintained with this political group, thanks to his close friend Juan García Carrés, president of the National Union of Various Activities between 1970 and 1977.
Carrés put him in contact with Lieutenant General Iniesta Cano (general director of the Civil Guard from 1972 to 1974) and José Antonio Girón de Velasco (Minister of Labor between 1941 and 1956), men with whom he always identified and who helped him. when he found himself in difficulties or needed support to carry out his coup activities.
It was precisely in Madrid that he became convinced of the need to put an end to the nascent democratic system. However, he was aware that organizing a coup d'état was unfeasible, as there was not enough consensus within the Armed Forces to plan it nor an undisputed military leader to lead it. However, he thought that if someone took the initiative, carrying out a spectacular coup d'état, the rest of the units would follow, since the unrest was deep among the military. Under this premise, Tejero designed the operation.
His partner in this action would be the Infantry Captain, assigned to the Armed Police, Ricardo Sáenz de Ynestrillas Martínez, another blue who had belonged to the X Flag of the Legion and whom ETA murdered on June 17, 1986.
The objective of the operation was the Moncloa palace, which was to be occupied by units of the Civil Guard commanded by Tejero during the celebration of a council of ministers (on a Friday). This action would allow all members of the Executive to be captured, creating a power vacuum. At the same time, Ynestrillas, with members of the Armed Police, would take over the most sensitive points of the capital to contribute to the success of the operation.
The absence of government and control of Madrid would be the triggers for an intervention by the rest of the garrisons, which would put an end to democracy. The two soldiers decided that the best day to carry out this operation would be Friday, November 17, 1978 for four reasons.
The first was that a shooting exercise was scheduled in the Destination Group of the Civil Guard, which would allow Tejero to have the necessary men to take over the residence of the President of the Government.
Secondly, that Friday was close to an important date, November 20, the anniversary of the deaths of General Franco and José Antonio Primo de Rivera. The event would bring together thousands of far-right sympathizers in Madrid, who could support the coup units to put an end to any resistance.
Thirdly, Juan Carlos I was on an official trip to Mexico, which would prevent him from opposing the coup plotters in person. Finally, the Minister of Defense, Manuel Gutiérrez Mellado, was in Cartagena (Murcia).
This plan had, however, two drawbacks. The first, that Ynestrillas did not have troops under his command. And the second, that Lieutenant General Federico Gómez de Salazar, captain general of the I Military Region, was reluctant to any intervention by the Army and had under his command the most powerful unit of the Army, the Armored Division (DAC) Brunete No. 1, garrisoned in the outskirts of Madrid, which could put an end to the coup forces without difficulty.
For this reason, the organizers needed to carry out two other complementary actions so that the taking of the Moncloa palace was not an isolated and failed event. On the one hand, provide the captain with troops so that he could carry out the part of the operation that he had been entrusted with. On the other hand, contact some DAC commanders so that they would help them or, at least, remain passive during the coup d'état.
To achieve both objectives, Tejero and Ynestrillas held a series of meetings with leaders and officers of the Army and Armed Police whom they trusted.
The first meeting was held with Commander Manuel Vidal Francés, stationed at the Special Academy of the Armed Police, to propose that he take control of this center, even by force, dismissing his boss, Lieutenant Colonel Manuel García de Polavieja Novo. This action would allow the 1,200 men of the student battalion of said establishment to be added to the operation.
The second meeting was with Commander Joaquín Rodríguez Solano and Captain José Alemán Artiles, assigned to the 14th Flag of the National Police, with the same objective: to incorporate them into the involutionist operation.
The third, on November 5, with Commander Ricardo Pardo Zancada, assigned to the DAC General Staff and friend of Ynestrillas. Tejero, after explaining the planned plan, stated that he had the support of members of the Civil Guard and the Armed Police, especially from the Academy and some of the Mobile Flags. Pardo asked what would happen next, to which Tejero very calmly replied: “Everything is ready.”
This response leads us to consider that the blues were aware of the operation and had a plan to occupy power once the coup d'état occurred, as Lieutenant Colonel Manuel Fernández-Monzón also defended in a report sent to Gutiérrez Mellado on December 7, 1978. The DAC commander did not join the operation, but he did assure them that he would try to prevent the division's units from confronting them.
The fourth and final meeting took place on Saturday, November 11 at the Galaxia cafeteria, in the Moncloa district of Madrid. The attendees were Tejero, Ynestrillas, Rodríguez Solano, Vidal Francés and Alemán Artiles, and their objective was to definitively outline the operation.
The lieutenant colonel of the Civil Guard explained that he would take the Moncloa palace with the Civil Guard company that was to carry out shooting exercises that day. At the same time, the troops of the Special Academy of the Armed Police and the 14th Flag would occupy the key points of the capital.
The five soldiers agreed with this plan, because four days later, on Wednesday the 15th, Ynestrillas telephoned Commander Vidal Francés and informed him: “Everything is prepared for the 17th.”
This call meant the end of the operation. Vidal Francés decided to inform his boss, García de Polavieja, of what he was preparing. This lieutenant colonel immediately alerted General José Timón de Lara, inspector general of the Armed Police, who then contacted his former colleague José María Bourgón López-Dóriga, director of the Higher Defense Information Center (CESID). ).
This general notified Lieutenant Colonel Andrés Casinello Pérez, head of the Information Service of the Civil Guard (SIG), who informed Adolfo Suárez and Gutiérrez Mellado of what was being plotted.
The president and vice president of the Government ordered security at the Moncloa palace to be reinforced and Tejero and Ynestrillas arrested on November 16. In the early hours of the 17th, in the building of the General Captaincy of the I Military Region, Gómez de Salazar took their first statement in the presence of the auditor general of the Air Force, José de Diego.
The two responsible for the attempted coup d'état were subjected to a court martial that was held on May 7, 1980. The sentence was very lenient: seven months and one day for Tejero, and six months and one day for Ynestrillas, " with the accessory consequences for both of suspension from employment and suspension from all public office, profession, trade and right to vote during the time of their respective sentences, which will not be a credit for their service."
These sentences were justified by the military members of the court, who considered that the accused, “deeply concerned by the progressive attacks on the components of the Armed Forces and Public Order perpetrated mainly in the Northern provinces by separatist terrorism, thought about the possibility of putting an end to such a state of affairs.”
The defendants, who had been imprisoned longer than they had been sentenced, were released.
As soon as he stepped onto the street, the lieutenant colonel began to think about a new coup d'état whose objective would be the Carrera de San Jerónimo building... Although this time he would not have Ynestrillas as a companion, but rather two of the most prestigious generals of the Army: Jaime Milans del Bosch and Alfonso Armada Comyn.
