China wants to leave the covid behind, recover and grow again. It estimates a growth of 5% for 2023, exceeding by more than two points the forecast for this year by the IMF for the world. This has been announced in the National People's Congress, which brings together 3,000 deputies these days in the Great Hall of the People in Beijing under the leadership of Xi Jinping. The analyst and founder of the Chinese Policy Observatory, Xulio Rios (Moaña, 1958), considers in this interview that nothing compensates for the damage that the war in Ukraine has for China, which will not embark on an arms race despite increasing its budget of defense by 7.2% compared to 2022, and that it will not renounce unification with Taiwan.
The first of 12 points in Xi Jinping's peace plan for the Ukraine war calls for respecting the sovereignty of all countries and a ceasefire. Do you mean that Russia has to withdraw from all occupied territories, including those of 2014? Does this plan start the path to end the war?
The fact that it is the first of the twelve points of the “political position” expressed by China certainly means something about the importance it attaches to territorial integrity, a sensitive matter for Beijing as well. On the other hand, remember that China did not recognize the annexation of Crimea. However, of course, everything would depend on the negotiations, which should be framed within the idea expressed in the following point, referring to the cessation of the expansion of the military blocs and the conception of a security that should not be achieved "by some at the expense of others". It will be difficult for Russia to accept a hypothetical withdrawal without assessing a security pact along these lines. On the other hand, China will be cautious in the possible advances of its proposal. It does not seem that the conditions are ripe enough to expect immediate results.
The US maintains that China will end up giving arms to Putin. It will?
Initially, no. It would be contradictory to the 12 points and to the Chinese foreign policy principle of not providing weapons to countries at war. Russia still has other options. Can you change this? The current situation is very volatile and complex and we cannot isolate this problem from the US-China global tension. If Russia comes to be in serious danger or if the US continues to disregard what China considers its territorial integrity (with Taiwan), which the US defends in Ukraine against Russia, do not rule out a change of position. Everything can get out of control since the risks are increasing as we settle in and deepen the path of confrontation.
Does the war in Ukraine benefit China at all?
Not even the tightening of economic ties with Russia compensates the damage. The war means breaking stability in a region that is key to their interests, not only because it affects their strategic Silk Road project but also because of the instability it causes in supply chains, the encouragement of decoupling and its impact on the economic recovery, which for China is another priority. In addition, it poses the added challenge of improving relations with Europe, one of the main issues on his diplomatic agenda. The 12 points listed are also a proposal to Brussels.
Is not Xi Jinping harmed by his “unlimited friendship” with Russia, which has invaded Ukraine in its project of achieving a new world order, which is also an objective of Putin?
The alliance between Stalin and Mao was also eternal and lasted as long as it lasted. Moscow and Beijing share a similar strategic vision, whose premise is the rejection of the "imperative and arrogant" Western hegemony. When China ponders the QUAD, the AUKUS or the strengthening of US military alliances with its neighboring countries, it is easy to understand that it "understands" Russia's strategic concern. However, the suspicions that have often been argued to disbelieve in an alliance between Moscow and Beijing are still valid, only that the current Western policy has mitigated them. I think it's a mistake to lump China and Russia together and not explore the nuances.
In light of the experience of the war in Ukraine, which has united the West and strengthened NATO, do you think mainland China will one day eventually invade Taiwan?
Taiwan is "territorial integrity" for China. He is not going to give up on unification. But the peaceful path continues to take precedence on the agenda despite the proliferation of warnings about invasions, perhaps self-interested, by the US, whose generals are already predicting it within two years. We will see what happens in the Taiwanese presidential elections in January 2024. It will be a crossroads that can give wings to one path or another. An invasion of Taiwan would be a tragedy and what is advisable for everyone, not only for China, is to work now to prevent the conflict. I doubt very much that the best formula for that is to cram the island with American weapons, and do as much as possible to irritate China. Political creativity has always been a laudable feature of Chinese thought, and if left to their own devices, there is room for innovation on both sides of the Strait.
Will there be a direct confrontation with the United States?
The high risks involved are a powerful deterrent but cannot be ruled out entirely. We are seeing how the trade war unleashed by Trump does not work at all as the US deficit continues to grow; the technological war has become a long fight in which China is showing significant resilience…. There is an obvious risk that if all else fails, Taiwan or the South China Sea will become a tinderbox. The biggest risk for China is losing patience. If it manages to complete its modernization in the next twenty or thirty years, its global economic status will provide it with the possible leadership so that multipolarity can make headway. If the US loses in that contest, it will find it difficult to maintain its enormous military power and, ultimately, its hegemony.
Instability doesn't benefit you either, right? Because as General Sun Tzu said, the most beautiful of victories is obtained without confrontation.
From the Chinese perspective, the key continues to lie not in the military factor but in the economic and technological ones. He is not going to emulate the USSR and embark on an arms race, although he will continue to improve his defense apace. But the conviction that the vertex of its global preponderance resides in the economy through a new model of development and insertion in the world continues to determine its focus. And for that it needs stability, a lot of regional and global stability. And those who want to avoid their rise will need to generate instability to truncate those expectations.
Nor does it enjoy stability in China, where the real estate bubble has burst, social tensions over wages or cuts in benefits for retirees are increasing, and the country is aging...
The situation in China is complex, partly due to international tensions, the effects of the pandemic and also a consequence of the change in the development model. But we would be making a mistake by underestimating the leeway available to the authorities to manage the situation. In that framework, stability is a major concern. It is no coincidence that the proposal for Ukraine was presented after publicizing the concept of Global Security or that internally security is at the heart of the state reform after the XX CPC Congress. Everything leads to the same inside and outside: stability as a priority.
The economic bonanza has disappeared. Has it undermined the legitimacy of the Communist Party?
Even with a very complicated international situation, internally, China has a significant margin to continue growing, even if it is at lower rates. They are good managers, the scale of their economy gives them a not inconsiderable plus. The socialization of certain well-being has hardly begun yet, domestic consumption can play a more important role and politically, nationalism constitutes a powerful cushioning mechanism. In addition, we cannot analyze the PCCh exclusively from an ideological perspective, but also taking into account its profile as an expression of the neomandarinate in the 21st century.
The XX Congress has enthroned Xi Jinping as the top leader, making him the most powerful leader since Mao. His objective at the XIX Congress was the fight against corruption. What is it now?
Xi's watchword revolves around revitalizing the Chinese nation. The main key right now resides in what we could define as the preservation of political security. This affects his own leadership but also Xiism as a theory for the current stage of the Chinese process and will result in an intensification of measures related to ideology, security and stability. This is one of the key issues of the two sessions that are being held these days in Beijing and that could announce a strong reorganization of the institutional apparatus in this area, very unstable in recent years, as well as encourage a greater redistribution of the State as a whole. .
