Anti-inflammatories have side effects. Some very dangerous for the patient. But in politics those side effects can be more deadly for the doctor who prescribes them. Good proof of this is that one of the factors of electoral erosion of the PSOE is its policy of relaxation towards Catalonia, with the pardons of June 2021 as the most visible element.
However, beyond the costs involved for the doctor to comply with the Hippocratic oath to relieve the patient, the key to any therapy lies in its results. And the truth (the data is from the CIS) is that the Catalan conflict as a Spanish problem has gone from being the fourth concern in the fall of 2017 (the first for one in four Spaniards), to fade from 2020 (with a 1% of mentions). Of course, after a momentary rebound in December 2019 -after the severe sentence of the Supreme Court-, when it was ranked as the eighth problem and first concern for one in ten citizens.
And in Catalonia? Data from the CEO and the ICPS indicate that anti-inflammatories work much better than electroshock therapies administered by judges and police once legality is restored. Four indicators seem to confirm this: support for independence, preferences regarding the relationship between Catalonia and Spain, the level of radicalization between blocs and the identity polarization of Catalan society.
Support for independence draws a line very much in tune with the intensity of events. The yes is clearly imposed from 2017 and only begins to lose steam in June of the following year, after the change in the central government. In fact, the rejection of secession has already been the majority since July 2019, after the electoral victory of the PSOE, and only registers a slight inflection after the sentence of November of that year (when supporters and opponents of the break with Spain approach technical tie).
However, the advantage of those opposed to secession is accentuated from the middle of 2020 and, except for some occasional bump, it is consolidated between eight and 11 points from the pardons of 2021. And this same evolution is confirmed in the panel of preferences on the relationship between Catalonia and Spain.
Between June and October 2017, the rate of Catalans who chose independence as the best option rose five points (up to 40%), and that percentage was maintained until July 2019, when it fell five points again. It is true that the pro-independence option picks up slightly in the autumn of that year, to the beat of the Supreme Court ruling, but then it embarks on a path of decline that places that election at the lowest level of the last ten years (34%).
Third indicator: radicalization between blocs. The data from an ICPS study on affective polarization in Catalonia in the last quarter of a century reveals that emotional radicalization between blocs (for or against independence) reached its maximum peak in 2017 and only began to visibly subside from 2020 and, above all, from 2021. And the same happens with identity radicalization (fourth indicator). In other words, the polarization between identities (more or only Spanish versus more or only Catalan) reaches its highest level between 2017 and 2019, but from 2020 and 2021 it begins a noticeable decline.
If the effectiveness of a treatment is measured by its results, the anti-inflammation therapy applied by the current Spanish Government would undoubtedly exceed any evaluation by a specialized agency.
