How Ukraine will go on the attack

The four scenarios presented in the graph constitute the synthesis of the assessments of experts and observers on a Ukrainian counter-offensive.

Oliver Thansan
Oliver Thansan
05 June 2023 Monday 11:17
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How Ukraine will go on the attack

The four scenarios presented in the graph constitute the synthesis of the assessments of experts and observers on a Ukrainian counter-offensive. But they are not mutually exclusive, but some can occur at the same time, some complementing others. What happened last day refers to expansions 2 and 3. As already announced by Kyiv, the operation will be played "on several boards" at the same time. One is already in sight: the series of attacks on Russian territory from the northern Ukrainian border, not only from bombings, but this time also with raids (in which Kyiv has emphasized that it is Russian opposition militiamen carry them out) and the drone strikes on Moscow fulfill the long-noted plan of the Ukrainian Chief of Staff, General Zalujny, to make the Russians feel the war in their own country.

The main objective – so it has been declared – is to break into the so-called land bridge in the occupied south that connects the Donbass with Crimea, to split the Russian forces in two and cut their supply lines – the railway and the M-14 road , mainly – towards the southern bank of the Dnieper and the peninsula. Naturally, this area is the one that has been most fortified by Russia. Is this where we should expect the Ukrainian raid?

The war in Donbass has been the opposite of a modern war: trenches and an urban battle longer than that of Stalingrad. The meaning of the stubborn – and failed – defense of Bakhmutencara is not clear. Everyone said that they had worn out the enemy forces there, but the human cost may have been greater for Ukraine, especially considering – as bad as it sounds – that Russia mainly occupied Wagner Group mercenaries accompanied by ex-prisoners.

The Ukrainians are now expected to prioritize a type of intelligent war (mosaic, according to the doctrine and terminology of the Pentagon), which involves more mobility and the use of technology - rapid and coordinated control of data, in addition to projectiles of precision and long range – over firepower, a factor in which Russia, with its industrial capacity, has an advantage. This includes a consistent use of drones, in the absence of combat aircraft to cover the offensive in the traditional style. Unless there are surprises, the announced supply of F-16s is not expected this time.

On the other side of the lines, it would be naive to think that Russia has not had time to correct mistakes, retool and prepare a long-term strategy after believing that time is running on its side. In this sense, the criticism of Wagner's boss, Yevgeny Prigozhin, to the Russian Ministry of Defense as if it were inhabited by useless people must be taken as pure trompe-l'oeil.