What is the true identity of the Catalans?

Five years after the events of 2017, the identity wounds of Catalans heal faster than political antagonisms might suggest.

Thomas Osborne
Thomas Osborne
09 March 2023 Thursday 22:28
17 Reads
What is the true identity of the Catalans?

Five years after the events of 2017, the identity wounds of Catalans heal faster than political antagonisms might suggest. Faster even than the polls suggest. At first glance, and according to the latest sociopolitical survey by the CEO, the citizens of Catalonia fall into two groups: 77% who feel proud of being Catalan and 55% who feel the same way for being Spanish. In parallel, 41% do not feel proud to be Spanish.

However, 77 plus 55 equals more than a hundred (132 to be exact), which means that there are overlapping identities (which is nothing new). And in this case, the figures also suggest that identity pride also overlaps and, therefore, territorial antagonisms are less than what partisan struggles or digital sewers sometimes suggest.

It is true that one in five citizens of Catalonia (19%) does not feel proud of being Catalan. And it is also significant that four out of ten Catalans do not feel proud of being Spanish. These figures are the inevitable consequence of the wounds of the process. However, the innards of the survey make it possible to more accurately measure shared identities and detect meeting spaces.

A statistical exploitation of the CEO survey carried out by the political scientist and ICPS associate researcher, Oriol Bartomeus, offers a more nuanced image of the Catalan identity map. When crossing the data, it turns out that the largest group (up to 41% of those consulted) is that of those who feel very or quite proud of being Catalan and Spanish. In other words, these are those who consider both expressions of identity pride compatible and who support the link between Catalonia and the rest of Spain.

Next comes the group of those who only feel proud of being Catalan (39%). It is a relevant figure due to its exclusive nature, but apart from that feature, it is not so unusual, since the survey was carried out in Catalonia and not in Greenland. And in this sense, it would be necessary to see the indicators that other Spanish communities register on the respective autochthonous pride. Finally, only 8% of Catalans feel only proud of being Spanish and a similar number do not feel any pride in one identity or another.

Conclusion: an intelligent political management of the Catalan conflict that moves away from the miseries of partisan calculation can expand the meeting spaces in Catalonia. On the one hand, Catalan is very present (close to 50%) in the most Spanish electorate (Vox, PP and Ciudadanos voters who are also proud to be Catalan). The pending issue is in the independence space, where only one in five voters for Esquerra, and one in ten for Junts, confess to feeling proud to be Spanish.

It does not seem easy to balance these figures in view of the emotional atmosphere generated by some political forces of one sign or another. But the parties can modulate their speeches and drag their voters to more temperate positions. Of course, not all formations can become "bridge parties" and make more than 70% of their voters feel simultaneously proud to be Catalan (76%) and Spanish (85%). However, "politics is pedagogy" and there is always room to nurture a climate of reunion that benefits both Catalonia and Spain as a whole.