The Kremlin appropriately chose the day to release statements by its Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, generating headlines around the world by saying that Russia will expand its military objectives in Ukraine as the West supplies Kyiv with long-range weapons. The German Foreign Minister, Annalena Baerbock, was not wrong in stating that “it is just new propaganda on the Russian side”. Indeed, the Russian army has been in the regions mentioned by Lavrov, Kherson and Zaporiya, since the beginning of the invasion, so there was nothing new. But the Russian message – which always adapts to the moment – was clear: the war will be long, prepare yourself. The chosen day was the vote on the confidence motion on the management of Prime Minister Mario Draghi in Italy, last Wednesday.
On Thursday, Draghi, who had stood alone in his defense of military support for Ukraine, resigned and the Italian Parliament was dissolved, but the Russian NordStream gas pipeline returned to pumping gas up to 40% of its capacity. Italy went from receiving 21 million cubic meters of gas per day to receiving 36 million.
Of course, Ukraine has not been the decisive factor in the fall of Mario Draghi, but it has been one of them. This war has enormous potential both to dismember the European Union and to strengthen it. To choose.
The Italian crisis finds the two most conflictive and rebellious members of the EU on opposing sides. Poland maintains the most belligerent attitude towards Russia, with a great difference with respect to the rest of the partners except for the three Baltic republics. Hungary, on the other hand, barely manages to hide her sympathy for Russia; And it is not just a question of his energy dependence: Viktor Orbán defends the same ultraconservative moral postulates as Putin, giving himself the paradox that they also prevail in Poland; and of course in the European extreme right in general.
Between one extreme and the other there is a range of variable positions. If in general the eastern states can now say that they were right to warn of Russia and rush to join NATO, in some cases the economic impact of the war has schizophrenic effects. The Czech Republic and Slovakia, which strongly support Ukraine, had to request exceptions within the EU to the blockade on imports of Russian oil at least until the end of the year, a date on which the most optimistic (or naive?) the end of the war. Slovakia has been included this week in the Kremlin's list of “hostile countries”.
The latest Eurobarometer, published in June, shows that 58% of Europeans do not feel ready to assume an increase in the price of energy and 59%, an increase in the price of food as a result of the war. 40% affirm that their quality of life has decreased and will continue to do so in 2023, a percentage that increases a lot in countries such as Portugal or Bulgaria and that, on the other hand, is minimal in Finland and Sweden, precisely the two new candidates to join NATO .
The Russian message also came to say, in a provocative key, to tighten the rope: we are moving forward, so do not try to propose a negotiated solution again. That has already been tried, and the Italian Government itself took part in the attempt, by the way. But now Mario Draghi was going against it in the country most characterized by the so-called Russia understanding, an intellectual tendency to understand Russia's motives in its old struggle with the West.
In a survey by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) carried out in May in ten countries on who put up greater obstacles to peace, Russia or the Western bloc (Ukraine, the EU or the United States, together or separately), the Italians they were clearly distinguished: 39% pointed to Russia and 35% to the others.
France and Germany are the other two major countries most likely to compromise with Moscow. On the one hand, President Emmanuel Macron – a frustrated negotiator on behalf of the EU on the eve of the invasion of Ukraine – has defended the need to leave Vladimir Putin a dignified way out of this war. On the other hand, in Germany the bulk of the political spectrum – Social Democrats, Christian Democrats, Greens... – is for a negotiated solution (which would inevitably have a territorial cost for Ukraine) rather than making Russia pay for its aggression. So are the far-rightists of the Alternative for Germany (AfD), which defends the lifting of sanctions on Moscow and of which Chancellor Scholz has said that "it is the party of Russia". AfD is the fifth parliamentary force in Germany.
In Italy, although the majority of the electorate is for a peace that would imply concessions, for Russia among the voters of the League and the neo-fascist (although not Russophile) Brothers of Italy party this support was 60% in May. It should also be remembered that the leader of the League, Matteo Salvini, is a notorious supporter of Putin, as is Silvio Berlusconi, who, together with him, was in charge of overthrowing Draghi.
And the same as Marine Le Pen, who for years has cultivated Russian backing. His formation, National Rally, managed last month to jump from eight deputies to 89 in the French legislative elections, becoming the second force in the National Assembly. Le Pen herself obtained 41% in the second round of the presidential elections, in April.
European support for Ukraine may cool to the extent that the war drags on – which Putin seems to be willing to do – as long as the effects of the sanctions on Moscow are not appreciated and instead it is considered that they end up harming the economy of the citizens of the EU, which has been one of the weighty arguments for those who would prefer to deal with the Kremlin. Add to this the great reluctance to the European Commission's demand to reduce gas consumption by 15% (in the case of Spain).
This vision would take into account the following: Russia now sells less gas and oil but at a higher price; in fact, in five months of war it has multiplied by three what it would earn from gas exports during a single winter, according to the director of the International Energy Agency (IEA), Fatih Birol. The measures taken by the Government and the Russian Central Bank to support the economy have been surprisingly effective, the Russian opposition portal Meduza recently pointed out. So Putin can calculate that famine and recession may undermine public support for Ukraine in Europe and increase the desire for a negotiated settlement in his favor. It could even, says Fatih Birol, "give up gas revenues to gain political influence."
Two prestigious political scientists, the Bulgarian Iván Krástev and the British Mark Leonard, warned when analyzing the May ECFR survey that in the following months the Ukrainian cause could become a serious factor of division. Possibly, after the crisis in Italy this situation is closer. And the perspective that opens up is that the far-right, populist and Eurosceptic parties, in which President Putin is considered to have invested efforts, can obtain political gains. The recipe, both analysts point out, is "to present the conflict as a defensive fight against Russian aggression instead of talking about a Ukrainian victory and a Russian defeat." And that while taking seriously the danger of escalation.
