Three keys to understanding the CJEU ruling on the Llarena Euro-orders

The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in its ruling on the preliminary rulings of the investigating judge of the case of the process Pablo Llarena in relation to the Eurowarrant (ODE) against the former Minister Lluís Puig denied by the Belgian judicial authorities balances between two basic concepts.

Thomas Osborne
Thomas Osborne
31 January 2023 Tuesday 04:37
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Three keys to understanding the CJEU ruling on the Llarena Euro-orders

The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in its ruling on the preliminary rulings of the investigating judge of the case of the process Pablo Llarena in relation to the Eurowarrant (ODE) against the former Minister Lluís Puig denied by the Belgian judicial authorities balances between two basic concepts. On the one hand, the principles of trust and mutual recognition between the Member States that would be aimed at granting surrender as a general principle, and on the other hand, the fundamental right to a fair trial, which would be aimed at protecting the defendants.

In summary, the court agrees with Llarena in general but is sensitive to the defenses' allegations, thus this process remains more open than what the European Union's general counsel, Richard de la Tour, suggested in July, who He pointed out that the Belgian justice system exceeded its functions and clearly aligned itself with the theses of the Supreme Court magistrate. The European High Court has come to qualify that opinion.

In general terms, the CJEU rules that the Belgian authorities cannot refuse to execute an EAW based on a reason that derives exclusively from their own Law, since if so, the Framework Decision, which regulates these deliveries, would not be applied uniformly and Member States could freely determine the scope of the obligation to implement them. In addition, the CJEU dictates that the Belgian authorities cannot deny the delivery on the grounds that it has been issued by a judicial authority that was not competent.

These two issues were two of the key questions that the examining magistrate of the process posed to the European High Court when the Belgian justice denied the delivery of Puig due to the lack of competence of the Supreme Court to issue the ODE and prosecute the facts, which led to the magistrate to paralyze the Euro-orders until they are resolved. The fact is that these reasons are not explicitly included in the aforementioned Framework Decision.

The CJEU points out that a refusal of a Eurowarrant must be of an exceptional nature. And here the CJEU introduces the reason for that exception: "when that execution would give rise to the violation of a fundamental right enshrined in Union Law". And it specifies that if, when the person sought alleges that his surrender would expose him to a violation of the fundamental right to a fair trial, because in Spain he would be prosecuted by a court lacking jurisdiction, the Belgian courts must assess the merits of said allegation.

Thus, the CJEU concludes that the Belgian courts may only deny enforcement on the grounds of the court's lack of jurisdiction if they conclude that there are "systemic or widespread deficiencies" in the functioning of the judicial system of the issuing State or "deficiencies affecting to the judicial protection of an objectively identifiable group of persons to which the person concerned belongs" and "there are serious and well-founded reasons to believe that said person will run such a risk if handed over to that Member State".

The Court of Justice also admits the refusal of the ODE due to lack of competence of the court that will prosecute the person (in this case the Supreme Court) only if this is "manifest". In this case, it warns that the decision must be preceded by a prior request for complementary information to the Supreme Court. Otherwise, you oppose the refusal of the ODE.

The ruling of the High Court also refers to the report of the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention on those convicted of the process, about which Llarena was asking, and points out that by not referring directly to the situation of the person to deliver this , by itself, does not justify the denial of the ODE. However, it maintains that it can be taken into account for the purposes of assessing "systemic or general deficiencies in the functioning of the judicial system" of the issuing state or deficiencies that affect the "judicial protection of an objectively identifiable group of people."

Both the aforementioned report and the risks of violation of rights to a fair trial due to deficiencies in the Spanish judicial system such as the fact that the defendants belong to a national minority, have been repeated arguments of the defenses that have found shelter in the text of the CJEU.

The CJEU declares that several successive EWAs may be issued against a wanted person in order to obtain their surrender by a Member State after that State has refused to execute a first EWA directed against that person. However, -warns the court- the execution of the new ODE must not give rise to a violation of the fundamental rights of said person and its issuance must be "proportionate".

The defendants' defenses understand that the notice on the proportionality of the new Euro-orders limits Llarena's ability to issue them again.