The new NATO Strategic Concept

In the new Strategic Concept (SC), adopted by the NATO summit held at the end of June in Madrid, Russia is considered, as the first great novelty, "a significant and direct threat" for its "brutal aggression" against Ukraine.

Thomas Osborne
Thomas Osborne
01 September 2022 Thursday 18:46
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The new NATO Strategic Concept

In the new Strategic Concept (SC), adopted by the NATO summit held at the end of June in Madrid, Russia is considered, as the first great novelty, "a significant and direct threat" for its "brutal aggression" against Ukraine. The previous Lisbon EC (2010), on the contrary, declared itself in favor of “a true strategic partnership between NATO and Russia”. With the first war in Ukraine (2014), the cooperation between NATO and Russia ended.

The second great novelty of the new CE has been the mention of China, absent from the previous one. It is considered a “challenge to our interests, security and values”.

Brzezinski, an adviser to Carter, said that the worst possible scenario for the United States was an alliance between Russia and China. Half a century ago, with his visit to Mao in February 1972, Nixon launched a “quasi-alliance”, in Kissinger's words, between the United States and China against the USSR. Today the "quasi-alliance" is between Russia and China against the United States.

With the successive enlargements of NATO, plus the opening of its doors to Ukraine and Georgia, along with the Alliance's military operations against Serbia and Afghanistan, Russia was pushed into the arms of China. This, in turn, became closer to Russia as a reaction against the economic and technological war initiated by Trump against it, continued by Biden, who is also trying to create a kind of NATO of the Pacific to contain China.

Added to the geostrategic considerations is Putin's desire to avoid the subversive effect that a consolidated democracy in Ukraine would have on his autocratic regime.

The war in Ukraine makes Europe much more dependent on the United States. For Washington, stopping China's rise is the top priority, and the war in Ukraine helps it engage Europe in that effort. Until now, Europe, invoking its "strategic autonomy" and offering itself as a "moderating power", has resisted. According to Josep Borrell, “so that the European Union does not remain imprisoned in the conflict between the United States and China, it has to act in its own way”, alluding to the Frank Sinatra song My way.

Macron recently declared that “Russia cannot be humiliated”. He understands that if Putin were cornered in Ukraine, a scenario could open up that would lead to the “end of history”. And that without a modus vivendi with Russia, Europe's "strategic autonomy" is hardly attainable. That is why he and Scholz traveled to Kyiv and Moscow on the eve of the war, in an attempt to prevent it. Zelensky did not accept the neutralization then, but a few weeks later he not only did so, but stated that he had understood long ago that Ukraine would not be admitted to NATO, the essential demand of Russia. That is to say, when he received the visit from Macron and Scholz he already knew it. Why then did he not tell his European visitors, or directly to Putin?

The EC adds that NATO is "open to constructive interaction with China." Time will tell what remains of Europe's "strategic autonomy". China will be the test of the nine.

The Financial Times published a real lesson in its May 31 editorial: “The brutal war in Ukraine should focus minds on China and the US-led West. If diplomacy does not prevail, the Indo-Pacific could become as combustible as Ukraine today."