Analyzing the future, we only see two major military moves possible for Russia now that the mobilization of 300,000 reservists will add at least 150,000 useful soldiers to its army, a number higher than the total that went into action last February.
The goal, then, was not to start a war but to end it with quick victory predicted by both Russian and American intelligence, both equally intoxicated by the false promise of a "post-kinetic" war that would combine electronic propaganda and deception with cyberattacks against everything from military barracks to civilian infrastructure. Generals who had never fought against patriotic Europeans but only against confessional groups in the Middle East (if they had), who considered tanks antiquated, and who harbored boundless respect for "information warfare," had a decisive influence on completely misguided intelligence estimates that misled Biden and Putin with fatal effect; and it is that the offer made by Biden to evacuate Zelensky, which was reported instantly, encouraged Putin's behavior. (It is not without justice that, while the top officials of the Russian Federal Security Service have been severely punished, in the United States the head of National Intelligence continues today in his position.)
After an initial failure that became apparent very soon, when the huge armored column that appeared in all the satellite photos got stuck unable to head for Kyiv (and gave rise to images of overwhelming force in terms of the theory of the information war), Putin actually had two perfectly viable options.
Order a withdrawal, which was politically feasible because the low-level war had been going on for years and it could all have been presented as an exercise in intimidation.
Or, on the contrary, declare war, mobilize the armed forces and invade Ukraine in earnest. The swift invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 was carried out with 800,000 soldiers; and that number was the minimum possible to invade the Ukraine, a country several times the size. However, at first the number of Russian soldiers did not exceed 150,000, including military dentists and similar personnel.
Rather than choose between withdrawal or an all-out offensive, Putin and his mediocre advisers just tried things out, from launching as many missiles as possible against Kyiv and other cities (including anti-aircraft missiles, with small warheads) to an attempt to conquer Odessa via the industrial city of Mykolaiv, where shipyard workers enacted in real life a favorite subject of Soviet propaganda: crowds of workers pouring out of the factories to fight the enemy with all available weapons.
This was followed largely by a withdrawal of Russian forces, abandoning the easily won territories around Kharkov and north of Kyiv. Putin's goal then appeared to be to hold on to the entire south, including the Kherson and Zaporizhia provinces, as well as Donetsk and Luhansk.
Since he had not declared war, which would have allowed him to mobilize the army (but send 18-19 year old recruits to the front and have their mothers at the Kremlin gates), Putin tried everything else, from units made up of recruited soldiers from the backward, non-Russian reaches of Siberia and the Caucasus to Wagner's collection of bandits and former convicts, before deciding to take the political risk of calling up 300,000 reservists.
It is these troops (or rather the actual number that ends up being, minus those who are discharged for health reasons during refresher training) that now provide the forces that Putin can send into action, in one of two ways. possible ways.
The new soldiers could be used to continue fighting the old way, which at this point in the war means continuing to try to drive the last Ukrainian forces out of the two disputed regions of Donetsk and Lugansk.
This is a goal already largely achieved today: the Russians are advancing on the village of Bilohorivka, the last part of the Lugansk region still in Ukrainian hands, and on the city of Bakhmut, the last part of Donetsk still held by Ukrainian forces.
It is possible (or, at least, "not impossible") that Putin is now trying to sing victory in a disastrous war and offer the cession of the parts of Zaporiyia and Jerson that remain under Russian control in exchange for Ukraine giving up Donetsk and Lugansk , the two regions, in fact, with higher proportion of Russophones and strong popular resistance to Ukrainian domination.
Of course, Zelensky would also have to be willing to negotiate and, aside from his expressed refusal to any territorial cession (including that of Crimea), it is not clear that he has the authority to negotiate territorial concessions.
And, if that point were to be reached, then the reality of Ukraine's limited sovereignty would become apparent to settle the issue. The country today depends on the United States and its closest allies for its survival; and the United States, in turn, must go hand in hand with the major European governments, which would undoubtedly demand an end to the war. The cession could even acquire democratic legitimacy with duly supervised plebiscites in the two disputed regions.
But Putin also has another path before him: let the Donetsk and Luhansk regional troops, units of contract soldiers and Wagner's mercenaries continue to push the Ukrainians back little by little and, with the new reservist units, their revamped eight-wheeled troop transports, their self-propelled artillery and main battle tanks, launch a new offensive from Belarus that could completely change the terms of the war.
Instead of continuing to engage in frontal combat with heavy casualties, the Russian columns could push from Belarus through east-central Ukraine towards Korosten and Zhytomyr until they reached Vinnitsia, a part of the country that has seen no fighting and where there is very little. Ukrainian soldiers and the flat terrain does not present any obstacles.
With this, the Russians would cut off all roads and rail lines carrying weapons, ammunition and civilian supplies from Warsaw, Berlin, Prague and the rest of the West to Kyiv, Odessa and all of the south and east of the country (except for the few shipments made by air).
If the Russian military is able to pull it off, it would in itself be an operational success restoring some of its lost reputation; and, of course, the same would be true of Putin, not necessarily a bad thing if he allows him to negotiate an end to the fighting.
Yes, negotiate, because actually cutting the roads and rail lines with the West would not open the way to a military victory. To be sure, the Russian columns could head east towards the Kyiv area, but once there they would be destroyed in a second fast-motion Stalingrad: Kyiv and environs today are full of determined fighters well equipped with anti-tank weapons and other types, and columns of eight-wheeled personnel carriers are most vulnerable in urban areas.
Now, an operational-level victory that allows the Russians to position themselves on critical supply lines to the Ukrainians could open the way to a diplomatic solution. Yes, the diplomatic solution, because there is only one: the holding of internationally supervised plebiscites in Donetsk and Lugansk in exchange for Russian withdrawal from all other areas in the south and south-east and, of course, an end to all fighting. From day one, that has been the only way out of the burning house of war, and it still is.
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Translation: Juan Gabriel López Guix
