Each new anniversary reinforces, with more arguments if possible, the same conclusion: the war in Iraq did not contribute to improving the situation in the country, quite the contrary.
None of the objectives announced to justify Operation Iraqi Freedom have been met. The country has not disarmed the supposed arsenal of mass destruction since the argument was false. Nor did the alleged collusion between the Iraqi dictator and Al Qaeda end, since there was no evidence that said cooperation existed. As for the project of making Iraq a model of a democratic State for the region, we have never been so far from this scenario. Two falsehoods and a resounding failure. The legacy of that war is a country sunk in political instability, while sectarian violence, foreign interference and corruption make change impossible.
In political terms, the system of sharing power among the country's ethnic and religious communities marginalized Sunnis, allowed the Iraqi insurgency to take root in society, and opened a hellish cycle of sectarian violence in the country. Jihadist groups took extensive advantage of the marginalization of Sunnis to the point that, without the invasion of Iraq, it is likely that Islamic State would never have existed. On the other hand, sectarianism plunged the country into permanent political instability as it has prompted political officials to give priority to the ethnic or religious group they represent and not to the Iraqi nation as such. Hence, the main demand, which was manifested in the 2019 protests, was to put an end to the sectarianization of politics.
Two other indirect consequences of the invasion make change difficult: on the one hand, Iran took advantage of sectarianism in Iraq, where the majority of the population is Shiite, to expand its influence and interfere in internal affairs. On the other hand, the power vacuum after the collapse of the Iraqi regime and the subsequent insurgency favored the irruption of some 80 militias whose power is superior to that of the Iraqi army, as demonstrated by the clashes between the Shiite militias and the armed forces in summer.
At the regional level, the intervention of March 2003, contrary to the principles of the United Nations Charter, seems to have normalized the use of military force as a means of resolving certain conflicts. NATO intervened in Libya to free the people from the dictatorship. This intervention plunged the country into civil war and destabilized the Sahel. The latest example is Mali and the military failure of a France in retreat. It is a startling paradox: even though these interventions have worsened the situation in these countries, military force continues to be used to achieve political change. These precedents also allow other regional powers to use Iraq, Libya, Syria and Yemen as an arena for direct or indirect confrontation.
While those responsible for these wars go unpunished, the populations suffer the consequences of this vicious circle. Civilians who have died in the region number in the millions, while the number of refugees and internally displaced persons exceeds tens of millions. The discredit of the West, which is accused of using the promotion of democracy as a pretext to defend its interests, has not stopped growing in the region. In this context, it is at least incomprehensible that, once again, there are voices being raised in Washington and Tel Aviv encouraging a military intervention in Iran. As if these twenty continuous years of regional instability have not left enough evidence of the failure of the neoconservative doctrine that led to that war.
